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Preface 
The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board (the Board) received funding 
from the Commonwealth Market-Based Instruments (MBI) Pilot Program to develop 
an auction approach for funding watercourse and riparian zone restoration and 
protection activities. The BushTender process in Victoria has demonstrated the ability 
of these approaches to increase the cost effectiveness of cost sharing funds for 
natural resource management. This report is a description of Catchment Care - an 
auction process that enables the scoring, evaluating, ranking and selecting bids for 
funds for environmental restoration and protection works in the Onkaparinga 
catchment in South Australia. Catchment Care borrows from the BushTender 
process and reinvents it in the context of riparian and catchment restoration and 
protection. 
A project team from the Policy and Economics Research Unit of CSIRO Land and 
Water was contracted to work with the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management 
Board in developing the project. This report describes the Catchment Care auction 
process and its implementation in an actual trial in the Onkaparinga catchment in 
South Australia.  
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Executive Summary 
This report describes the design, development and trial of Catchment Care. 
Catchment Care is an auction-based system which aims to increase the cost 
effectiveness of funds for private on-ground natural resource management (NRM) 
actions distributed by the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board (the 
Board). Catchment Care is a first-price sealed bid procurement auction where the 
Board purchases the most cost effective on-ground NRM works by landholders. A 
risk analysis framework is developed to score, rank and select bids that offer the 
greatest benefits for biodiversity and water quality for the limited amount of funding 
available.  
The Catchment Care process begins by advertising the availability of funds for 
private on-ground works which is designed to generate a competitive market for 
natural resource management contracts. Interested landholders are sent detailed 
information about all aspects of the auction process and best practice NRM 
techniques. The level of information supplied allows landholders to make an informed 
bid and address Board priorities but does not give enough information provide a 
basis for rent seeking. Proposed sites are assessed in the field and specific 
environmental value and threat characters associated with the geomorphology, 
hydrology and remnant vegetation are scored. Based on discussion with field officers, 
landholders propose certain environmental restoration and protection actions to 
reduce specific threats acting upon the site. Landholder actions are described and 
priced in a Site Action Plan and submitted as a competitive bid.  
Bids are then assessed, ranked, selected, and contracted by the Board. Bid selection 
begins by calculating the risk of the site as the environmental value multiplied by 
threat. The impact of proposed landholder actions is calculated as the risk of the site 
multiplied by the level of threat reduction expected by proposed actions. An 
environmental benefit score is then calculated for each bid by multiplying the impact 
of each proposal by the area over which the action is conducted. Cost effectiveness 
of each bid is then calculated by dividing the environmental benefits by the price. 
Bids are then ranked according to cost effectiveness and the most cost effective bids 
are selected for funding until the funds are exhausted or the reserve price is reached. 
Landholders are then contracted to perform the proposed actions and a milestone-
based payment scheme is devised. 
The bid scoring and risk analysis framework of Catchment Care was tested by Monte 
Carlo simulation and refined before going to trial. Following this a full trial of the 
auction system was run in the Onkaparinga catchment. A total of 52 expressions of 
interest were received, 42 site assessments were made and 29 bids were submitted. 
A total funding limit of $150,000 was set resulting in the funding of the 17 most cost 
effective bids. 
To assist agencies considering moving from a devolved grant scheme to an auction 
system for distributing funds for on-ground works, we estimate that the minimum cost 
of doing so is around $100,000 not including funding costs. The cost effectiveness of 
Catchment Care is compared against the Board’s previous Watercourse 
Management and Assistance Program (WMAP) based on historical data on prices 
paid for landholder actions. Considering both implementation and funding costs we 
estimate that Catchment Care is between 23 and 34% more cost effective than 
WMAP although this estimate is subject to some uncertainty. Depending on the  
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amounts of funding distributed the upfront development costs of an auction would be 
quickly recouped through increased efficiency. 
Despite the overall improvement in cost effectiveness of the auction system, there 
are advantages and limitations of both programs. The auction enables landholders 
who are able to supply environmental benefits very cheaply to do so. However, the 
more expensive environmental benefits are lost to the system. Whilst the negotiation 
and leverage ability inherent to WMAP enables access to higher priced 
environmental benefits, the total environmental benefits gained from these higher 
priced bids are limited. 
Significant learnings were made about many aspects of the auction system and many 
areas have been identified for improvement. There is substantial interest in another 
trial over the larger Mt. Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide NRM region. Before this 
occurs there is a need for substantial modification and refinement of the processes 
and protocols and for enhanced sophistication of the site assessment characters. 
There is potential to add a series of regional scale characters according to 
conservation planning principles and to directly map auction priorities to regional 
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1 Introduction 
Development in many regions in Australia and elsewhere for agriculture and other 
productive and extractive land uses has led to the degradation of the natural 
environment. This usually takes the form of reductions in biodiversity, poor water 
quality through salinity, nutrients and turbidity, problems with erosion, air quality and 
a raft of other impacts. Active management of the environment and natural resources 
is required in many regions to slow, stop and reverse these trends. 
However, many of the environmental problems occur on private land. Hence, the 
responsibility to take action and the cost of these actions falls on private individuals. 
Conversely, the benefits of environmental and natural resource management actions 
are largely public. Improvements in water and air quality, and increases in 
biodiversity are enjoyed by the wider community. The community however, does not 
help bear the cost. Incentives are required to motivate individuals and groups to 
undertake natural resource management actions on private land. 
Natural resource management in Australia has become increasingly regional in focus 
and administration since the advent of major national programs such as the National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. Regional agencies such as the Catchment 
Management Authorities, Catchment Water Management Boards and Natural 
Resource Management Groups carry most of the responsibility for natural resource 
management in the regions. Devolved grant schemes are the most common 
incentive mechanism used to encourage NRM actions on private land by these 
regionally-based natural resource management agencies and also some state 
government agencies.  
Devolved grant schemes involve payments to landholders for agreed NRM actions 
such as revegetation, vegetation management including weed removal and stock 
exclusion, and erosion control amongst others. There is usually some level of cost 
sharing involved with private individuals making financial and in-kind contributions. 
Rarely is the most basic form of devolved grant schemes – the first-come-first-served 
approach, still used for distributing funds for on-ground works. Schemes have often 
evolved from this and commonly include modifications such as the payment of 
standard capped amounts by the agency for specific actions (e.g. $5 per linear metre 
of fencing) and some form of discrimination between funding applicants. However, 
significant attention has recently been paid to developing market-based instruments 
(MBIs) for encouraging natural resource management actions on private land. 
The National MBI Pilots Program classifies MBIs into 3 categories: price-based, 
quantity-based, and market friction. Tendering-, or auction-based approaches to the 
distribution of funds for private on-ground natural resource management actions are 
classified as price-based instruments. Auctions for conservation contracts have been 
found to result in significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of these funds 
(Stoneham et al. 2003). In this National MBI pilot Program we develop an auction 
system called Catchment Care for the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management 
Board (the Board) to enhance the cost-effectiveness of public funds used to 
encourage on-ground natural resource management actions by private landholders. 
The Board has responsibilities for the management of water resources in the 
Onkaparinga catchment and a number of adjacent smaller catchments which flow 
into the Gulf St. Vincent. To provide incentives for private on-ground works, the  
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Board has developed a modified devolved grant scheme to distribute public funds. 
This program has involved significant public education and engagement activities.  
The Board has now effectively engaged the community in its work programs to the 
extent where demand from landholders for on-ground works funding exceeds the 
funds available. There is a need for a transparent, quantitative and defensible 
method for differentiation of funding applications for on-ground NRM works from 
landholders. Market-based instruments such as discriminative price auctions for 
conservation contracts can potentially meet this need. Discriminative price auctions 
may also enhance the cost effectiveness of NRM funds as they are designed to 
reveal information about the minimum price landholders are willing to accept for 
conducting on-ground works.  
The aim of this MBI pilot project is to develop the Catchment Care auction system for 
natural resource management contracts to enhance the environmental benefits from 
publicly funded on-ground works by private landholders. The auction system aims to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of funds for on-ground works and provides a 
systematic and transparent means of selecting bids that propose high priority natural 
resource management actions in high priority sites. The Catchment Care auction 
system is designed such that it enables the ranking and selection of bids based on 
the environmental risk of the proposed sites, the reduction in threats achieved by 
proposed landholder actions, the area addressed by landholder actions, and the 
amount of funding sought for the actions. The bids that offer the most cost effective 
environmental benefits are selected for funding. This report describes the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of the auction system. 
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2 Market-Based Instruments and NRM  
Taking an economic perspective, natural resource management involves the 
implementation of institutional arrangements that enable the efficient allocation of 
resources. Inefficiencies result when the outcomes of individuals acting in their own 
private interest diverge from what would happen if individuals acted collectively to 
maximise the benefits to society as a whole. The outcome of this divergence is 
termed market failure. Thus, although there seems to be a public demand for 
environmental goods and services resulting from a healthy environment, the market 
for these goods and services is not sufficiently well developed to facilitate a healthy 
environment. Market failure generally results from inadequate institutional 
arrangements or from poorly defined property rights. Murtough et al. (2002) list 5 
general reasons why markets may not exist: 
•  large transaction costs;   
•  high uncertainty about the attributes of a good or service; 
•  asymmetric information (sellers are much better informed than buyers, or vice 
versa); 
•  few buyers and sellers; or 
•  ownership cannot be defined and enforced, or it is very costly to do so. 
Natural resource management focuses on improving the efficiency of resource use 
by improving institutional arrangements and/or property rights through the design and 
implementation of environmental policy instruments (ABARE 2001). The natural 
resource management situation in the Onkaparinga catchment is representative of 
much of the developed landscapes of Australia. Environmental degradation has 
occurred because private interests have used natural resources (e.g. cleared and 
developed land, captured runoff) for private economic gains. Market failure has 
occurred because there has been no market for ecosystem services from aquatic and 
terrestrial biodiversity, and in-stream water quality and quantity to balance up private 
demand for natural resources with public demand. There are few incentives for 
private individuals to engage in natural resource management actions which incur a 
private cost (e.g. fencing off stock, revegetation) but have a largely public benefit 
(e.g. for biodiversity, water quality).  
A wide range of policy instruments exist for rectifying the problem of market failure 
and encouraging natural resource management. These policy instruments cover the 
full spectrum of levels of intervention ranging from command and control policies to 
economic or market-based instruments. ABARE (2001) classify policy options into 5 
headings. Below they are listed in order of decreasing levels of intervention:  
• Regulatory  measures; 
•  Property right solutions; 
• Suasive  measures; 
•  Provision of information; 
• Economic  or  market-based instruments. 
Regulatory measures are a quintessential command and control policy instrument 
and involve the implementation of controls on resource use or emissions combined  
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with compliance monitoring and penalties for non-compliance (ABARE 2001). Well 
defined property rights are those where the entitlements to the use of a resource are 
known and enforced and the rights are secure and transferable. Importantly, well 
defined property rights also ensure that all benefits and costs of the use of the 
resource accrue to the holder of the property right (ABARE 2001). Incentives can be 
used to encourage the sustainable management of natural resources when resource 
users are responsible for the full costs of resource use, including environmental 
degradation or externalities. 
Suasive measures and provision of information can address market failure by 
increasing the awareness of the full costs and benefits of the actions of individuals 
acting in their own private interest. Information provision may enhance natural 
resource management if individuals are more aware of the public cost of land 
management actions. Suasive measures may also include negotiation, social 
pressure and threat of regulatory actions as well as other measures.  
Economic or market-based instruments encourage behaviour through market 
incentives rather than through explicitly specified regulation and enforcement 
(Stavins 2001). Market-based instruments attempt to harness market forces by 
encouraging actions by private individuals and firms in their own interest, and these 
actions also contribute to the best environmental outcomes for society as a whole. 
They do this by incorporating into market signals some or all of the costs of resource 
use, including environmental degradation (see Hahn 1989, Bright et al. 2002, Connor 
and Hatton Macdonald 2002, Sterner 2003). 
Market-based instruments can be either price or quantity based. Price based 
instruments assign a price to environmental degradation or benefits within existing 
markets (ABARE 2001). Taxes, charges and subsidies can be implemented so that 
private interests who cause environmental degradation can pay for it. Alternatively, 
payments can be made to private interests who are willing to provide environmental 
benefits. Quantity based instruments create a market in the rights to engage in 
activities that cause environmental degradation by restricting the total permitted level 
of the activity or of the degradation in a region and thereby creating scarcity. Rights 
to engage in the activity are distributed and may be traded through a market 
mechanism (ABARE 2001). These instruments are often referred to as cap and trade 
or credit systems.  
There are many other issues to consider when choosing between policy instruments 
for an environmental outcome. Often, it may be appropriate that more than one 
instrument is used in a policy mix. Scheduling of instruments may also be important. 
In most circumstances, the transaction costs of administering policy instruments, 
monitoring requirements, and enforcement costs will affect the cost effectiveness of 
different policy options. Many other issues such as equity, acceptability, attitudes and 
information affect the design and success of policy instruments (Comerford 2004). 
In Australia, the National MBI Pilots Program, part of the National Action Plan for 
Salinity and Water Quality (see Section 3.2), has provided substantial impetus for 
research into MBIs to improve natural resource management. Prior to this, the use of 
MBIs for natural resource management was less common (NAP 2002). Many 
agencies across Australia and overseas have in place mechanisms for providing 
incentives to landholders to engage in a variety of natural resource management 
actions on private land. These usually take the form of a devolved grant scheme of 
some kind where landholders are paid to undertake NRM actions. Research into  
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MBIs for providing environmental services and natural resource management has 
seen significant advances in the design, development and implementation of market-
based instruments which are able to create markets for natural resource 
management and increase the cost effectiveness of NRM funds. 
Many countries including Australia are fast moving from environmental policy 
dominated by regulatory measures to so-called new environmental policy instruments 
(NEPIs) (Papadakis and Grant 2003). Two notable examples of MBIs implemented 
prior to the MBI Pilots Program in Australia include the BushTender trial in Victoria 
(Stoneham et al. 2003) and the NSW Environmental Services Scheme (NSW DPI 
2005). These are discussed in more detail later. As part of the MBI Pilots Program a 
range of market based instrument trials are occurring. Apart from the Catchment 
Care trial, these include the use of auctions, subsidies and grants, rebates, taxes, 
cap and trade systems, offsets, approaches to reduce uncertainty and risk, 
leveraging mechanisms, and product differentiation to provide incentives for natural 
resource management actions (Australian Government 2004).  
Advancement of MBIs for natural resource management in other countries is varied. 
Many different programs have been trialed in different types of socio-economic, 
cultural and environmental systems. These include the Conservation Reserve 
Program in the US (FSA 2005), the payment for environmental services in Central 
America (Herrador and DImas 2000, Zbinden and Lee 2005), MBIs and eco-labelling 
in Finland (Sairinen 2003). Other countries however, have been slower in the uptake 
of so-called new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) (Jordan et al. 2003; Flynn 
2003, Wurzel et al. 2003). 
Auctions for conservation contracts are a market-based policy instrument. In this 
study, we use an auction process to develop a market for natural resource 
management contracts to increase the provision of natural resource management 
actions. In the auction process, funds for natural resource management actions are 
made available and landholders are invited to bid for funds for supplying on-ground 
natural resource management works. The most competitive and cost effective bids 
are selected for funding until the funds are exhausted or perhaps, a reserve price is 
breached. Thereby, the auction process increases the cost effectiveness of NRM 
funds. 
2.1 Auctions and Auction Theory 
Wolfstetter (1994) defines auctions as “a bidding mechanism, defined by a set of 
auction rules that specify how the winner is determined and how much he has to 
pay”. Auctions are a market-based mechanism that provide buyers and sellers with a 
forum for the trade of goods and services with a structure or form which, if well 
designed, can result in the efficient allocation of resources. In the case of auctioning 
public resources such as conservation contracts, governments can achieve efficient 
resource allocation without prior knowledge of the value of the resource.  
Most people typically think of auctions involving a single seller and many buyers 
competing against one another to purchase a single item such as those used to sell 
real estate, antiques or art. In this section we provide a background to basic auction 
theory and design in terms of this most simple auction analogy of a single seller and 
many bidders. As will be discussed later, auctions for conservation contracts however 
are different in that the government agency (or in this case, the Board) is the buyer.  
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Landholders are sellers and submit bids proposing specific on-ground works at a 
nominated price. The bids offering the greatest value for money win conservation 
contracts (funding for on-ground works).  
Auction theory, including a full suite of mathematical underpinnings, has been well 
developed, originating with Vickrey’s (1961) seminal paper. Formal theory of auctions 
and bidder behaviour is necessary as intuitive assumptions are dangerous in 
environments as complex as auctions. Formal theory has been developed by taking a 
game theoretic approach. Recent reviews by Wolfstetter (1994) and Klemperer 
(1999) provide accessible introductions to auction theory and Chan et al. (2003) fills 
the gap between formal theoretical treatment and its application to the particular 
problem addressed in this study – the allocation of public resources. Much of the 
following synopsis of auctions and auction theory is taken from these sources. 
Auctions are generally one of two main types – selling or procurement. Selling 
auctions are where a seller interacts with many buyers (e.g. a real estate auction). 
Procurement auctions are where a buyer interacts with many sellers (e.g. an auction 
for conservation contracts) (Chan et al. 2003).  
There are four basic forms of auction: English, Dutch, first-price sealed bid and 
Vickrey. The two factors distinguishing these auction types are whether the bidding is 
open (or oral) or sealed (secret), and whether the price is ascending or descending. 
English auctions are ascending price open bid where the auctioneer seeks increasing 
bids cried out orally until all but the winning bidder are eliminated (Wolfstetter 1994). 
Dutch auctions are descending price open bid auctions where the auctioneer starts at 
a high price and calls out ever decreasing prices and the first bidder to claim the item 
is the winner. Similar to Dutch auctions are first-price sealed bid auctions when bids 
are submitted without the knowledge of other bidders and the highest bidder wins 
and pays their bid price. Vickrey auctions present yet another variation in that they 
are second-price sealed bid auctions where the winning bidder pays the price of the 
second highest bidder. The revenue equivalence theorem broadly states that on 
average, the four different auction forms produce the same price (Chan et al. 2003). 
Game theory, as applied to auctions, centres on the strategic decision-making by 
buyers and sellers in adversarial engagement within the auction environment. In this 
environment, sellers try to maximise revenue from the sale of goods and services 
whilst buyers try to maximise rent from privately held information about their 
willingness to pay for the goods and services (information rent). The selling price falls 
between the bidders’ highest valuation and the sellers’ cost of supply, enabling both 
the seller and the buyer to gain from the trade (Chan et al. 2003). Bidders adopt 
various strategies under each different form of auction and usually anticipate being 
able to win the auction at a price below their valuation.  
Advantages of auctions over other means of allocation of public resources include 
increased allocative efficiency, objectivity, transparency, and flexibility. Efficient 
allocation in an auction occurs when the auction is won by the highest bidder and 
when the value of the highest bidder reflects the true social value of the resource. 
Bidders who value a resource highly will usually be willing to pay a higher price for it. 
Auctions therefore have the potential to allocate resources to those most able to 
make best use of them. Auctions tend to be more objective because the market 
determines prices for resources rather than nominal pricing by governments. The 
auction process also tends to be more transparent as they are usually based on 
explicit rules for assessing and comparing bids (Chan et al. 2003). Auctions are also  
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flexible in that complex rule sets can be implemented that may help manage the risk 
of the seller amongst other things. 
Generally, the greater the number of bidders, the greater the competition for 
resources. Greater competition in an auction setting tends to increase the price of the 
resource and the efficiency of resource allocation (Chan et al. 2003). Under perfect 
competition where there are many sellers and many buyers and there is perfect 
access to information auctions are likely to maximise the allocative efficiency of 
resources. However, several factors can reduce the efficient allocation of resources 
at auction, especially the allocation of public resources. Whilst auctions have the 
potential to achieve efficient outcomes, they may also perform poorly depending on 
market conditions, bidder behaviour and auction design. The efficiency of auctions 
can be enhanced through clever design of the auction environment. 
2.2 Auction and Contract Design Issues 
Chan et al. (2003) discuss the characteristics of auctions and their implications for 
auction design. This discussion is summarised briefly below: 
•  Bidder valuation models 
•  Bidder attitude to risk 
• Reserve  prices 
• Bidder  Collusion 
• Bidder  participation 
• Information 
• Quality  Assurance 
• Multiple  items 
• Sequential  auctions 
2.2.1 Bidder Valuation Models 
A key characteristic of auctions is the presence of asymmetric information. Two 
different models are commonly used to describe this asymmetry. The simplest model 
is the private-value model where each bidder knows how much they value a resource 
but this information is private (i.e. it is not divulged to other bidders). In the common-
value model the value is the same for all bidders but each bidder has different 
information about what the value actually is (Klemperer 1999). Bidders attitudes to 
the risk resulting from uncertainty surrounding their valuation affect the auction 
outcomes for both models. From the perspective of the seller the key role of auctions 
is the revelation of the bidders true valuation. 
2.2.2 Bidder Attitude to Risk 
In the private value model bidders attitude to risk may be incorporated into their bid 
such that they maximise the expected gain from the auction. To achieve allocative  
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efficiency in the common-value model, bidders need to have the same attitudes to 
risk surrounding valuation uncertainty.  
The winners curse is another common problem in achieving allocation efficiency at 
auction. The winners curse occurs under the common value model when bidders pay 
too much for the resource as a result of overestimating the value of the resource. 
Bidders can avoid this by discounting their valuation. Auction design features can be 
used to minimise this phenomenon. Information disclosure of the potential value of 
the resource by the seller and using an open or English auction are 2 such ways the 
winners curse may be minimised (Chan et al. 2003).  
In addition to the above risk associated with winning the auction and the winners 
curse, there may also be risk associated with losing an auction. To minimise the risk 
of losing the auction bidders need to bid close to their valuation but not over it. This 
strategy increases the bidder’s chance of winning at the cost of a reduction in the 
gain from winning. In Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions especially, risk-averse 
bidders tend to bid more aggressively and raise the sellers pay-off (Wolfstetter 1994). 
2.2.3 Reserve Prices 
In selling auctions the goal of the seller is usually to maximise the expected revenue 
from the auction. In procurement auctions such as those for conservation contracts, 
the goal of the seller (the Board) is to maximise the environmental benefits achieved 
by public funds. One tool available to the seller that may be used to increase 
revenue/benefits is the reserve price – the minimum price acceptable for the sale of 
an item. Reserve prices should be set at or above the cost of the item to the seller. 
The reserve price encourages bidders to bid closer to their valuation due to the 
increased risk of losing the auction. In doing so, the reserve price reduces the 
information rent of the bidders. However, setting a high reserve price increases the 
risk to the seller of a no sale if the reserve price is set higher than the highest 
valuation. The seller needs to set an appropriate reserve price that increases 
competition without threatening the sale. However, the reserve price can also have 
the effect of discouraging bidder participation and thereby reducing competition 
(Chan et al. 2003). In the case of procurement auction, setting a reserve price can 
also protect the seller prom paying too high a price. In the case of an auction for 
conservation contracts, the reserve price is a maximum price (i.e. dollars per unit of 
environmental benefit) the buyer is prepared to pay landholders for on-ground works. 
2.2.4 Bidder Collusion 
Commonly referred to as auction rings (Wolfstetter 1994), bidder collusion can also 
reduce the allocative efficiency of auctions. Collusion is the co-operation of bidders to 
reduce competition and, in the case of auctions for conservation contracts, increase 
the price paid for landholder actions. Collusion may be explicit, based on a prior 
agreement, or implicit, occurring without any communication at all. Auctions with 
multiple bidding rounds and repeated auctions are more susceptible to collusion 
(Hailu and Schilizzi 2003, Masaki 2003). Design features used to combat collusion 
include (Chan et al. 2003): 
•  the use of high or secret reserve prices;  
•  adopting a secret allocation rule;  
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•  selling several items in one auction rather than several auctions, and; 
•  using a sealed bid in preference to open auction format. 
2.2.5 Bidder Participation 
Two main factors may discourage potential bidders from participating in an auction – 
the costs of participation, and strategic motives (Chan et al. 2003). Bidders may be 
discouraged from participating in an auction if the costs of participation are high. 
Participation costs may be broader than a non-refundable fee paid for entry into the 
auction. The costs of valuing resources and the cost of preparing bids are two other 
important costs that may inhibit bidder participation (Chan et al. 2003). Care must be 
taken in auction design to minimise participation costs and to encourage the largest 
number of bidders possible. 
Bidders may also use strategic behaviour to discourage other bidders from 
participating in an auction. The outcome of this is that with less competition, the 
bidder has a greater chance of winning the auction at a lower price. Sealed bid 
auctions can reduce this effect (Chan et al. 2003). 
2.2.6 Information 
Information is a central issue in auction theory. In the context of auctions for 
conservation contracts, auctions provide a mechanism for landholders to reveal 
information about the minimum price they would accept for providing natural resource 
management actions. This mechanism provides the basis for achieving efficient 
allocation of NRM funds. The information provision issue relates to how much 
information it should share with landholders about how bids will be prioritised.  
There is a risk involved with sharing too much information with bidders about the bid 
prioritisation process. If a landholder had enough information to realise which actions 
they can take rank as high priority to the agency administering the auction process, 
the landholder might be inclined to ask for a higher cost share than they would 
otherwise. Thus, a concern is that landholders will shade their bids or rent seek – that 
is, they will base their bids on what they believe the seller will pay rather than on the 
cost at which the bidder is willing to provide the works. 
In practice, it is difficult to know what component of a bid is information rent because, 
in the case of auctions for conservation contracts, the minimum cost at which a 
landholder is willing to provide services is private information. However, evaluation of 
the first round of the BushTender trial (Stoneham et al. 2003) did reveal that about 
5% of bids were very expensive. The least attractive 5% of bids offered 
environmental benefits between 4 and 40 times more expensive as the average of 
the 75% of bids offering best value. The very expensive bids were not accepted 
because the budget only happened be sufficient to cover about 80% of bids 
submitted. However, had the budget been higher or had more very expensive bids 
been submitted, there would have been nothing in the auction protocol that would 
have protected the seller from having to pay for some very expensive environmental 
benefits (Stoneham et al. 2003).  
Conceptually, a similar issue could arise in the Catchment Care auction process if 
adequate safeguards are not built in. If information is provided to landholders that  
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allows them to clearly understand precisely how proposed actions affect bid 
prioritisation, they could be inclined to inflate bids to levels well above their minimum 
price at which they are willing to do the NRM actions. Revealing information about 
the total amount of funding available could also lead to inflated bids. 
A reserve price can provide protection for the seller against rent seeking as 
discussed above. However, it will take a few runs of an auction scheme before the 
seller gets an idea of appropriate reserve prices for abstract environmental benefit 
scores. The best strategy is to set reserve prices ex post. In other words, within the 
bounds of legality and fairness, reserve prices may be set based on analysis of the 
submitted bids. 
Much of the economics literature related to auction design focuses on how 
information can create inefficiency because it allows rent seeking (Stoneham and 
Chaudhri, 2000). However, there is good reason to believe that in the case of on-
ground rehabilitation and protection works, there are likely to be significant benefits of 
providing information to landholders. Most landholders are not experts in riparian 
zone management for environmental goals. Thus, many landholders do not 
understand the locations on their property where it is most important to take action, or 
the kinds of actions that are most effective. 
Experience with the BushTender program in Victoria suggests that landholders may 
well be more likely to take action when they are advised personally in site visits about 
how they can most effectively act to improve the ecological health of their property. 
Over 75% of landholders who received site visits in the BushTender trials submitted 
bids (Stoneham et al. 2003). Evaluation of BushTender trial results showed that 
many offered to provide services at nominal cost (Stoneham et al. 2003).  
These results suggest (but do not prove) that simply understanding how they can 
effectively act provides impetus to some landholders to provide significant action with 
little cost sharing. Providing such landholders with less information about the 
ecological importance of their property could decrease their willingness to take action 
with minimal cost sharing. Thus, a fine balance is required in information provision 
such that landholders are sufficiently informed of the technical detail of restoration 
and protection works, but not sufficient information to provide a basis for rent 
seeking. 
2.2.7 Quality Assurance 
Auctions are competitive environments where bidders have an incentive to compete 
by offering to provide works at lower cost. In procurement auctions there is potential 
that winning bidders will not be able to provide the services they offer at the price that 
they agree to in their bid. In auctions for conservation contracts, some may bid low 
because they do not truly understand the scope of work involved. In addition, some 
of the work specified in bids may require specialised skill or training (e.g. herbicide 
application, establishment of native species). Thus, selecting bids on the basis of 
cost alone could in some instances lead to sub-optimal environmental outcomes. A 
higher cost bid by a more skilled landholder may, in some instances, lead to better 
outcome per dollar spent than a lower cost bid by a more skilled landholder. Quality 
assurance is a difficult issue with conservation contracts because it is impossible to 
measure the quality of environmental outcomes at the bid assessment stage. Rather, 
bids are based on the magnitude of inputs or actions. As a result, significant risk is  
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borne by the seller. Auction and contract design must include features that provide 
some assurance of quality outcomes (Chan et al. 2003). 
2.2.8 Multiple Items 
Multi-unit auctions are when the seller offers more than one unit for sale. Items can 
be identical or non-identical and can be complements or substitutes. In addition, 
bidders may also bid for multiple items. We will concentrate our discussion on 
identical substitute units. Chan et al. (2003) state that a multi-item auction achieves 
allocative efficiency if the items are allocated amongst bidders such that the greatest 
combined value is achieved. An important design problem is then to devise a 
mechanism that facilitates the allocation of items/resources so that the greatest 
combined value is achieved. In its simplest form, the way to ensure efficiency is by 
setting the reserve price to the sellers valuation and allocating the resources to the 
highest bidders. 
However, allocative efficiency may be reduced when multiple items are available. 
The more items available the more bidder demand is reduced. Bidders may 
strategically discount their bids as all they have to do is bid the highest price for the 
last item up for auction. Thus, bidders discount their bids in the knowledge that there 
are more items available and thereby the risk of not winning the auction is reduced in 
line with the number of items available. Bidders may also demand multiple units 
which increases the complexity of their bidding strategy again.  
With multiple items up for auction, two types of payment may be provided – uniform 
price and discriminative price. In a uniform price auction all bidders receive either the 
price of the lowest accepted bid or the highest non-accepted bid. In the discriminative 
price auction the actual bid price is paid. Cason and Gangadharan (2004) found in an 
experimental setting that bid prices were closer to cost under the uniform price 
auction compared to the discriminative price auction but the discriminative price 
auction performed better overall. Stoneham et al. (2003) and White and Burton 
(2005) report significant improvements in the efficiency of discriminative price over 
uniform price auctions. 
In the case of auctions for conservation contracts the items are substitutes as it does 
not matter which contract bidders receive, as long as they get funded. In some cases, 
landholders will submit multiple bids for works at multiple sites. In order to avoid the 
problem of demand reduction a first price sealed bid format withholding information 
about the total amount of funds available for conservation contracts may assist. 
2.2.9 Sequential Auctions 
Analysis of sequential auctions suggests that revenue equivalence holds and 
allocative efficiency may be achieved if all of the usual assumptions can be made 
(Klemperer 1999). In this case, at each auction round the auction is won by the 
highest bidder(s). However, efficiency may be reduced by several factors. 
Competition may be reduced through successful bidders leaving the market and 
hence, reducing the price. Bidders may also learn information about the valuations of 
other bidders and the seller over successive rounds and use this information to adjust 
future valuations and increase their information rent. Collusion may also increase 
over successive auction rounds (Aoyagi 2003). Measures to avoid these pitfalls of  
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sequential auctions include keeping secret the reserve and winning prices, and the 
identity of other bidders in sealed bid auctions. 
2.3 Auctions for Natural Resource Management Contracts 
A major challenge facing governments and other agencies responsible for natural 
resource management is the motivation of private individuals to engage in NRM 
actions. Auctions create a market for the supply of NRM actions by landholders and 
have the potential to increase the cost-effectiveness of funds for natural resource 
management. Auctions have been used for different types of NRM actions including 
irrigation reduction (Cummings et al. 2004), land use change (Ho 2003), soil and 
habitat protection (Muller and Weikard 2002), and environmental restoration and 
rehabilitation (Stoneham et al. 2003). 
Auctions for conservation or natural resource management contracts are usually 
procurement auctions. They involve the government or agency offering contracts for 
NRM actions which are competitively tendered for by individuals who propose to 
provide a level of environmental benefit resulting from proposed NRM actions for a 
bid price. Thus, auctions for conservation contracts enable landholders to name their 
own price for undertaking NRM actions and compete for contracts. Auctions for 
conservation contracts will either be limited by using a reserve price (although it may 
be difficult to set a reserve price because of the abstract nature of scoring 
environmental benefits of landholder bids) or by limits to the total amount of funding 
available. The auction process enables the agency to select those bidders that can 
provide NRM actions at the least cost. Where there is a limitation on the total amount 
of funding, as is the case in the Catchment Care trial, efficient allocation is achieved 
by selecting the combination of bids that maximise the total environmental benefits 
achieved for the available funds. Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1997, 
1998) and Stoneham et al. (2003) should be consulted for a formal bidding model for 
auctions for conservation contracts. 
There are two important aspects of auctions for conservation and natural resource 
management contracts. Firstly, the auction format and processes affect the efficiency 
and success of the auction. Secondly, the methods used for ranking and selecting 
bids affect how well the auction targets the priorities of the funding agency. 
2.3.1 Selected Examples of Auctions 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the United States is a major voluntary 
conservation program for landholders engaged in agriculture. Through the CRP, 
landholders can be paid annual rental payments and cost share assistance to 
provide environmental services and contribute to natural resource management by 
establishing long term, resource conserving covers on eligible farmland (FSA 2005). 
From 1986 – 2003, nearly US$27 Billion has been outlayed for conservation actions 
on an area of over 34 million acres through the CRP. In 2003, nearly US$1.7 billion 
was paid in rental payments and nearly US$100 million spent in cost share payments 
to landholders (FSA 2004). Payments are made to landholders by the Commodity 
Credits Corporation and contracts are made for periods of 10 – 15 years. The CRP 
includes both a competitive auction process and a continuous signup process which 
is not competitive and specifically targeted at highly desirable environments. Under 
the auction CRP process landholders submit competitive bids for contracts. A reserve  
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price of sorts is used in that the CRP will only pay market rates for annual rent and up 
to a 50% share of the costs of land use change actions. Bids are scored against an 
Environmental Benefits Index and the most competitive bids are selected for support. 
In the most recent (29
th) signup, 26,080 bids were submitted and 19,732 were 
accepted. 
The Environmental Services Scheme was launched in 2002 by the New South Wales 
government. The scheme seeks to motivate landholders into making land use 
changes for the multiple objective outcomes of carbon sequestration, terrestrial 
biodiversity, salinity, soil erosion, water quality, and acid sulphate soil mitigation. 
Landholders were encouraged to submit bids for changing agricultural land use to 
provide the above environmental services. Landholder actions can include the 
establishment of deep-rooted, perennial pastures, native species, commercial 
species, and saltbush, improving drainage and restoring natural flooding regimes to 
wetlands. Toolkits are provided to landholders to predict the amount of benefits 
achieved by different actions and the most cost-effective bids are selected. Property 
rights arrangements are also made to enable potential future trading of 
environmental services. A total of A$2 million was made available and a total of 24 
contracts had been signed by October 2003 involving land use change over nearly 
11,000 ha (Grieve and Uebel 2003). 
The third significant example of an auction process for conservation contracts is the 
acclaimed BushTender trial approach in Victoria. BushTender is an auction-based 
approach to improving the management of native vegetation on private land. In a 
similar way to the Conservation Reserve Program and the Environmental Services 
Scheme, BushTender invites landholders to competitively bid for contracts to improve 
the management of native vegetation. The most cost-effective bids are selected for 
funding. Successful landholders are contracted to provide the proposed services and 
periodic payments are made for the proposed actions. In the BushTender trial, 98 
bids were received from landholders proposing works over 3,478 ha. A funding limit 
of $400,000 was imposed and 78 bids were funded for works over 3,160 ha 
(Stoneham et al. 2003). The success of the BushTender approach has progressed to 
a wider roll out of the program across southern Victoria and spawned a number of 
similar auction-based programs including CarbonTender, PlainsTender, RiverTender, 
BushReturns administered through the Victorian Catchment Management Authorities 
(DSE 2005). It is also the inspiration behind the Catchment Care auction process 
presented in this study.  
All three of the auction processes discussed above share some common design 
features but also vary in some design aspects. All use a price discriminating first-
price sealed bid auction format. The goal of all three auctions is to maximise the 
environmental benefits of conservation funds by selecting those bids that offer the 
greatest benefit to cost ratio. All three auctions use a quantitative evaluation 
procedure for ranking and selecting bids. Conversely, there are small differences in 
the other aspects of the process such as the amount of information given to 
landholders, use of a reserve price, and the size of the market.  
2.3.2 Bid Scoring, Ranking and Selection Techniques 
Each agency dispersing funds for on-ground works by landholders has specific 
objectives and priorities for the outcomes of their funds. Bids for funds for on-ground 
works are heterogeneous in the sites proposed and the nature and magnitude of the  
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proposed works. A very important part of auctions for conservation contracts is the 
processes and protocols used for scoring, ranking and selecting bids. These 
processes and protocols are essential to enable the most cost effective bids to be 
selected in order to achieve an efficient outcome for the funding body. Bid ranking 
and selection relies on a quantitative assessment of the site of the proposed actions 
and the nature and magnitude of the actions. Indices of environmental benefits have 
been widely used in this role. 
In the US Conservation Reserve Program an Environmental Benefits Index is used to 
evaluate and rank land offered for enrollment (Cattaneo et al. 2002). The index 
involves a scoring process Bids are assigned a point score for the Environmental 
Benefits Index and each offer is compared with all other offers in the national sign-up 
round. The Environmental Benefits Index is composed of six environmental factors 
plus a cost factor. The six environmental factors including wildlife, water quality, 
erosion, enduring benefits, air quality, and conservation priority areas. Each of these 
factors consists of one or more sub-factors. Landholders can propose practices such 
as tree planting, wetland restoration etc. Different practices attract points for different 
factors and sub-factors. Points are also scored for lower cost bids (FSA 1999). 
The Victorian BushTender approach to bid ranking and selection is based on the 
Habitat Hectares approach of Parkes et al. (2003). Habitat Hectares is based on the 
characteristics of existing vegetation relative to benchmark communities of mature 
stands in their natural undisturbed state. Aspects of the vegetation assessed include 
physiognomy (e.g. presence of large trees, understorey), viability (i.e. presence of 
weeds, regeneration, litter, logs), and landscape context (e.g. area, shape, 
connectivity). Each component is scored and the scores are summed and multiplied 
by the area of the stand to provide a measure of the magnitude of actions. The 
approach has been subject to healthy debate in the scientific literature (McCarthy et 
al. 2004, Parkes et al. 2004). The Habitat Hectares approach has been adapted and 
applied to the NSW Environmental Services Scheme (Oliver 2003). 
In BushTender, a Habitat Services Score reflecting the change in quality of habitat as 
a result of proposed management actions is multiplied by a Biodiversity Significance 
Score. The Biodiversity Significance Score is a measure of the rarity of the Ecological 
Vegetation Class. The result is then divided by the bid price to create a Biodiversity 
Benefits Index. Tenders are then ranked and selected according to the Biodiversity 
Benefits Index. 
In this study we use a risk analysis framework to rank and select bids for funding. 
Risk analysis is an advance on the simpler scoring approaches and enables the 
selection of bids that propose actions that have the greatest benefit at priority sites. 
The risk analysis framework is described in more detail later.  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 31  
3 The Onkaparinga Catchment Study Area 
3.1 Description of the Study Area 
The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board (the Board) has 
responsibilities for managing steams and surface water bodies over an area of 
920km
2 within the Mount Lofty Ranges of South Australia (Figure 1). Within this area 
there are more than 2,000 km of streams, ranging in size from minor creeks that 
receive little flow, to the Onkaparinga River that flows through the Port Noarlunga 
estuary and out to sea (Figure 2). The Board’s region of responsibility extends 
beyond the physical extent of the Onkaparinga River catchment and includes the 
catchments of several other smaller waterways including Christie Creek, the Field 
River, Pedler Creek, Port Willunga Washpool Lagoon, Sellicks Creek, and Maslin 
Creek (OCWMB 2005, Figure 2). For simplicity, we refer to the Board’s region of 













0 5 10 15 20 2.5
Kilometres










Figure 1 - Location and extent of the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management 
Board’s region of responsibility and the Catchment Care trial area (Source 
data: SA Department of Environment and Heritage).  
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Figure 2 – Hydrology and land cover of the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board region. Displayed are watercourses and storages including 
farm dams (blue). A Landsat 7 Thematic Mapper image provides an 
appreciation of the regional landcover. The image is a false colour 
representation where dark red areas are native and plantation vegetation, light 
red is vigorously growing vegetation, usually irrigated crops, the light 
blue/green is cleared land and the pink/grey is urbanisation (Source data: SA 
Department of Environment and Heritage). 
 
The Onkaparinga is a peri-urban catchment in the hinterland of Adelaide, the capital 
city of South Australia, which has a population of over 1 million people. The  
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population of the Onkaparinga catchment itself was over 174,000 people in 1996 and 
is projected to reach 218,000 by 2015 (OCWMB 2000). The catchment includes 
warmer, dryer undulating plains and coastal wetlands in the downstream areas to the 
cool, moist hilly uplands of the Onkaparinga headwaters in the Adelaide Hills (Figure 
3). The rainfall ranges from around 400 mm near the coast to over 1,100 mm per 
year in the uplands (OCWMB 2005). The region experiences warm to hot, dry 
summers and cool, moist to wet winters. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Catchment topography and elevation of the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board region including the context of the surrounding areas of 
the Mt. Lofty Ranges (Source data: SA Department of Environment and 
Heritage).  
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Vegetation of the Onkaparinga catchment is dominated by open forest and woodland 
with Eucalyptus sp. overstorey and sclerophyllous understorey (Figure 4). Land 
clearance has resulted in many vegetation communities being restricted to isolated 
remnants. The diverse geomorphology and hydrology in the Onkaparinga catchment 
gives rise to diverse communities of aquatic flora and particularly fauna (Figure 5, 











































Figure 4 – Distribution and structure of remnant vegetation in the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board region (Source data: SA Department of 
Environment and Heritage).  
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Figure 5 – A relatively undisturbed lower order stream in the upper reaches of the 
Onkaparinga catchment. 
 
Figure 6 – Example of a relatively natural gorge-like reach in the Onkaparinga 
catchment. Land clearance and agricultural development have impacted on the 
landscape in the background.  
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Land use in the Onkaparinga catchment is diverse and includes urban areas, 
intensive horticulture and viticulture, extensive cropping and grazing, wetland and 
remnant native habitat (Figure 2, Figure 7). Much of the land in the Onkaparinga 
catchment is privately owned and includes some of the most productive agricultural 
land in South Australia. However, land use is dominated by small holdings set up as 
hobby farms and rural retreats following subdivision of larger agricultural properties. 
Many of these properties support remnant native habitat and water courses that are 
of high conservation significance (Figure 5, Figure 6). The tourism industry is also 
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Figure 7 – Land use in the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board region 
(Source data: SA Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation).  
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The effects of productive land use continue to impact upon biodiversity and water 
quality in the Onkaparinga catchment and these impacts are serious and widespread. 
Many high value environments are threatened by these processes and are subject to 
continued degradation. Some of the major threats to biodiversity and water quality 
include past land clearance and habitat removal, livestock grazing especially cattle, 
agricultural, viticultural and horticultural activities, farm dams, pest plant and animal 
invasion, and surface water diversion for metropolitan supply.  
Past land clearance has resulted in the direct removal of native species and 
reduction of habitat. Clearance has also resulted in changes to natural flow regimes, 
increases in erosion, sedimentation and nutrients in watercourses. Livestock grazing 
has a serious impact on watercourses and biodiversity (Figure 8). Cattle suppress the 
regeneration of native species through grazing and trampling, and can cause 
excessive stream bed and bank erosion through trafficking across watercourses. 
Cattle grazing in riparian areas can also reduce water quality through increasing 
turbidity (as a result of increased erosion), and increasing the level of bacteria in 
watercourses, especially faecal coliforms. Modern agricultural, viticultural and 
horticultural practices can have adverse impacts on water quality through increased 
nutrients in runoff and contamination of waterways through the use of pesticides and 
other chemicals in normal production practices.  
 
 
Figure 8 – Cattle are a widespread threat to water quality and bank stability in the 
Onkaparinga catchment. Cattle graze and trample native plants, cause pugging  
(hoof holes) in stream banks, and high levels of faecal coliforms in runoff. 
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Farm dams also pose a major threat to environmental flows in the Onkaparinga 
catchment and hence, the aquatic biota that depends on these flows. The National 
Land and Water Resources Audit stated that the region is over-developed. OCWMB 
(2000) report that only 35% of available water in the region flows to the sea. State 
government databases record more than 3,000 farm dams in the Onkaparinga 
catchment with an estimated storage capacity of 8.5 GL and a farm dam density of 
15 ML/km
2 in addition to the major storages at Mt. Bold and Happy Valley (Teoh 
2003). This level of disturbance to natural environmental flows is seriously impacting 
upon downstream riverine ecosystems (OCWMB 2000). 
The other major threat to water quality and biodiversity in the Onkaparinga catchment 
is weed invasion (Figure 9). Species such as blackberry (Rubus spp.), gorse (Ulex 
europaea), boneseed (Chrysanthemoides monilifera), cape broom (Genista 
monspessulana), olive (Olea europaea), and bridal creeper (Myrsiphyllum 
asparagoides) are the most invasive weeds in the Onkaparinga catchment although 
other species are also problematic. Introduced tree species such as the weeping 
willow (Salix spp.) are also present. 
The continued decline of biodiversity and water quality in the region (EPA 2003) 
requires remedial intervention and management. A range of Commonwealth, State, 
and regional (OCWMB) environmental policy mechanisms are in place to facilitate 
improved natural resource management in the Onkaparinga catchment. 
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Figure 9 – Example of weed infestation in creeklines and grazing impact in the 
Onkaparinga catchment.  Woody weeds including blackberry (Rubus spp.) and 
gorse (Ulex europaeus) are particularly invasive and exclude native species. 
They also provide habitat for other pest species rabbits and foxes. Grazing also 
suppresses regeneration by more palatable native species. 
3.2 Relevant NRM Policy  
The two main planks of Commonwealth NRM policy in Australia are the Natural 
Heritage Trust (NHT) and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
(NAP). Established in 1997, the aim of the Natural Heritage Trust is to help restore 
and conserve Australia's environment and natural resources. The focus of the NHT is 
the funding of community groups for on-ground environmental and natural resource 
management works. Continued government support means that by 2007-2008 the 
NHT will have acquitted $3 billion in funding NRM projects and initiatives. The 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality builds on and occurs in parallel  
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with the Natural Heritage Trust. The NAP was endorsed in November 2000 by the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and has become a commitment of $1.4 
billion over seven years. The NAP aims to address salinity problems and improve 
water quality in Australia on a regional basis and to include government, community, 
individuals and private enterprise in the process. Both of these programs have 
resulted in localised environmental and natural resource management works in the 
Onkaparinga catchment. 
There are several other policy mechanisms operating in the Onkaparinga catchment 
designed to conserve the natural environment. The main mechanisms are clearance 
controls, nature reserve selection, Heritage Agreements, and groundwater and 
surface water prescription. Legislated clearance controls that prohibit the removal of 
remnant vegetation on private land have been in force in one form or another for 
more than 20 years. An active program of reserve selection is ongoing in the 
Onkaparinga catchment where the state government purchases land of conservation 
significance and protects it under national parks or other legislation. Heritage 
Agreements are also used to conserve remnant native habitat on private land. Under 
this scheme, landholders can receive funds for management of natural areas and the 
agreement is passed with the title of the land.  
However, under current rates of uptake, these schemes are unlikely to ensure the 
sustainability of biophysical systems in the Onkaparinga. Substantial amounts of 
native habitat continue to be degraded predominately through grazing and weed 
invasion. Water courses in the Onkaparinga catchment are also subject to continual 
decline through these processes in addition to the interruption of natural flow regimes 
and processes such as erosion and sedimentation. To combat this, the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board commits up to $800,000 each year to fund on-
ground works in natural resource management. 
3.3 The Watercourse Management Assistance Program 
The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board’s Watercourse Management 
Assistance Program (WMAP) is the primary means of distributing public funds for on-
ground natural resource management actions by landholders in the Onkaparinga 
Catchment. The aim of WMAP is to provide technical and financial assistance for 
best practice watercourse management and has provided assistance to over 300 
landholders (OCWMB 2005). 
The long term objective of WMAP is to provide water quality and biodiversity benefits 
through promoting good land and watercourse management practice. Water quality 
and biodiversity benefits include aspects of soil erosion, nutrients, sedimentation, and 
habitat value. WMAP offers landholders technical and financial assistance in 
undertaking the following activities in relation to watercourses (OCWMB 2005, Figure 
10, Figure 11): 
• Fencing;   
•  Stock crossings, stock watering points and stock troughs;  
•  Revegetation with local native plants;  
•  Control of woody weeds along watercourses;  
•  Removal of exotic trees such as willows and olives;  
•  Erosion control; and  
• Education.    
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Figure 10 – Example of on-ground restoration and protection works including 
replacement of an old fence (orange arrow) with a new fence (blue arrows) to 
exclude stock from the watercourse, and revegetation along the stream bank to 
improve bank stability and achieve biodiversity outcomes (yellow arrow). 
 
Figure 11 – Example of more extensive on-ground restoration and protection works by 
a landholder. A wide watercourse buffer has been fenced off from stock and 
extensive revegetation has been undertaken.  
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Under WMAP, the level of funding available for landholder actions varies. In addition, 
as a condition of funding the landholder may be required to undertake allied work 
such as site preparation and maintenance, or watercourse management training. 
Landholders are also expected to make some contribution to the works which is 
almost always in the form of an in-kind contribution. 
Historically, funds for landholder actions were allocated on a first come first served 
basis. This has changed in recent years with the evolution of WMAP. Guidelines 
have been established by the Board for funding riparian rehabilitation works on 
private property and these provide an indication of the level of incentive funds that 
can be provided to landholders for specific works. While the guidelines stipulate 
maximum rates available for a range of watercourse management activities, the level 
of funds provided is based on a subjective assessment of watercourse/environmental 
assets and determined in one-on-one negotiations with the landholder. In this way 
the Board is able to set a cap on funding which is commensurate with environmental 
asset values, and in consideration of the landholder’s willingness to make in-kind 
contributions.   
The original priorities for undertaking on ground works were established in 1998 
through a community consultation process where landholders were asked to rank 
lengths of stream according to their level of concern. However, this resulted in 
prioritising works in streams in the worst condition first. This is now recognised as 
being counter to acknowledged best practice in stream rehabilitation (and 
environmental management generally). Further, the Board has recognised that many 
at risk sites of high biodiversity value were not even considered in the initial priority 
setting processes.  
The Board, in partnership with neighbouring Catchment Water Management Boards, 
revised its priority setting process to focus on maintaining and increasing biodiversity. 
The framework for this revised process, called the Watercourse Rehabilitation Priority 
Setting (WRPS) tool, has been established and an initial range of desktop priorities 
established for the Board’s catchment area. The WRPS tool enhanced the ability of 
the Board to prioritise funding for on-ground works in high-priority streams. However, 
whilst the WRPST was a good start, it did not provide sufficient information on which 
to base funding decisions. The decision of who should receive funding and in which 
priority order was made by the Board on a largely subjective basis. 
Thus, prioritisation of funding applications under WMAP lacked a systematic, 
comprehensive, transparent, and defensible framework. This study aims to improve 
these aspects of the prioritisation process and provide a basis for making funding 
decisions for on-ground works by landholders. This study also aims to assess the 
auction process for increasing the cost-effectiveness of payments for natural 
resource management actions by landholders.  
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4 The Catchment Care Auction Process 
4.1 Overview of the Auction Process 
The Catchment Care auction process has been designed based both on the 
extensive auction literature and theoretical development, and on the lessons learned 
from other auctions for conservation contracts as discussed in Section 2.2. 
Pragmatically, the Catchment Care auction process begins with wide communication 
and advertisement of the availability of funding for on-ground works and a call for 
expressions of interest. A field officer visits each site proposed by interested 
landholders. During the site visit the officer performs a site assessment and scores 
the environmental values and threats of the site. The field officer also provides the 
information necessary for the landholder to develop a Site Action Plan for their 
proposed site(s). A bid is submitted to the Board by the landholder based on the Site 
Action Plan outlining the type, location, and extent of the actions to be undertaken, a 
price for which they are willing to undertake the proposed actions (the amount of 
funding requested from the Board), and the level of cost-sharing involved in the 
proposed works. The level of threat reduction achieved by the proposed landholder 
actions in each bid is then assessed by the Board. 
Bids are then quantitatively evaluated, compared, ranked and selected for funding. In 
the bid selection process, risk scores are calculated for the proposed sites based on 
environmental value and threat scores as assessed in the field. An impact score is 
then calculated as the risk of the site multiplied by the level of threat reduction 
expected as a result of landholder actions. An environmental benefits score is then 
calculated by multiplying the impact score by the area over which the action is to be 
conducted. Dividing the environmental benefits score by the amount of funding 
requested from the Board provides a measure of cost effectiveness of each bid. 
Those sites offering the greatest environmental benefit for the cost are selected for 
support under the Catchment Care program.  
In this section we detail the Catchment Care auction process as implemented in a 
trial in the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board region. The auction 
process can be summarised in six steps from the initial call for expressions of interest 
right through to bid selection and contracting. The six steps are described below and 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
1. Catchment Care Promotion – Funding opportunities are advertised and calls 
made for expressions of interest in accessing funding for on-ground 
restoration and protection works. An information pack is mailed to interested 
landholders and a site visit is arranged. 
2. Site Visit and Assessment – Interested landholders receive a visit from a field 
officer. A range of appropriate actions and priorities are discussed with the 
landholder. Environmental values and threats to the site are scored using a 
Site Assessment Sheet. 
3. Site Action Plan Development – The Board considers appropriate actions for 
each site and makes recommendations to the landholder. The landholder then 
develops the Site Action Plan based on the Boards recommendations. The  
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Site Action Plan outlines the actions to be taken to arrest the threats, the areas 
covered, techniques used and funding required.  
4. Bid Submission and Auction – The landholder submits the Site Action Plan to 
the Board as a bid for Catchment Care funds. 
5. Bid Assessment – An environmental benefit score is calculated for each bid 
using the risk analysis framework. 
6. Bid Selection and Contracting – Bids are ranked based on the environmental 
benefits per dollar of funding requested. The most cost effective bids are 
selected for funding support by the Board under the Catchment Care program. 
Successful landholders are contracted to perform the proposed actions over a 




Figure 12 - Overview of the Catchment Care auction process. The non shadowed boxes are inputs and outputs to the assessment process. The 
shadowed boxes signify discrete steps in the process. The bold boxes indicate major outcomes of the Catchment Care process. The Steps relate 
directly to the 6 Steps outlined above. 
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4.2 Risk Analysis Framework 
Fundamental to the Catchment Care auction process is that landholders propose 
sites for environmental restoration and protection works which may include areas of 
watercourse, bank and catchment. Bids are heterogeneous in terms of the 
environment of the site, in the type and magnitude of the proposed on-ground works, 
and in the amount of funding requested. Ecological risk analysis (or simply risk 
analysis) provides a basis for the objective, transparent and defensible evaluation, 
comparison and selection of landholder bids in Catchment Care.  
The US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA 1998) defines ecological risk 
analysis as: 
Ecological risk assessment is a process used to systematically evaluate and organize data, 
information, assumptions, and uncertainties to help understand and predict the relationship 
between stressors and ecological effects in a way that is useful for environmental decision 
making 
Risk analysis has been widely used to set priorities for environmental management 
actions and to support environmental decision making (Hunsaker et al. 1990, Suter 
1993, Landis and Wiegers 1997, papers in Landis 2005). Although the field of 
ecological risk analysis has evolved into a complex management science in itself, a 
simplified version is used in this study.  
Risk can be broadly thought of as how much there is to lose combined with the 
likelihood of losing it. In the context of environmental assessment, the environmental 
risk of a site is based upon two elements – the environmental value of the site and 
the threats affecting the environment, where risk equals value x threat. Thus, sites of 
high environmental value that are subject to high levels of threat are considered to be 
at highest risk. Risk can be used as a basis for environmental decisions as sites at 
high risk should be highest priority for restoration and protection.  
In the risk analysis framework developed in Catchment Care, sites are attributed 
inherent environmental value. The environmental value of a site is derived from the 
site’s Geomorphology, Hydrology and Remnant Vegetation characteristics. Sites may 
also be subject to specific threats. Threats are processes that degrade the 
biophysical environment including Bed Instability, Bank Instability, Dams and Off-
takes, Patch Size, Invasive Weed Presence, Weed % Cover, and Grazing Pressure. 
Threats are value-specific in the Catchment Care risk analysis framework insofar as 
they affect certain values but not others. For example, the presence of Dams and Off-
Takes relates to the Hydrology value as they alter natural hydrological flow. Dams 
and Off-Takes however, do not directly affect the river style (Geomorphology value) 
or any aspect of remnant vegetation. 
In the Catchment Care auction process, the risk of each site is equal to the threat 
score multiplied by the respective environmental value score and summed over all 
threats. Sites that have the greatest environmental value and are subject to the most 
serious threats are at highest risk. Sites with the lowest risk are those with low 
environmental value and subject to little or no threat. All other permutations of 
environmental value and threat have risk values somewhere between these 
extremes. To quantify the risk of each proposed site, a number of environmental 
value and threat characters are assessed from spatial databases and in the field. 
These are discussed in detail in Section 4.4.1.  
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Environmental restoration and protection works proposed by landholders are termed 
actions in Catchment Care and include Stock Exclusion, Non-Engineered Structures, 
Revegetation, Dam Modification, and Weed Eradication. Landholder actions are 
threat-specific in that they are able to reduce specific threats acting upon a site and 
hence, over time, reduce the environmental risk of a site. For example, fencing off a 
stream bank from cattle (i.e. the Stock Exclusion action) will reduce the Bank 
Instability threat. In the Catchment Care trial, landholder actions are not able to 
influence processes affecting their site whose root causes originate off-site (e.g. 
sedimentation from an upstream erosion process). Landholder actions are also 
unable to influence the environmental value character scores of the site. The level of 
threat reduction achieved by landholder actions is scored by the Board. 
Bids are ranked in Catchment Care based on the risk of the site, the level of threat  
reduction achieved by landholder actions, the area over which the actions are 
conducted, and the prices of the bid. This information is combined mathematically to 
evaluate, compare, rank and select bids for funding. 
4.3 Step 1 - Catchment Care Promotion 
4.3.1 Promotion and Demand Creation 
Markets for public resources such as conservation contracts and radio frequency 
spectrum licenses can be thin, resulting in reduced competition and allocative 
efficiency of public resources. To enhance the efficiency of auctions for conservation 
contracts, competition and demand for resources needs to be strong. To ensure this 
we need to establish a large market by advertising and direct invitation to participate. 
However, there is a funding limitation of $150,000 and constraints on the human 
resources of the Board. This limits the total number of bids able to be processed by 
the Board in the Catchment Care trial. Hence, enough bids need to be incited to 
provide competition for resources (i.e. that total more than $150,000) without 
compromising the ability of the Board to assess the bids. 
In an attempt to strike this balance, the Catchment Care trial was limited to the upper 
part of the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board region (Figure 1). 
Widespread communication was made of the fact that funding is available to 
landholders in this area for environmental restoration and protection works to ensure 
an appropriate market size. The aim of this communication strategy was not only to 
ensure a sufficiently large number of bids, but also to target a wide diversity of 
environments and geographical spread of sites.  Examples of documents produced to 
promote the trial are presented in Appendix A. 
The Catchment Care process was promoted via a number of means including: 
•  Publishing an ‘Advertorial’ in the local newspaper The Courier for two 
consecutive issues (Appendix A.1).  
•  Production and distribution of a ‘Flyer’ which explained who could be eligible, 
what they could expect to receive funding for and a précis of how the trial will 
work (Appendix A.2).  
•  An electronic version of the flyer and an online Expression of Interest form 
(Appendix A.3) uploaded to the Board’s website.   
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 48  
 
•  In addition, a targeted approach was also used to directly engage 224 
landholders. Landholders were targeted on the basis of recorded important 
environmental assets (largely remnant vegetation), or where relevant, 
completion of Board approved training in basic land management. Letters 
were mailed directly to these landholders inviting them to participate in the 
Catchment Care program.  
Interested landholders were asked to submit an initial Expression of Interest 
(Appendix A.4) in participating in the Catchment Care program.  
4.3.2 Information Provision 
Landholders were considered ineligible if their property was located outside the trial 
area or if they already received funding under WMAP. Both eligible and ineligible 
(Appendix B.1) landholders were notified by mail. The Board also mailed out an 
information pack to all eligible landholders who submitted an expression of interest in 
the Catchment Care program. 
Information is widely recognised as a key aspect of auctions (Section 2.2.6). The 
amount and nature of the information provided by the Board to landholders was 
carefully designed to ensure the success of the auction process. Two types of 
information were provided to landholders in the information pack including 
information about the Catchment Care auction process and information about best 
practice in land and natural resource management activities. 
Information about the Catchment Care process included the flyer (Appendix A.2) and 
a bid development guide (Appendix B.2). This guide provides information on how the 
trial will work and what the landholder will need to do throughout the process and 
Includes a step-by-step guide to putting the bid together. The bid development guide 
briefly outlined the key elements of the bid ranking and selection process insofar as 
landholder actions removing threats at high value sites were considered highly. The 
fact that the bid would be considered in a competitive market emphasised the need 
for bids to be competitively priced. No information was provided on the precise 
means of scoring or ranking as this may have increased the information rent of 
landholders and allowed them to shade their bids closer to what they thought the 
Board might pay rather than closer to their opportunity cost. 
Extensive technical information about best practice techniques in land management 
and on-ground works was also provided to the landholder. The intention of providing 
this information was to enhance the technical knowledge of the landholders and to 
give them an appreciation of the effort and requirements of conducting on-ground 
works. Landholders may then make their bids with full knowledge of the expectations 
and priorities of the Board. This may also help reduce the likelihood of landholders 
defaulting on their commitments resulting from under-estimating the work required of 
them or through and the subsequent moral hazard of landholders shirking their 
responsibility to conduct the contracted actions. Thereby, provision of detailed 
technical information reduces the risk of the Board and enhances the environmental 
outcomes of landholder actions.  
The technical information contains an action reference guide which is a summary 
document containing basic descriptions of actions approved for the trial, when the 
landholders should consider those actions, and why they are important (Appendix 
B.3) and was developed specifically for Catchment Care. Five other documents were  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 49  
 
also included in the information pack which comprise more detailed information about 
technical aspects of the landholder actions of Weed Eradication, Revegetation, 
Erosion Control, Stock Exclusion, and Dam Modification. The documents include: 
•  A weed control handbook which describes technical detail and best practice in 
weed removal covering the safe use of chemicals, physical removal, timing 
etc. (Appendix B.4). This was developed specifically for Catchment Care. 
•  A revegetation guide describing the different techniques for successful re-
establishment of native plant communities including site preparation, planting, 
and weed control etc. (Appendix B.5). This was substantially extended for 
Catchment Care. 
•  An erosion control guide describing best practice in erosion control techniques 
such as revegetation, logs, straw bale, sediment traps and bank protection 
(Appendix B.6). 
•  A guide for managing stock in a sympathetic way for the conservation of 
biodiversity and water quality including fencing types, locating watering points 
etc. (Appendix B.7). 
•  Information on installing low-flow bypasses for dams to allow for increased 
environmental flows (Appendix B.8). 
The information pack also contains a high resolution map of the landholder’s property 
(Appendix B.9) and a copy of the Site Action Plan (Appendix B.2). The map includes 
spatial data such as the property boundary and a 1:50,000 scale watercourse layer 
underlain by an aerial photograph. The map, especially the aerial photograph 
provides the landholder with plan-view information about the extent of remnant 
vegetation, and the location of streams and other environmental features. It provides 
an excellent base for planning the location and extent of landholder actions. The Site 
Action Plan is provided so the landholder can see the format of information required 
in a bid for Catchment Care funds. 
An important objective of the auction trial is to encourage those who are willing to 
supply significant effort with little cost sharing to do so. However, it is important to 
reduce the risk of underperformance posed by low bids from poorly informed 
landholders who do not actually understand the cost and effort involved in the work 
that they propose, as such landholders are more likely to default on agreements. The 
landholder information pack described above includes advice on indicative costs of 
different actions to help reduce the risk of underperformance. Field officers reinforce 
this advice on the level of in-kind work effort and indicative material costs associated 
with options for action on their property.  
The covering letters to eligible landholders state that the Board will contact them to 
arrange a site visit. 
4.4 Step 2 - Site Visit and Assessment 
All landholders interested in receiving funding for on-ground works receive a site visit 
by a field officer from the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board. The 
site visit in the Catchment Care process has two main objectives:  
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•  the assessment and scoring of environmental values and threats of the sites 
proposed for landholder restoration and protection works, and; 
•  the exchange of information about the priorities of the Board with regards to 
on-ground works, technical advice, and potential landholder actions. 
4.4.1 Sites and Multiple Bids 
The spatial scale at which the Catchment Care auction process operates is the site 
scale. The related Watercourse Risk Priority Setting Project which is used to derive 
information about some environmental value characters operates on a watercourse 
reach scale. A site is defined as a distinct area on a landholder’s property 
characterised by relatively homogeneous environmental values and threats (Figure 


















Figure 13 – Example of the site-based scale at which the Catchment Care auction 
process operates. In this example 3 sites are proposed on a single landholder’s 
property.  
This scale permits multiple landholder bids (for multiple sites on a single property). 
This scale is also flexible enough to allow for works to be undertaken across property 
boundaries by neighbouring landholders working together in future enhancement of 
the Catchment Care process. Sites proposed for Catchment Care funding will 
generally include areas of watercourse but may also include significant areas of the 
catchment adjacent to riparian environments.  
Landholders may wish to seek support for works at multiple sites on their property. 
Sites are distinct when they have significantly different environmental values and 
threats, and/or have different geographic locations. Determination of distinct sites is 
at the discretion of the field officer. Each distinct site should be assessed and scored 
individually and submitted by the landholder as a separate bid. Where landholders 
submit bids for more than one site, the environmental benefits per dollar should be 
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receive funding for all, some, or none of their proposed sites depending on the 
competitiveness of each bid. 
4.4.2 Scoring Environmental Values and Threats 
Scoring environmental values and threats provides a basis for the risk analysis and 
for quantifying the priority of sites for funding. The environmental values and threats 
of sites are scored in Catchment Care as characters.  
The set of environmental value and threat characters used to evaluate the 
environmental risk of sites was developed for this project in a number of workshops 
involving Board officers, CSIRO, consultants and other experts. The character set 
was continually refined in response to the simulation results and the field trials. 
Although the characters used are not an exhaustive list, they capture the elements of 
greatest importance to the Board. The characters are intended to facilitate the 
understanding and ranking of a site’s environmental values and threatening 
processes in a systematic, concise, repeatable, and interpretable manner.  
Development of the character set required a trade-off between detail and breadth of 
environmental assessment. The character set and assessment protocols also 
needed to be practical. In effect, Board officers needed to be able to complete a site 
assessment in a timely and cost effective manner lest the cost effectiveness gains 
made by the auction process be negated by the transaction costs involved in its 
implementation. 
The decision to include particular characters into the final character set was based on 
several considerations including: 
•  The usefulness of the character as an indicator of relevant biodiversity and 
water quality values and the processes threatening those values;  
•  The ability of the character to be assessed in a timely and repeatable manner; 
•  The ability of threat characters to be reduced by on-ground restoration and 
protection actions by landholders, and; 
•  The capacity of characters to identify priority areas for on-ground works 
funded by the Board. 
The environmental values and threat characters are described in Table 1. Each value 
character is affected by one or more threats which, in turn, can be reduced by 
predetermined landholder actions.  
  




Values  Threats Description 
Geomorphology Bed  Instability 
Bank Instability 
Value is described by rarity, intactness and the role of the stream form in 
catchment wide ecological processes.  It is measured in terms of stream style 
category.  The stream style category is an indicator of the reach’s capacity to 
change. 
In this project the impact of bed and bank erosion is seen to be the most useful 
and easiest measure of threat for this assessment process and threats are often 
of a nature and size that can be tackled by landholder actions. 
Hydrology  Dams and Off-Takes  Undisturbed natural base flow is considered to be healthy and valuable. Threats 
are defined as the presence of water storages and of artificial discharges 




Invasive Weed Presence 
Weed % Cover 
Grazing Pressure 
Value is described by presence of remnant native riparian vegetation, its 
conservation significance, condition, and connection to other stands of remnant 
vegetation. These characters are particularly important for creating biodiversity 
corridors in the Board’s catchments. 
Level of threat is indicated by the presence of factors such as percentage and 
type of weed infestation, absence of fencing from stock size of the remnant. 
Table 1 - Summary of environmental values and threats. * note that the Remnant 
Vegetation environmental value is not scored directly but is calculated as a weighted 
sum from the Conservation Significance, Condition and Landscape Connectivity 
characters. 
The site assessment and scoring process has been designed to be a simple, 
informative and useful technique for understanding and quantifying the environmental 
properties of proposed sites. It is also intended to be a rapid assessment technique 
for providing a quantitative and repeatable basis for evaluation and comparison of 
landholder bids.  
The two key documents for the scoring process are the Site Assessment Sheet 
(Appendix C.1) and the guides for field officers (Appendix C.2 and Appendix C.3), 
both developed specifically for the Catchment Care trial. The Site Assessment Sheet 
enables the field officer to capture all of the site assessment details on one form in a 
simple format. The Catchment Care guide for field officers explains in detail and with 
photographs, the different characters and how to go about scoring them robustly. The 
field officer guide enhances the consistency and comparability of character scoring at 
different sites. This is especially important when, as in the case of the Catchment 
Care trial, more than one field officer is involved in scoring sites. The more 
information provided on scoring the less open the process is to interpretation thereby 
enhancing the consistency of site assessment and character scoring. 
During the site visit the field officer records environmental value and threat scores of 
the proposed site on the Site Assessment Sheet. Characters for each site are 
assigned an integer score between 1 and 5 with 5 being high value/threat and 1 low 
value/threat. The site assessment process is designed to be as intuitive as possible. 
Once a Project Officer has become familiar and skilled in the use of the sheet and 
interpretation of the characters the field guide should not need to be referred to. 
Thereby the time taken to assess a site will become less as more sites are assessed. 
Site assessment is undertaken in two stages – a desktop stage and a field stage. 
The desktop stage involves deriving scores for environmental value characters from 
the Watercourse Risk Priority Setting (WRPS) tool, a Geographic Information System 
(GIS) database developed for the Board prior to this project. The GIS-derived scores 
need to be obtained before field site assessment, then checked and, if necessary, 
refined in the field. The field stage involves a site visit by the field officer where  
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values and threats are assessed with the assistance of the landholder. However, the 
results of the site assessment are not made known to the landholder.  
Table 2 summarises the value and threat characters assessed in the process, and 
from where the data score for each character is acquired. The characters are 
discussed further in the next section and detailed instruction on scoring each 
individual character is contained in the field officer guides (Appendix C.2 and 
Appendix C.3). 
Character Name  Type  Scored from GIS  Scored in Field 
Geomorphology 
River Style ©  Value  yes  confirm only 
Bed instability  Threat  no  Yes 
Bank instability  Threat  no  Yes 
Hydrology 
Hydrological disturbance  Value  yes  confirm only 
Dams and Off-takes  Threat  yes  confirm only 
Remnant Vegetation 
Conservation Significance  Value  yes  confirm only 
Remnant Vegetation Condition Value  no  Yes 
Landscape connectivity  Value  yes  confirm only 
Patch size  Threat  yes  confirm only 
Weed % Cover  Threat  no  Yes 
Invasive Weed Presence  Threat  no  Yes 
Grazing pressure  Threat  no  Yes 
Table 2 - Environmental value and threat characters and their source. Note that scores 
are not directly available from GIS but rather are able to be derived from available 
layers. 
The calculation of the environmental benefit score of each bid which underlies the 
process of bid ranking and selection in Catchment Care also involves scoring the 
amount of threat reduction achieved by proposed landholder actions. As discussed 
above, risk is calculated by multiplying environmental value by threat. High value 
sites at high threat receive a high score for risk. In Catchment Care, risk is then 
multiplied by threat reduction to arrive at an impact score. The impact score is, in 
turn, multiplied by the area of action to arrive at an environmental benefits score. The 
environmental benefits score of each bid is divided by the cost to give a measure of 
cost effectiveness of each bid which forms the basis of bid ranking and selection. 
4.4.2.1 The Watercourse Rehabilitation Priority Setting Tool 
The site assessment methodology of Catchment Care includes characters derived 
from the Watercourse Rehabilitation Priority Setting (WRPS) tool. These characters 
require specialist technical expertise to interpret and score. Thus, scores for these 
characters are acquired not during the site visit but from the WRPS tool prior to the 
site visit. The characters scores are validated on site at time of assessment using 
information contained in the field guides (Appendix C.2 and Appendix C.3). If there is  
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an obvious discrepancy in the score originally assigned to those characters at those 
interpreted by the field officer, the character score is revised in the WRPS tool. This 
discrepancy may arise because many of the data sets that were utilised in the WRPS 
tool were sourced from third parties and at a more coarse scale of assessment.  
The WRPS tool was jointly developed by the Onkaparinga, the Northern Adelaide 
and Barossa, the Patawalonga, and the Torrens Catchment Water Management 
Boards. The aim of the WRPS tool was to provide a method that would enable 
description of the physical and ecological condition of their riparian environments, 
and to provide focus and information to guide the establishment of priorities for future 
on-ground protection and rehabilitation works. This resulted in the following: 
•  Production of a geomorphic stream style classification of watercourses of the 
Mt. Lofty Ranges. This was the first time that such a classification, widely 
applied interstate, has been undertaken in South Australia. 
•  A desktop risk assessment that derived a relative ranking of watercourse 
reach segments according to physical characteristics and exposure to 
threatening processes (note that the risk assessment in the WRPS tool bears 
no relationship to the risk analysis framework used in Catchment Care, it is 
simply used to help score some of the characters). This desktop assessment 
was based on existing datasets. 
The WRPS tool is a linked MS Access database and ArcGIS project which stores 
base data and calculates risk scores. The tool can be used to generate graphic 
representations of reach status and to compare field observations over time. The 
scoring and parameter assumptions used in the model can be modified as required. 
The WRPS tool, developed prior to the Catchment Care trial through investment by 
the Board, was found to be very useful in providing information on several 
environmental value characters which are then validated in the field during the site 
assessment stage. 
4.4.2.2 Geomorphology 
The physical form and behaviour of a watercourse provides the physical structure or 
template within which riverine ecosystem processes occur. The concept of river style 
(Brierley and Fryirs 2000) is used as an integrated assessment tool in Catchment 
Care. The uses of the river style typology enables the classification of watercourses 
according to their physical form and related stream behaviour and provides 
boundaries and limitations on the ecological processes that occur naturally within that 
river style. The ecological processes occurring within a watercourse will react 
differently to threatening processes depending on the river style. The incorporation of 
geomorphic assessment with riparian vegetation and hydrologic data is a relatively 
new approach to take for the consideration of environmental health and rehabilitation. 
In order to understand and identify the range and state of these river styles, a 
geomorphic investigation was conducted in the Watercourse Rehabilitation Priority 
Setting Project. This investigation categorised the types of streams that existed in the 
Onkaparinga catchment. A set of detailed maps of river styles with broad scale 
interpretations of the processes that occur across the major catchments have been 
prepared utilising aerial photography, geological mapping, rainfall data, topographic 
analysis and field inspection following the Brierley and Fryirs (2000) typology (Figure 
14).   




















































Figure 14 – Distribution of river styles in the Onkaparinga catchment. 
The river style of a watercourse reach and its adjoining reaches have both value and 
threat implications for that reach. Each river style indicates prior (undisturbed) form 
and likely future form, both of which influence rehabilitation options. Fieldwork and 
observations over time are recommended to accurately determine the rate of change 
of any watercourse. 
Environmental values for Geomorphology were assigned according to river style 
(Brierley and Fryirs 2000) and threats were assigned on the potential of a reach to 
undergo changes from bed and bank erosion.   
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Environmental Value – River Style 
The Geomorphology environmental value character is a score based upon the 
geomorphic river style (Brierley and Fryirs 2000) of the waterway and the relative 
frequency of occurrence within the Onkaparinga catchment. The value ranking was 
based on rarity, intactness and the role of the reach with respect to catchment wide 
ecological processes. The cut and fill river style is given the lowest score due to its 
common occurrence and the fact that the cut and fill streams have generally been 
subjected to gullying or erosion, thereby reducing the biophysical value of the stream 
style. The chain of ponds and gorge river styles were given high value scores due to 
their limited extent within the catchment and the rarity of their characteristic 
biophysical components and processes.  
Intact discontinuous streams are those most susceptible to significant changes from 
their pre-European physical condition. The incised form of these streams (i.e. cut and 
fill) are likely to be the most active streams in the catchment, supplying sediment to 
downstream reaches and threatening upstream reaches with incision associated with 
headward erosion.  
There are a large number and length of the intact valley fill form of the discontinuous 
stream style. There is a risk of losing these forms as a result of incision associated 
with downstream headward migrating erosion processes. However, as this is a 
relatively common stream category within the Onkaparinga catchment the protection 
of each individual reach of this stream category may be less important than the 
protection of the more rare chain of ponds river style. Where the vegetation cover is 
also largely intact these intact valley fills provide a glimpse into the original form of 
these streams in the region.  
To create the Geomorphology environmental value character, geomorphic stream 
styles were ranked for each reach, with values from 1 to 5, with 1 being considered 
the least value and 5 being the highest value (Table 3). 
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River Style Category  Score 
Chain of ponds  5 
Anabranching Swamp Belt  5 
Tidal 5 
Gorge 4 
Intact valley fill  3 
Alluvial continuous 2  3 
Alluvial continuous 5  3 
Alluvial continuous 6  3 
Steep headwater  3 
Flood out  3 
Confined 2 
Partly Confined 1  2 
Partly confined 2  2 
Partly confined 3  2 
Cut and fill  1 
Urban, Quarry, Farm Dam, Reservoir 1 
Table 3 - Environmental value scores for Geomorphology according to geomorphic 
stream style. 
Threats - Bank and Bed Erosion 
The threat from erosion is based on degree of instability experienced by the bed and 
bank of a watercourse.  Depending on the circumstances, poor bank stability may not 
be as serious a threat as an erosion head (unstable bed). When undertaking erosion 
control works, it is generally accepted that bed erosion is of higher priority than bank 
erosion – bank erosion control measures will be unlikely to be successful if bed 
erosion is allowed to continue. If an extreme erosion issue is identified on a site, an 
expert will be called in to assess the issue and potentially the erosion issues will be 
funded for erosion control works via a different Board funding program. A flag exists 
in the Site Assessment Sheet to note this situation. Thus, the more severe the Bank 
and Bed Instability (Table 4) operating at a site the greater the threat value. 
 
Bank Instability  Score    Bed Instability  Score 
Intact  1   Intact  1 
Stable  2   Stable  2 
Limited instability  3   Limited instability  3 
Moderate instability  4   Moderate instability  4 
Extensive instability  5   Extensive instability  5 
     Bed Aggradation  5 
Table 4 - Bed and Bank instability threat scores.  
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4.4.2.3 Hydrology 
Consideration of natural flow patterns can provide insight to the level of hydrological 
disturbance in the catchment with reference to natural (undisturbed) conditions.  
Understanding the level of disturbance to hydrologic and hydraulic regimes, and the 
causes of disturbance needs to be based on information about the natural 
environmental flow regimes. Measures to reduce and prevent further disturbance and 
to return more natural environmental flows can also be based on this information. 
Runoff generation and stream hydrology are influenced by factors such as climate, 
topography and soils. These parameters will create subtle and distinct variations 
between catchments and reaches and the natural systems have adapted to the 
characteristics of the local environment. The substantial variation in biotic 
communities occurring between sites is driven by heterogeneity in the geomorphic 
and hydrologic conditions. 
Environmental Value – Hydrology 
The environmental value of Hydrology captures the degree of disturbance of the 
natural hydrological flows. The Hydrology value is affected by water storages (farm 
dams), water off-takes and public water supply and water treatment systems. The 
Onkaparinga River is used as an aqueduct for water from the River Murray between 
Hahndorf and Clarendon Weir. Specific analyses are required to determine the 
influence of these changes in flows on the hydrological value of waterways in this 
area. The impacts however, are likely to be significant and possibly extreme and 
hence, a low environmental value score for Hydrology should be attributed to those 
reaches influenced by public water supply systems.  
Hydrological disturbance for all other watercourses was modelled in GIS using the 
following procedure. Using 5m elevation contours, a digital elevation model (DEM) of 
the Onkaparinga catchment was generated using ArcView 3D Analyst. From the 
DEM, first order sub-catchments were delineated. Sub-catchments were checked to 
ensure boundary accuracy and the area of each sub-catchment was calculated. Data 
on rainfall and run-off rates from gauging stations, and weather station data were 
collated and interpolated for all first order sub-catchments. These figures were used 
to generate runoff rate and average rainfall data for the low flow season (December 
to May) and high flow season (June to November). For each catchment, the run-off 
volume for low and high flow seasons was calculated. 
A GIS database of farm dams was used to estimate farm dam volume and total dam 
volume. The run-off from each catchment was calculated so that downstream 
catchment calculations included all upstream contributing catchments (i.e., a third 
order catchment includes all upstream second and first order catchments). The 
proportion of dam interception to total run-off was determined and recorded on a 
watercourse reach basis into GIS. The degree of hydrological disturbance is scored 
for high and low flow seasons as shown in Table 5. 
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Degree of Disturbance 
Low Flow (Dec - May) High Flow (Jun - Nov) Score 
Low Low  5 
Moderate Low  4 
High Low  2 
High High  1 
Table 5 - Degree of hydrological disturbance and environmental value score for 




































































Figure 15 – Hydrological disturbance of watercourses in the Onkaparinga catchment. 
Note that mapped classes of low and moderate were described simply as LOW 
(Table 5) whilst the high, very high and extreme were described simply as HIGH 
(Table 5). 
Threat – Dams and Off-takes 
The threats to Hydrology are considered in terms of the presence and operation of on 
and off stream dams and off-takes. Threats to Hydrology were assessed based on 
the presence of farm dams and the potential disturbance to watercourse flows 
(through interception of runoff) that they present. The nature and position of these 
obstructions is scored according to the description in Table 6. The greater the 
reduction in flows, the higher the threat score. 
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Dams and Off-Takes  Score  Description 
Active on stream dam/off-
take with no low flow 
bypass  5 
Dam located on stream, or there is an in stream off-take 
(diversion or pump) for off stream dam.  Dam has no low 
flow bypass and is actively used for agricultural and 
domestic purposes. 
Large inactive on stream 
dam/off-take with no low 
flow bypass 
4 
Greater than 2ML dam located on stream, or in stream off-
take (diversion or pump) for off stream >2ML dam.  Dam is 
not actively used, but offers aesthetic or fire fighting value. 
Small inactive on stream 
dam/off-take with no low 
flow bypass  3 
Less than 2ML dam located on stream, or there is an in 
stream off-take (diversion or pump) for off stream <2ML 
dam.  Dam is not actively used, but offers aesthetic or fire 
fighting value. 
On stream dam/off-take 
with low flow bypass  2 
Dam located on stream, or there is an in stream off-take 
(diversion or pump) for off stream dam.  Dam has low flow 
bypass. 
No on stream Dams/Off-
Takes  1  No on stream dams/off-takes 
No watercourse  0  No watercourse 
Table 6 – Dams and Off-takes description and threat score. 
4.4.2.4 Remnant Vegetation 
Scores for the environmental value characters of Conservation Significance and 
Landscape Connectivity, and the threat character of size were derived from the 
WRPS tool. For the WRPS project vegetation related information was assembled 
from three existing datasets; riparian vegetation from previous riparian surveys, the 
state government Floristic Vegetation Mapping of South Australia, and land cover 
and land use data. These data sources are described briefly below. 
Watercourses of 3
rd order and larger in the Onkaparinga and Willunga Catchments 
have been  previously assessed through Riparian Zone Management Plan (RZMP) 
projects utilising methods developed primarily by the SA Department for Environment 
and Heritage (DEH). All watercourses in the Field River and Christie Creek were 
surveyed by consultants using a similar method. These surveys collected information 
on the composition and distribution of native and exotic vegetation, with particular 
reference to the riparian zone. The state government Floristic Vegetation Mapping of 
South Australia data records the distribution floristic community types at a scale of 
1:50,000. Native vegetation distribution data was also extricated from the land cover 
and land use data sets developed by DEH, the SA Environmental Protection Agency 
and Planning SA. In these data sets only the community composition and distribution 
of native vegetation are represented, no information is provided on density, condition 
or biological diversity.   
It must be noted that there are a number of significant limitations in the application of 
the RZMP and state Floristic Mapping data to both the WRPS project and this project 
which include: 
•  The data sets being used were not collected for this purpose and it is 
recognised that this restricts their accuracy and useability;  
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•  Many of the surveys were conducted five or more years ago and the presence 
and distribution of weed species and native vegetation may have changed 
since the surveys were conducted; 
•  The RZMP surveys generally only covered the 3
rd order and larger streams 
and hence the data could not be applied to 1
st and 2
nd order streams that 
comprise the greater proportion of total watercourse length for any catchment; 
•  The RZMP surveys did not consider the influence or presence of vegetation 
outside of the immediate riparian zone; and  
•  The smallest vegetation mapping unit was generally smaller than the 
geomorphic reach length. 
With these limitations in mind, these databases were useful for providing a basis for 
scoring Remnant Vegetation characters in Catchment Care and validating the scores 
in the site assessment. The Remnant Vegetation environmental value character is a 
composite character that is calculated as a weighted sum of three individual 
characters: Conservation Significance, Condition, and Landscape Connectivity. The 
environmental value characters for Remnant Vegetation were selected because they 
provide information on three important ecological aspects, namely the Conservation 
Significance of the vegetation community, the Condition or degree of 
disturbance/weed invasion of the community, and the landscape context of the 
vegetation patch.  
These three characters also capture information about the management priorities for 
remnant vegetation in the Onkaparinga catchment. In essence, remnant vegetation 
patches have a higher environmental value score if they are of Conservation 
Significance, are in good Condition, and are well connected to other nearby patches 
thereby allowing species migration. The three Remnant Vegetation value characters 
are discussed in more detail below. 
Environmental Value – Conservation Significance 
There are several vegetation associations and species that are now considered rare, 
threatened or vulnerable in the Mt. Lofty Ranges. The Remnant Vegetation 
Conservation Significance environmental value character is scored based on the 
conservation significance of the vegetation community and component species. The 
conservation significance ratings for remnant vegetation communities were derived 
from Neagle (1995). The conservation significance ratings for known species are 
scored based on their South Australian conservation status as derived from the 
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1972 - Schedule 7 Endangered Species, Schedule 9 
Rare Species, and Schedule 8 Vulnerable Species. Environmental value scores for 
Conservation Significance are high for vulnerable and endangered communities and 
species and low for more common communities and species (Table 7). 
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Category Description  Score 
Very High 
Project Site is predominantly comprised of a veg association that is classed 
as Vulnerable or Endangered, and known to contain species of conservation 
significance 
5 
High  Project Site is predominantly comprised of a veg association that is classed 
as Uncommon, and known to contain species of conservation significance.  4 
Moderate  Project Site is predominantly comprised of a veg association that is classed 
as Common, and known to contain species of conservation significance  3 
Moderate 
- Low 
Project Site is predominantly comprised of a veg association that is classed 
as Common, and may contain species of conservation significance  2 
Low  Project Site is predominantly comprised of a veg association that is classed 
as Common, and appears to contain no species of conservation significance  1 
Very Low  So little remnant vegetation remaining on Project Site that Pre European 
Veg Association cannot be considered extant on the site  0 
Table 7 - Remnant vegetation Conservation Significance and environmental value 
score. 
Environmental Value – Condition 
The Remnant Vegetation Condition environmental value character considers several 
aspects of vegetation health, but excludes the presence of weeds as weed species 
presence and density are captured as threats in Catchment Care. The Condition 
score takes into account: 
• diversity  of  indigenous  species; 
• structural  integrity; 
•  level of disturbance, and; 
•  canopy and perennial health. 
Based on a combination of these parameters the vegetation is scored as shown in 
Table 8.   
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Dense understorey, very little or no clear ground. Canopy 
completely intact  >80 5 
Mostly Intact  Medium understorey however some bare ground. 
Canopy cover is close to complete.  60 - 80  4 
Slightly 
Degraded  Very little understorey.  Generally good canopy cover.  40 - 60  3 
Moderately 
Degraded 
No understorey.  Canopy cover around 50%. Usually in 
form of group of remnant trees.  20 - 40  2 
Very Degraded 
Scattered remnant vegetation, usually in form of remnant 




Degraded  No, or very little remnant vegetation  0  0 
Table 8 -  Remnant Vegetation Condition and environmental value score. 
Condition is considered to be a good indicator of the environmental value of native 
vegetation areas. Large patches of remnant native vegetation in excellent condition 
will be largely self-sustaining in the current ecological conditions in the Mt Lofty 
Ranges. Remnant vegetation patches in good condition may be subject to 
disturbance and degradation but they have the best chance of recovering from 
disturbance when threats are removed. Rehabilitation or protection works to address 
degrading processes are likely to be minor, of low cost, and have a good chance of 
success. These patches are a high priority to the Board. 
By comparison, vegetation in highly degraded condition will need active management 
to prevent it degrading further. Few natural processes will be functioning in patches in 
poor condition. These patches may be subject to invasions of weeds and pathogens 
and provide limited habitat. Rehabilitation works will be extensive, expensive, they 
will take longer and have less chance of success. 
Vegetation may have other value in other aspects of watercourse health such as 
erosion control or in providing connective corridors. However, highly degraded 
vegetation is attributed a low environmental value as an essential and substantial 
part of the ecosystem in the Onkaparinga catchment.  
Environmental Value – Landscape Connectivity 
Landscape connectivity refers to the degree of connection between the site under 
assessment and surrounding remnant vegetation. This character recognises the 
inherent importance of habitat proximity (McIntyre and Hobbs 1999) when proposing 
investment in on-ground works. Patches of remnant vegetation that are better 
connected to other patches in the landscape have a higher environmental value 
score for Landscape Connectivity (Table 9). 
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Category  Description  Score 
Continuous  Project Site highly connected, directly buffering or is contained within a 
significant (>10Ha) remnant block.  5 
Almost 
Continuous 
Project Site highly connected, directly buffering or is contained within a 
significant (>1<10Ha) remnant block.  4 
Partly 
Fragmented 
Project Site of >1Ha functionally linked (ie not more than 100m from) a 
significant remnant block (>1Ha).  3 
Fragmented  Project Site of <1Ha functionally linked (ie not more than 100m from) a 
significant remnant block (>1Ha).  2 
Highly 
Fragmented 
Project Site of >1Ha NOT functionally linked (ie  more than 500m from) 
a significant remnant block (>1Ha).  1 
None  Project Site of <1Ha NOT functionally linked (ie  more than 500m from) 
a significant remnant block (>1Ha).  0 
Table 9 - Landscape connectivity environmental value score. 
Sites that are located within close proximity (as defined in Table 9) to existing 
remnant vegetation (of habitat value) are of higher value as actions (especially 
Revegetation) in these sites provide buffering or extension of existing habitat 
depending on the type of works proposed (Hobbs 1993, Fahrig 2003). This value 
progressively diminishes as the site becomes further dislocated from nearby remnant 
vegetation, and when nearby remnant vegetation is smaller in size. 
Threat – Patch Size 
Smaller patches of remnant vegetation are more open to edge effects (Fahrig 2003).  
Essentially, in smaller patches there is proportionally less core habitat (habitat which 
remains relatively undisturbed by edge effects). This results in changes in species 
composition of the patch, favouring those species which can thrive in the edge 
environment over interior species. In addition, smaller patches, especially those that 
are poorly connected to other patches, support smaller species numbers and thus 
increase the chances of localised species extinction. The diversity and viability of 
larger patches of remnant vegetation are generally greater. Thus, sites with smaller 
patches of remnant vegetation receive a higher Patch Size threat score (Table 10). 
 
Patch Size (ha)  Score 
< 1  5 
1 to 3  4 
3 to 5  3 
5 to 10  2 
> 10  1 
No vegetation  0 
Table 10 - Patch size threat score.  
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Threat – Weed % Cover 
Invasive weeds reduce the diversity of vegetation communities by out-competing and 
excluding native species. The presence of exotic vegetation, particularly invasive 
weeds is an indicator of disturbance and degradation of the native vegetation. The 
Weed % Cover threat score is a measure of weed density calculated as a percentage 
cover of all weeds and classified into five classes (Table 11). The greater the 
proportional cover of weeds in the remnant vegetation community, the higher the 
threat score. 
 
Description of Weed % Cover  Score 
Low cover or not many 1-10 individuals (<10%)  1 
Any number of individuals covering 10 – 25% of the area  2 
Any number of individuals covering 26 –50% of the area  3 
Any number of individuals covering 51 – 75% of the area  4 
Covering more than 75% of the area  5 
Table 11 - Weed % Cover threat score. 
Threat – Invasive Weeds Presence 
Different weed species have different levels of impact on native ecosystems in the 
Onkaparinga catchment. Hence, some species present a greater threat to the native 
biodiversity than others. The species of invasive weeds influences land management 
priorities. The Invasive Weeds Presence threat character involves recording for each 
site the presence/absence of both proclaimed and non-proclaimed exotic plant 
species of importance in the Onkaparinga catchment. Removal of proclaimed species 
is mandatory as part of the landholder’s duty of care and must form part of the overall 
works proposed by the landholder.  
Derivation of a threat score for Invasive Weeds Presence involves two steps. Firstly, 
a total score is summed based on the weed species occurring at the site following 
Table 12. For example, if a site had Bridal Creeper, African Boxthorn and an Olive 
tree the total Invasive Weed Presence score would equal 4 + 3 + 4 = 11. 
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Common Name  Scientific Name Score Proclaimed 
African Boxthorn  Lycium ferocissimum  3 Yes 
African Daisy  Senecio pterophorus  3 No 
Ash, Popular, Elm  Fraxinus sp.  2 No 
Blackberry  Rubus sp.  4 Yes 
Boneseed  Chrysanthemoides mon.  4 Yes 
Bridal Creeper / Veil  Myrsiphyllum sp.  4 Yes 
Broad-leaved Cotton Bush  Asclepias rotundifolia  2 No 
Bulbil Watsonia  Watsonia sp.  3 Yes 
Cape Broom  Genista monspessulana  4 Yes 
Cape Weed  Arctotheca calendula  1 No 
English Broom  Cytisus scoparius   4 Yes 
Erica  Erica sp.  4 No 
Exotic grasses   Various sp.  3 No 
Fountain Grass  Pennisetum macrourum   3 Yes 
Gorse  Ulex europaeus  4 Yes 
Monadenia  Monadenia bracteate  4 Yes 
Olive  Olea europaea  4 Yes 
Periwinkle  Vinca major  3 No 
Phallaris  Phallaris sp.  4 No 
Pittosporum  Pittosporum undulatum  3 No 
Radiata Pine  Pinus radiata  3 No 
Salvation Jane  Echium plantagineum  3 Yes 
Wattles  Acacia sp.  2 No 
Willow   Salix sp.  3 No 
Table 12 - Invasive Weed Presence threat score. 
This total score is then normalised using the following table to provide the final score 
for this character, The final score is between 1 and 5 so that it is comparable with the 
other character scores (Table 13). 
 
Sum score  <10  10 to 17  18 to 24  25 to 29  >29 
Normalised Score  1 2  3  4 5 
Table 13 - Normalising the scores for the Invasive Weed Presence threat. 
Threat – Grazing Pressure 
Livestock grazing is a widespread threat to biodiversity and water quality in 
agricultural landscapes. Grazing Pressure involves the degradation of biodiversity 
through direct predation and trampling by livestock. The impact on water quality 
occurs largely through the pugging (holes caused by hooves) and disturbance of  
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soils thereby increasing erosion and turbidity, and through the contamination of run-
off by faecal coliform.  
Grazing pressure can be exerted by various domestic animals, but cattle are 
generally agreed to have the greatest impact due to their size (hoof size and body 
weight) and foraging nature. The Grazing Pressure threat character score depends 
on stocking rates and the nature of the grazer. The greater the grazing pressure, the 
higher the score for the Grazing Pressure threat (Table 14). 
 
Category Description  Score 
No grazing  No loss of foliage due to grazing  1 
Lightly 
grazed 
There is some loss of foliage due to grazing, and/or broken branches, but the 
plant essentially retains its natural growth form.  2 
Moderately 
grazed 
There is more obvious loss of foliage due to grazing, and/or broken branches, 
but the plant essentially retains its natural growth form.  3 
Heavily 
grazed 
There is obvious loss of foliage OR the plant’s height is stunted due to grazing  
OR there is an obvious browse line.  In some species, there may be epicormic 




The plant is grazed back severely, with little foliage remaining, OR plant has 
been severely physically damaged due to broken/crushed stems or branches.  5 
Table 14 - Grazing pressure threat scores. 
4.4.3 Information Exchange 
The other important functions of the site visit are to establish rapport between the 
landholder and the Board and the exchange of information between the two parties. 
The establishment of rapport and the exchange of information decreases the risk to 
the Board from funding private landholders. 
4.4.3.1 Establishing Rapport 
Establishing rapport is important for both the landholder and the Board. The 
landholder gains trust in the Board through personal contact and the development of 
a relationship. The landholder also has someone in the Board who they know 
personally and can feel comfortable contacting for further information. From the 
Boards perspective the establishment of rapport with the landholder may decrease 
the likelihood of moral hazard and possibly also the tendency for rent seeking. 
4.4.3.2 Discussion and Dialogue 
The exchange of information is important from both the landholder and the Board’s 
perspective. As far as the landholder is concerned, they can gain information about 
the priorities of the Board as they relate specifically to the proposed site(s). They can 
also gain information about best practice techniques for on-grounds works and the 
auction process itself through discussions with the field officer.  
From the Board’s perspective, the landholder’s local experience, expertise, and 
process knowledge of the proposed site(s) can be used to inform the development of 
priority actions. In addition, the provision of information to the landholder regarding  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 68  
 
priority actions may influence the choice of actions undertaken by the landholder to 
more closely follow the priorities of the Board. Provision of technical information 
about best practice for on-ground works may increase the certainty and quality of the 
environmental outcomes achieved by on-ground works. Emphasising the competitive 
nature of the auction process to the landholder may also decrease the information 
rent of the landholder and result in increased efficiencies for the Board. 
A key function of the site visit is to help the landholder understand the range of 
actions they can take and how they can benefit the environment. During the site visit 
the field officer advises on the most appropriate restoration and protection actions on 
the landholder’s site(s). The landholder and the field officer discuss actions that the 
landholder is interested in taking and how these relate to the priority actions of the 
Board. The field officer provides advice on how each action works to reduce 
particular threats and how the Board rates the relative value of action options 
available to the landholder. However, caution must be taken not to divulge enough 
information about the bid ranking and selection process to provide an information 
basis for landholders to rent seek. 
The amount of information provided is a critical element of auction design (Stoneham 
et al. 2003). This level of information provision to landholders means that landholders 
could not actually compute the environmental benefits score that their bid would 
receive and hence pre-empt the willingness to pay for their actions. Giving complete 
information could lead to the rent seeking problems similar to those experienced in 
the U.S. conservation reserve program where farmers could develop an 
understanding of agency maximum willingness to pay quite easily. All that was 
required was to observe reserve prices above which bids were not accepted on land 
similar to their own.  
Advice to the landholder may include detailed explanation of the types of restoration 
and protection actions in the context of the environmental values and threats of the 
sites being proposed. Field officer advice includes information and assistance in 
designing landholder actions using best practice techniques thereby reinforcing and 
complementing the material contained in the landholder information pack (Appendix 
B). The advice may also include recommendations on sequential actions or 
combinations of more than one action that are necessary to receive funding. For 
example, revegetation actions should not be funded in areas that are still accessible 
by livestock. In this case the field officer will recommend sequential actions where 
stock exclusion should occur before revegetation. These interrelationships are too 
complex to include in the bid selection algorithm and should be noted on the Site 
Assessment Sheet and discussed with the landholder. 
The field officer also provides advice about the appropriate and realistic area targets 
for landholder actions. Estimates of the area of each action are drawn on the high-
resolution map of the landholder’s property with the underlying aerial photograph 
supplied by the Board. 
It is very important that the discussion of actions relates directly to reduction in 
threats and specific area targets as scored on the Site Assessment Sheet. In effect, 
the threat classes outlined in the Site Assessment Sheet can be used as outcome 
targets for landholder actions. Landholder actions must aim to achieve a clearly 
defined threat reduction level, and this is explicitly included in the funding contract 
between the Board and the landholder.  
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For example, a landholder might be interested in reducing the coverage of blackberry 
from a creek line. A realistic action might be to undertake a slashing and poisoning 
program that reduces the Weed % Cover threat from 75% coverage (threat score of 
4) to < 50% coverage (threat score of 3) over an area of 1 hectare. The funding 
contract would then clearly indicate that the amount of funding sought is for a 
reduction of Weed % Cover threat to <50% coverage over an area of 1 hectare. The 
success in meeting contracted outcomes when they are framed in terms of reducing 
threat levels is directly assessable and may form the basis of continuation of periodic 
payments. 
4.5 Step 3 - Site Action Plan Development 
4.5.1 A Note on Landholder Duty of Care 
In South Australia, landholders are legally obliged to meet minimum duty of care 
requirements such as eradication of proclaimed pest plants and animals. There is an 
issue about whether landholders should be made to meet their minimum duty of care 
requirements before receiving funding by the Board. One option is that landholders 
receive no credit for mandatory duty of care actions in the Catchment Care auction 
process. In this case, only restoration and protection actions above and beyond duty 
of care may accrue credit (Figure 16). 
The policy of funding only those actions beyond duty of care has the potential to 
disadvantage some landholders. For example, a landholder that has purchased a 
property with significant existing proclaimed pest problems would be disadvantaged 
insofar as they have to spend significant amounts of time and effort before they can 
access Catchment Care funds. This factor may act as a disincentive to landholders in 
applying for funding and for undertaking restoration and protection actions on their 
property. It was decided that it is better to make funds available for all restoration and 
protection actions including those considered as duty of care.  










































Figure 16 - Example of environmental trajectories of threats to a site used in site 
assessment.  The two diagrams represent sites that both have a rapidly degrading 
environmental trajectory. The bottom figure represents a site whose threatening 
processes are largely processes that should be addressed under the landholder’s 
duty of care whereas the top figure represents a site largely threatened by processes 
not covered under the landholder’s duty of care. The dashed line is the environmental 
status quo.  A is the environmental trajectory expected if no actions are taken, B is 
the trajectory expected if actions demanded under the landholder’s duty of care are 
exercised, C represents the trajectory expected if both duty of care actions and 
actions proposed in the Site Action Plan are undertaken. One option for Catchment 
Care is that landholders may only be funded for actions resulting in reductions in 
threat from B to C. 
4.5.2 Landholder Actions and the Site Action Plan 
Landholders wishing to bid for Catchment Care funds need to develop a Site Action 
Plan which summarises the actions they propose to undertake and submit this as 
part of their bid. This is done in two stages.  
Firstly, after the site visit the field officer considers and recommends a suite of 
appropriate actions for each site. The list of actions considers the desired actions of 
the landholder and the most appropriate natural resource management actions for 
the site. Giving the landholder some say in the actions to be undertaken engenders a 
sense of ownership and participation in the process and may decrease the risk on 
non-or under-conformance. The list of recommended actions is documented in the  
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Site Action Plan and mailed to the landholder for consideration. As discussed above 
there are 5 main types of landholder actions funded under Catchment Care:  
•  Stock Exclusion; 
•  Non-Engineered Structures (for erosion control); 
•  Revegetation; 
•  Dam Modification, and; 
•  Weed Eradication. 
Based on the list of recommended actions, the landholder accepts or rejects actions 
and nominates a price for which they would be willing to conduct the actions. The 
landholder documents the proposed actions in the Site Action Plan and submits this 
with the nominated bid price to the Board for consideration. 
The Site Action Plan proforma is provided in the back of the landholder information 
pack and is presented in Appendix B.2 and when submitted as a final bid by 
landholders needs to include the following: 
•  A description of the proposed actions (e.g. Stock Exclusion, Revegetation) and 
practice being undertaken (e.g. fencing), including an estimate of the time and 
materials required; 
•  The level of financial support from the Board they require to take the actions 
including the amount of funding required for each activity and the total bid 
price, and the level of cost-sharing they are willing to contribute. It is important 
that the actions are fully justified and costed; 
•  A Gantt chart showing timing of activities; 
•  An accurate delineation of the areal extent and boundaries of sites targeted for 
each action (e.g. one site could involve 300m
2 of Bank Instability addressed 
through Revegetation and 10ha of remnant vegetation fenced off to remove 
Grazing Pressure). Delineation of areas can be hand drawn on the high-
resolution map of the property. Areas are digitised and stored in a GIS by the 
Board and the area is calculated using a GIS; 
•  A signed acknowledgment of the conditions of receiving Board funding. 
4.6 Step 4 - Bid Submission and Auction Process 
For the purposes of the Catchment Care trial, landholders were given up to 6 weeks 
to prepare and submit their bid. Telephone support was made available to 
landholders by the Board during this period and many took advantage of this. 
4.6.1 Scoring Threat Reduction 
On receipt of the all bids the levels of threat reduction achieved by each action needs 
to be scored. To ensure consistency in scoring threat reduction, this was done by all 
of the field officers involved in the site assessment process. All bids were collated 
and the level of threat reduction of each action proposed in each bid was scored by 
agreement by all field officers.  
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A landholder is eligible for a threat reduction score when they agree to undertake an 
action that reduces a threat to an environmental asset observed during the site visit.  
The number of threat reduction points a landholder may score depends on the 
current threat, the extent of the activities proposed and their likely success in 
reducing threats to values.  The threat reduction template is presented in Appendix 
D. 
The threat reduction score was determined using an expert panel approach, 
including selected field officers and project team members.  Landholders could earn 
the maximum threat reduction score by seeking to undertake on ground works that 
could reduce threat to the lowest category. 
For example, a landholder scores a Grazing Pressure threat score of 4 due to a 
heavily grazed riparian zone. By undertaking appropriate and comprehensive stock 
control activities the landholder may earn a maximum of 3 threat reduction points 
(refer to threat reduction score sheet in Appendix D). If the landholder elects to 
undertake actions contrary to those necessary to achieve a maximum threat 
reduction score the expert panel may score the landholder down accordingly. 
This component of the assessment is necessarily subjective.  However, by 
undertaking the threat reduction scoring process in an expert panel setting, the 
potential for inaccuracy and bias is reduced. 
The area over which threat reduction is achieved by proposed landholder actions was 
calculated following determination of the threat reduction score. The Board was 
aware that this process was open to a large degree of subjectivity and therefore 
undertook the procedure in Table 15 to retain as much consistency in the process as 
possible.  
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Threat  Calculation of the Area of Threat Reduction 
Bank 
Erosion  
Calculated as the total length of watercourse (regardless of stream Order) over which 
the proposed actions were deemed to provide a threat reduction for Bank Instability. 
This may in some cases have been a cumulative total resulting from actions occurring 
along separate reaches of the same watercourse or multiple watercourses.  
Watercourse reach lengths were measured accurately in GIS.  Watercourse length was 
multiplied by 4 metres (2m either side of the watercourse) to calculate area of threat 
reduction.  A buffer width of 2m either side of the watercourse was considered 
appropriate for the nature of the watercourse bank erosion observed in all tendered 
bids, but may need to be reconsidered for deeply incised watercourses. 
Bed 
Erosion  
The length of watercourse over which the Threat Reduction for bed Instability could 
occur was calculated in a similar way to Bank instability with the following exceptions. 
The width over which the threat reduction could be calculated was dependent on stream 
order. Stream order for all watercourse reaches in the Board’s area is available in GIS.   
To standardised the assessment across all properties the following bed widths were 
applied to stream order: 
 
Stream order   Bed width  Stream order   Bed width 
1st   1m  4th  3m 
2nd   1.5m  5th  4m 
3rd   2m  6th  5m 
 




The length of watercourse over which the threat reduction could occur is equal to the 
length of watercourse between the Dam where the proposed threat reduction actions 
are to take place and the next On-Stream Dam located downstream.  The width over 
which threat reduction could apply was as for stream order bed widths summarised 
above. Area was then calculated by multiplying watercourse reach length by stream 
order bed width. 
Patch Size   Where the Patch Size threat Reduction occurred as a result of a Revegetation action, 
the area of threat reduction was calculated as –  
 
Area  = no. stems proposed to be planted x 0.8 
  
This is based on a plant spacing of 1m (ie 1 plant/m
2) and a survival rate of 80%. 
 
In situations where natural regeneration could expect to occur as a result of grazing 
pressure reduction, area was estimated conservatively by the expert panel. 
Weed % 
Cover  
Areas of proposed weed control by the landholder were identified and accurately 
mapped on aerial photographs. These areas were digitised in a GIS layer to create area 
polygons. An area calculation formula was then run on this layer to determine the exact 




These areas were calculated in the same way as the Weed % Cover Areas. 
Grazing 
Pressure  
Areas of proposed grazing pressure control (through the use of fencing) by the 
landholder was identified and accurately mapped on aerial photographs.  These areas 
were digitised in a GIS layer to create area polygons and areas calculated as above. 
Table 15 - Area calculations for threat reduction actions.  
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4.6.2 Auction Design  
Experience with auctions more generally, suggests that the cost-effectiveness of the 
Catchment Care trial will depend on the design of auction processes and contracting 
to provide services (Klemperer 2002). This section describes auction design issues 
that past experience suggests may influence performance. Contract design issues 
are discussed in Section 4.8.2. 
4.6.2.1 Auction Format 
The type of auction favoured for the Catchment Care trial is a first price sealed bid 
discriminative price auction. This auction format is seen to have the greatest chance 
of increasing the allocative efficiency of Board funds for private on-ground NRM 
works. First price sealed bid auction formats have also been used by the 
Conservation Reserve Program, the NSW Environmental Services Scheme and the 
BushTender auctions of conservation contracts discussed earlier. 
First price sealed bid auctions are likely to encourage bidders to bid close to their true 
price in order to minimise the risk of losing the auction. This risk reduction strategy 
increases the efficiency for the Board at the at the cost of a lower pay off for the 
bidders. This is a manifestation of the effect of auctions in reducing the information 
rent of landholders. Further, first price sealed bid auctions do nothing to reduce the 
likelihood of the winners curse as landholders have no way of knowing when they bid 
very low for a given set of actions. As a result they may be contracted to provide 
substantial on-ground works for very little cost to the Board. Although the landholder 
may be disadvantaged by this, the efficiency and cost effectiveness of funds for on-
ground works is increased by this effect, as long as the landholder delivers the 
proposed actions. 
The sealed bid format means that the bidding strategies of competitors are not 
revealed publicly. In comparison to an open format where information about bids is 
shared publicly, this would give landholders less of a basis for rent seeking by 
developing an understanding of what the “agency would bear” in terms of level of 
bids likely to be accepted on a site like theirs.  
The first price sealed bid auction has many design elements that discourage 
collusion. Using a secret allocation rule makes it very difficult for bidders to 
systematically act to increase the price paid for landholder actions in a procurement 
auction. Selling several conservation contracts in one auction rather than several 
auctions reduces that ability of bidders to learn information about the sellers 
willingness to pay for on-ground works. Using a sealed bid format also reduces the 
ability of landholders to learn each others valuations. For similar reasons, the first 
price sealed bid format is probably also the most robust format for sequential 
auctions as is the case in the auction of conservation contracts. 
Using a Vickrey auction (equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction) may further 
encourage bidders to bid closer to their true valuation. However, the trade-off is in 
introducing an unfamiliar auction format as the Vickrey auction format is not common 
in Australia. This may have a negative effect on participation rates and hence reduce 
competition. As a result, the Vickrey auction format was not adopted but it may be 
worth further investigation in the future.  
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Auctions for conservation contracts are also multi-unit auctions where the Board 
offers more than one contract for sale and bidders may also seek more than one 
contract. The goal for the Board is the allocation of conservation contracts so that the 
greatest combined value (environmental benefits) is achieved. Conservation 
contracts are substitutes. Hence, as far as bidders are concerned it does not matter 
whether they are awarded the first or last contract, as long as they win one. This may 
result in demand reduction. Another hazard is that bidders may strategically increase 
their bid price to what they consider will be the highest price paid for a contract. 
However, not divulging the total amount of funding and the setting of a reserve price 
may help reduce these effects.  
Bidders can also bid for more than one contract. As long as the cost effectiveness of 
bids are evaluated individually and resources are allocated to the highest bidders (i.e. 
those offering the greatest EB/$), there will be no effect on the allocative efficiency of 
the auction. 
Discriminative price payment formats have been found to perform better than uniform 
price auctions for multiple conservation contracts (Stoneham et al. 2003, Cason and 
Gangadharan 2004, White and Burton 2005). A discriminative price payment format 
will be used in Catchment Care where bidders are ranked and selected according to 
the cost effectiveness of their bids and paid their actual bid price, rather than a 
uniform price for environmental benefits resulting from landholder actions. 
4.6.2.2 Reserve Price 
The great benefits of reserve prices in the context of auctions for conservation 
contracts, is that they can protect the seller from paying too much for on-ground 
works. Reserve prices can also reduce the effect of collusion. In auctions for 
conservation contracts, reserve prices can be set at the maximum price the Board is 
willing to pay for a unit of environmental benefit (i.e. $/EB or the inverse of the 
ranking metric). The difficulty lies in the setting an appropriate reserve prior to the 
auction.  
On the first run of an auction setting a sensible reserve price is virtually impossible 
because of the abstract units of measure (environmental benefits). Setting a reserve 
price on the second and subsequent auctions can be based on information learned in 
the previous rounds and the reserve price continually refined. It is difficult to predict a 
suitable reserve price but simulation does offer some clues (see Section 5). 
In the first few auction rounds it may be beneficial to maintain the right to set a 
reserve price post hoc once it sees the full spectrum of environmental benefits 
offered by the bids. This could be done by not divulging the total amount of funding 
available in the auction. This may mean withholding some allocated funds from one 
auction round over for a subsequent round (or to be allocated otherwise) if there were 
not a sufficient number of bids that offered good value for money. Bids would still be 
prioritised based on an objective formula, only the Board sets the reserve price once 
it evaluates the cost effectiveness of all bids. This approach would effectively allow 
the Board to avoid having to fund bids that it felt did not provide good value but still 
maintain a transparent and objective process of prioritising in order of environmental 
benefits per dollar.   
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4.7 Step 5 - Bid Assessment 
The Site Assessment Sheet and the landholder’s Site Action Plan includes a variety 
of information about environmental values, threats, threat reduction, area and costs 
that needs to be recorded by the Board. The data from each bid is entered into a MS 
Excel spreadsheet. The Catchment Care trial bid ranking and selection algorithm was 
implemented in the spreadsheet software. The bid assessment and ranking stage 
involves running the bid selection algorithm in Excel. The bid ranking and selection 
algorithm is described in detail below (note that values, threats and actions are 
italicised to assist interpretation). 
4.7.1 Catchment Care Risk Analysis Structure 
In the Catchment Care risk analysis framework, threats are related to specific 
environmental values (Figure 17). For example, the Invasive Weed Presence threat 
affects the Remnant Vegetation Condition value but does not influence other 
environmental values such as Hydrology or Geomorphology. Similarly, landholder 
actions can only reduce specific threats. For example, the Dam Modification action 
can reduce the threat of Dams and Off-Takes but not say, Weed % Cover. Some 
actions can simultaneously reduce more than one threat (e.g. Stock Exclusion can 
reduce the Bed Instability, Bank Instability and Grazing Pressure threats). Each 
character is given a weighting according to its overall importance in the process of 
watercourse and riparian zone rehabilitation (Figure 17).  The weights were 
developed by the project team on advice from the Board and using insights from 
auction simulation. 
It is useful to describe in more detail the risk analysis structure of Catchment Care 
illustrated in Figure 17. Firstly, the Geomorphology environmental value character 
reflects the inherent environmental value attributed to the style of stream (e.g. chain 
of ponds, gorge etc.). Geomorphology can be threatened by both Bank Instability and 
Bed Instability processes which are related to this environmental value. Three 
landholder actions may reduce the threat that both Bank Instability and Bed Instability 
have on the geomorphology of the site. Stock, particularly hoofed animals such as 
sheep and cattle, can disturb sediment and enhance erosion. Thus, landholders can 
take the action of Stock Exclusion to reduce the threat of both Bank Instability and 
Bed Instability. Revegetation can also be undertaken by landholders to help stabilise 
sediment and reduce the Bed Instability and Bank Instability threats.  
Because of the potential cost and complexity associated with engineering options to 
arrest Bed Instability, hard engineering actions by landholders to address these 
threats are not recommended as part of Catchment Care. Engineering options that 
are not designed or constructed appropriately may result in exacerbating degradation 
rather than mitigating erosion. Where Bed Instability is not advanced, landholder 
action is recommended. Where Bed Instability is severe and covers a large area, the 
site should be flagged for major erosion works. Major erosion works are not catered 
for in the Catchment Care risk analysis framework. The site however, should be 
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Figure 17 - Structure of Catchment Care risk analysis framework. Represented are the relationships between the environmental value, threat and 
action characters and the weights applied (in diamond) to each character in the calculation of risk. The dashed lines between actions and 
threats indicate that actions can reduce threats. The solid lines represent the mathematical relationships between threats and values in the 
risk calculation. Note that the 3 individual elements comprising Remnant Vegetation Value are also weighted. For a detailed description of 
each character refer to Section 4.4.2.  
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The environmental value character Hydrology reflects the naturalness of the flow 
regimes of the waterway. Dams and Off-Takes (Figure 17) pose a threat to the 
natural hydrological regimes in the Onkaparinga catchment as they interrupt the flow 
of surface runoff and reduce the amount of water in the river system. Landholders 
can propose to undertake the action of Dam Modification on their property to reduce 
the threat Dams and Off-Takes impose on the natural hydrology. In many cases, 
dams interrupting flow will occur off-site and be owned by other people. In this 
situation, the landholder can rarely take any action to reduce the threat of Dams and 
Off-Takes. Dam Modification can include dam wall modification and the installation of 
low flow bypass mechanisms. 
The environmental value character Remnant Vegetation includes 3 elements which 
are weighted according to their relative importance (Figure 17). Remnant Vegetation 
Conservation Significance is an indicator of the regional significance of the remnant 
vegetation community. Vegetation types with high significance include rare and 
threatened community types, and communities that include rare and threatened 
species. Remnant Vegetation Condition represents the degree of naturalness of the 
remnant vegetation of the site. The final Remnant Vegetation value character – 
Landscape Connectivity, provides an indication of the distance to and amount of 
remnant native habitat in the neighbourhood of the site (see Section 4.4.2). 
Threats to the Remnant Vegetation character include Patch Size which is a measure 
of the area of remnant vegetation at and adjacent to the site. The smaller the patch 
size the greater the threat to the fauna and flora associated with the patch as smaller 
patches are only able to support small species populations. The larger the patch, the 
more sustainable the habitat and the lower the threat. The Invasive Weed Presence 
threat includes the presence or absence of different species of invasive weeds, Weed 
% Cover refers to the percentage cover of invasive weeds, and Grazing Pressure 
captures the level of threat from grazing by stock such as sheep, cattle and horses. 
In terms of actions, landholders can undertake Revegetation to increase the area of 
patches and thus reduce the Patch Size threat. Revegetation can also reduce the 
Weed % Cover threat by increasing the relative proportion of native vegetation. 
Landholders can undertake Weed Eradication which can reduce the Invasive Weed 
Presence threat by eradicating different species of weeds, and also reduce the Weed 
% Cover threat. Stock Exclusion can be undertaken by landholders to exclude 
grazing animals from areas and reduce the Grazing Pressure threat to the site. 
It is important to note that some landholder actions may reduce multiple threats 
concurrently. In this case, the landholder will receive credit for all of the 
environmental benefits achieved. This feature of the Catchment Care risk analysis 
framework will tend to favour actions that reduce multiple threats as these tend to be 
the more efficient use of Catchment Care funds. For example, lets say a riparian area 
of 3.5 ha is subject to threats including Grazing Pressure on the riparian vegetation 
over the whole area (threat = 5, area = 3.5 ha) and Bank Instability caused by stock 
over a subset of this area (threat = 4, area = 0.3 ha). If a landholder excludes stock 
from the whole 3.5 ha area by fencing it off they reduce the threat of Grazing 
Pressure by 4 over an area of 3.5 ha but they also reduce the threat of Bank 
Instability by 3 over an area of 0.3 ha. In this case, undertaking a single action has 
resulted in multiple environmental benefits. As discussed above, the action of Stock 
Exclusion can reduce three different threats (Bank Instability, Bed Instability, and 
Grazing Pressure), Non-Engineered Structures can be used to reduce both Bed and 
Bank Instability, Revegetation can reduce multiple threats (Bank Instability, Bed  
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Instability and Weed % Cover), Weed Eradication can reduce two different threats 
(Weed % Cover and Invasive Weed Presence), whereas Dam Modification can only 
affect one threat (Dams and Off-Takes). 
There are many characters that could have been included in the Catchment Care risk 
analysis framework. Most notably, a character describing the risk posed by a site to 
other sites upstream (e.g. through erosion) downstream (e.g. through sedimentation). 
This is a very important consideration as sites that have a strong deleterious effect on 
other sites of high value should be a high priority for catchment care funding. 
However, this character is extremely difficult to assess in the field as it requires a mini 
risk assessment in itself where both the level of threat posed by the site to other sites 
and the environmental value of these sites need to be assessed. This character has 
not been included as it was considered impractical to assess off site threats but is 
worthy of consideration in further improvements to the risk analysis framework. In the 
same way, threats to individual sites that originate offsite were not included in the 
framework as they are also too difficult to reliably assess in the field. 
4.7.2 Calculating Risk, Impact and Environmental Benefits  
The aim of the Catchment Care risk analysis framework is to quantify the 
environmental benefits of the actions proposed by landholders to provide a 
quantitative basis for ranking and selecting the bids for funding which overall offer the 
greatest environmental benefits for the available funds. Environmental benefit is 
considered in terms of the risk of the site, the total amount of threat reduction 
achieved by landholder actions, and the area targeted for action.  
During the site assessment the environmental values and threats of each site are 
scored. We can calculate the risk of a site as: 
Risk = Environmental Value x Threat  Equation 1 
Environmental value and threat characters are scored such that sites with high 
environmental value have high scores for the environmental value characters. 
Likewise, sites subject to high threat also have high scores for the threat characters. 
Hence, sites of high value subject to high threat are at the highest risk in the risk 










Figure 18 - Relationship between environmental value, threat and risk in Catchment 
Care.  
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The Catchment Care risk analysis framework builds upon this simple risk analysis 
formula in the calculation of environmental benefits of landholder actions. The 
underlying tenet of the risk analysis of each site is that the sites at higher risk are 
given higher priority for restoration and protection action. The risk analysis framework 
involves several different environmental values and threats each with different 
relative weightings according to their importance. Calculating the total risk for each 
site is done at three stages. Initially, risk can be calculated for each threat as the 
weighted product of the threat and its respective environmental value (Equation 2 - 
Equation 8). The risk for each environmental value can be calculated from these as 
the sum of the risk of the individual threats operating on each value (Equation 9 - 
Equation 11). The total risk of each site is calculated as a sum of the risk associated 
with each individual environmental value (Equation 12).  
Formulae for calculating individual risk scores for each threat and value character, in 
addition to total risk are presented below: 
 
RISK by THREAT   
Riskbank = wgeo x River Style x wbank x Bank Instability  Equation 2
Riskbed = wgeo x River Style x wbed x Bed Instability  Equation 3
Riskdams = whydro x Disturbance x wdams x Dams and Off-Takes  Equation 4
Riskpsize  = wveg  x Remnant Vegetation x wpsize x Patch Size  Equation 5
Risk%cover  = wveg  x Remnant Vegetation x w%cover x Weed % Cover  Equation 6
Riskwpres  = wveg  x Remnant Vegetation x wwpres x Invasive Weed Presence  Equation 7
Riskgraz  = wveg  x Remnant Vegetation x wgraz x Grazing Pressure  Equation 8
Where: 
Remnant Vegetation = (wsig x Cons Significance) + (wcond x Condition) + 
(wland x Landscape Connectivity) 
wsig + wcond + wland = 1 
RISK by ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
Riskgeo = Riskbank + Riskbed  Equation 9
Riskhydro = Riskdams  Equation 10
Riskveg  = Riskpsize  + Risk%cover  + Riskwpres  + Riskgraz  Equation 11
RISK TOTAL 
Risktotal = Riskgeo + Riskhydro + Riskveg  Equation 12
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The next element required in the Catchment Care risk analysis framework is the 
quantification of the impact of landholder actions. Impact is calculated as the product 
of the amount of threat reduction achieved by landholder actions and the risk of the 
site. The amount of threat reduction is quantified by field officers using an expert 
panel workshop approach. 
In Catchment Care the bids that offer the largest amount of threat reduction at sites 
with highest risk are the highest priority for funding. Bids that propose either actions 
that have moderate threat reduction on high risk sites, or involve substantial threat 
reduction on moderate risk sites are of high priority for funding. Bids that propose 
moderate-low threat reduction on moderate-low value sites are the lowest priority for 
funding.  
We implement this by multiplying the amount of threat reduction achieved by the risk 
of the site to create a measure termed the impact score. This is done in stages 
similar to the calculation of risk above. Firstly, impact is calculated individually for 
each threat. These are then summed to obtain values for each environmental value 
and again for total impact. The formulae are presented below. 
 
IMPACT by THREAT 
IMPACTbank = TRbank x Riskbank  Equation 13
IMPACTbed = TRbed x Riskbed  Equation 14
IMPACTdams = TRdams x Riskdams  Equation 15
IMPACTpsize  = TRpsize x Riskpsize  Equation 16
IMPACT%cover  = TR%cover x Risk%cover  Equation 17
IMPACTwpres  = TRwpres x Riskwpres  Equation 18
IMPACTgraz  = TRgraz x Riskgraz  Equation 19
IMPACT by ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
IMPACTgeo = IMPACTbank + IMPACTbed  Equation 20
IMPACThydro = IMPACTdams  Equation 21
IMPACTveg  = IMPACTpsize  + IMPACT%cover  + IMPACTwpres  + IMPACTgraz  Equation 22
IMPACT TOTAL 
IMPACTtotal = IMPACTgeo + IMPACThydro + IMPACTveg  Equation 23
 
Different bids will propose actions that reduce threats over different areas. Where 
bids propose actions resulting in similar impact over different areas, bids covering the 
largest areas are the highest priority for funding. To achieve this in Catchment Care, 
the impact score is multiplied by the area of the site. This forms a measure of the  
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magnitude of environmental benefits achieved by the proposed landholder actions 
and in Catchment Care is simply termed Environmental Benefits. In the same way as 
risk and impact, the environmental benefits score is calculated in stages firstly by 
threat, then by value, then total. The formulae for calculating the environmental 
benefits of each bid are presented below: 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS by THREAT 
EBbank = AREAbank x IMPACTbank  Equation 24
EBbed = AREAbed x IMPACTbed  Equation 25
EBdams = AREAdams x IMPACTdams  Equation 26
EBpsize  = AREApsize x IMPACTpsize  Equation 27
EB%cover  = AREA%cover x IMPACT%cover  Equation 28
EBwpres  = AREAwpres x IMPACTwpres  Equation 29
EBgraz  = AREAgraz x IMPACTgraz  Equation 30
EB by ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
EBgeo = EBbank + EBbed  Equation 31
EBhydro = EBdams  Equation 32
EBveg  = EBfrag  + EB%cover  + EBwpres  + EBgraz  Equation 33
EB TOTAL 
EBtotal = EBgeo + EBhydro + EBveg  Equation 34
 
As illustrated in Figure 17, each environmental value and threat character can be 
weighted according to relative importance and influence. In the Catchment Care trial, 
all environmental value and threat weights are set to 1 but they can be changed to 
reflect changes in funding priorities. This has several implications as follows. 
With all weights set to 1, the impact of actions addressing different threats has the 
same effect on the calculation of environmental benefits no matter which threat it 
addresses. In this case, the set of bids selected will represent the most efficient use 
of Board funds. 
With all weights set to 1, risk scores for each threat will range between 1 and 25 
(Figure 18). Risk scores for Geomorphology can theoretically range between 2 and 
50, Hydrology between 1 and 25, and Remnant Vegetation between 4 and 100. 
Thus, the relative influence of environmental values in the calculation of 
environmental benefits will be uneven insofar as the influence of Remnant Vegetation 
will be approximately twice as strong as Geomorphology, and Geomorphology 
approximately twice as strong as Hydrology.  
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The weights of both the environmental values and threat can be altered to reflect the 
change in importance of different elements in the catchment. Changing the weights 
however, will alter the relative impact of different actions on the calculation of 
environmental benefits. As a result the types of actions funded will change and the 
bids funded may not represent the most efficient expenditure of Board funds. 
4.8 Step 6 – Bid Selection and Contracting 
4.8.1 Bid Ranking and Selection 
Bids will be heterogeneous in the levels of environmental benefits offered and in the 
levels of financial support requested to implement environmental restoration and 
protection actions. Thus, to ensure allocative efficiency, the amount of environmental 
benefits proposed by landholders needs to be considered in the context of the total 
cost of landholder actions to the Board. The bids that offer the greatest 
environmental benefits per dollar cost to the Board become the highest priority for 
funding. Thus, environmental benefits per dollar becomes the critical indicator of cost 
effectiveness of each bid such that:  
 
EB/$ = EBtotal / Cost  Equation 35
  
Sites then need to be ranked by environmental benefits per dollar. The selection 
process then involves selecting the bids with the highest environmental benefits per 
dollar until the funds are exhausted or until the reserve price is breached. Note that 
this problem is different to the knapsack problem in bid selection suggested by 
Hajkowicz et al. (2004) and White and Burton (2005) which maximises the 
environmental benefits achieved from a given limited funding amount. Depending on 
the nature of the bids and the funding limit, the knapsack formulation has the 
undesirable potential to favour less cost effective bids over more cost effective bids. 
Pragmatically, the bid ranking and selection process may be done in a spreadsheet 
such as MS Excel. The result of applying the procedure outlined above is a list of 
bids ranked in order of their environmental benefits per dollar as calculated above. 
There will also be a level of requested financial support associated with each bid. The 
process of selecting bids could then involve: calculating the cumulative amount of 
requested financial support in another spreadsheet column, and then sequentially 
selecting bids with the highest environmental benefits per dollar, then next highest 
environmental benefits per dollar, and so on until the cumulative amount of funding 
exceeds the amount available. If a reserve price is to be used then this should be 
based on the inverse of the EB/$ cost effectiveness measure (i.e. $ / EB). The 
reserve price should be a limit on the cost per unit of environmental benefit that the 
Board is willing to pay. Simulation however, sheds more light on the use of a reserve 
price (Section 5). 
To illustrate, an example bid selection is shown in Table 16, for a case where the 
Board has $150,000 in total funds available for financial support. In the example, 26 
bids are submitted. The Board can afford to fund the 22 most cost effective bids, but 
the remaining 4 that offer least environmental benefits per dollar are not funded.   
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Cumulative 












1  43  38  $1,700  $1,700 
2  16  33  $4,100  $5,800 
.  .  .  .  . 
.  .  .  .  . 
21  5  21  $4,700  $148,700 
22  51  18  $1,200  $149,900 
23 12  15 $3,300  $153,200 
24 35  12 $4,000  $157,200 
25 9  8 $3,600  $160,800 
26 22  7 $5,300  $166,100 
 
Table 16 - Example bid selection spreadsheet. Shaded are the 22 of 26 bids selected in 
the example Catchment Care process described above. 
This system ensures comparability between bids such that bids covering smaller 
areas with low cost are compared fairly with those covering larger areas with higher 
costs. Hence, as an example, 2 sites with similar environmental benefits (i.e. similar 
values, threats and actions proposed over similar areas) will be differentiated solely 
on the basis of cost where the least expensive bid is selected first. This is the 
advantage of the Catchment Care auction process to funding landholder restoration 
and protection actions and this is expected to maximise the environmental benefits 
achieved for the funding available to the Board. 
4.8.2 Contract Design 
Elements of contract design can also be used to both reduce the risk to the Board of 
underperformance and to further encourage best practice techniques. Contract 
design can reduce the likelihood of underperformance through staged payment 
schedules and can encourage best practice through detailed specification using the 
Site Action Plan. 
Underperformance usually results from one of two main causes. Moral hazard is 
where landholders deliberately do not undertake the agreed actions and results in 
under- or non-performance of on-ground works. Underperformance can also arise 
from the winners curse where landholders bid too low for an agreed set of actions 
caused by either an overly aggressive bidding strategy or poor information on the 
costs of actions. 
To minimise risk of payment for services that are not actually delivered, it is 
recommended that contracts for works be specified with staged payment schedules. 
This could include some initial payments to cover up-front capital costs and further 
payments contingent on evidence that agreed actions have been satisfactorily carried 
out.   
Contracts also need to formally recognise and encourage the use of best practice 
methods. The quality of certain types of materials (e.g. seedlings from appropriate 
local providers), services (e.g. herbicide application, weeding around and fencing off 
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plantings) and the sequencing of actions can be critical to the success of works to 
improve riparian zone conditions. Failure to use appropriate materials, or to properly 
perform or sequence actions can lead to significant effort with little success. To 
ensure appropriate inputs, services and work sequences are used, it is 
recommended that the Board consider only accepting bids that meet mandatory 
requirements related to how works will be performed. This could include: 
•  requirements for seedling provider/supplier;  
•  requirements that herbicide application be only by a certified individual; and 
•  requirements that certain type of vegetation planting and maintenance be 
carried out by suitably trained landholders or contractors. 
Note that these requirements would be in addition to the requirement that works 
required to meet duty of care would be prerequisite to payment for further efforts as 
described in Section 4.5.1.  
The requirement, benefits and costs of such actions is spelled out in detail in the 
landholder information pack (Appendix B) and needs to be reinforced to the 
landholder at the time of the site visit. The type of methods used is documented in 
the Site Action Plan which is developed with input from both the landholder and field 
officer, The Site Action Plan forms part of the landholder’s bid for funds and also 
forms part of the formal contract. The detailed contracting of actions decreases 
ambiguity about the nature of the actions paid for by the Board, encourages best 
practice and decreases the risk to the Board. 
Thus, successful landholders are required to enter into a contractual agreement with 
the Board. This agreement is designed to protect the Board’s investment by ensuring 
that works it funds are maintained into the future. The conditions of receiving Board 
funding are presented in Appendix E and are summarised below. 
•  All stock exclusion fencing must be set back at a minimum of 5 meters from 
the top of bank in order to qualify for payment. 
•  The landholder will undertake the works identified within the time period 
indicated in their Site Action Plan. 
•  The Board will pay for services provided by the landholder as specified 
according to a payment schedule to be advised upon signing of an agreement 
with the Board. Further payments will be made based on achieving agreed 
milestones. 
•  The landholder agrees to maintain or replace any of the works and items 
funded through this Site Action Plan, should they be lost, stolen, damaged or 
destroyed. 
•  Stock is to be permanently excluded from areas where Revegetation works 
funded through this Site Action Plan have been undertaken. 
•  The landholder’s responsibility to maintain in good order the works and items 
funded through this Site Action Plan succeed the term of the agreement with 
the Board. 
While the landholder signs an agreement for funding over 3 years with the Board, 
they are required to maintain in good order or replace where necessary works/items 
funded by the Board. In this sense, on-ground works and areas that have been  
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rehabilitated or protected using Board funds must be maintained so in perpetuity. In 
practice it may prove difficult to police all properties on an ongoing basis.  
A major issue for the Board is to ensure the continuity of on-ground watercourse 
works on private land in the longer term.  Currently this is achieved with the 
preparation of a Work Plan between the landholder and Board providing the basis for 
on-ground assistance. The arrangement is however limited to the current landholder 
and there is no property right mechanism in place to bind successive owners to 
maintain the works. In 2003, in support of this MBI Pilot project, the Board 
commissioned an investigation into mechanisms to secure Board funded on-ground 
works (Iris Iwanicki and Assoc, 2001). A number of mechanisms where investigated 
of which the use of ‘conservation covenants’ in the Protected Areas on Private Land 
program under the Nature Conservation Act 2002 (Tasmania) provides a good 
precedent for an arrangement binding successive owners under the program. 
In the near future, the best mechanism to bind successive owners to agreements with 
the Board is likely to be offered by the new Natural Resources Management (NRM) 
Act (2003).  Any procedures adopted by the Board now have a high potential to be 
overtaken by the proposed restructuring involved in the upcoming NRM Act. The 
South Australian NRM Act replaces the SA Water Resources Act, the SA Soil 
Conservation and Land Care Act, and the SA Animal & Plant Control (Agricultural 
and other purposes) Act 1986 and provides for management agreements binding on 
subsequent land holders (sections 196 and 208 of the Bill) and also for enforcement.  
Effectively, the NRM Act will address the current dilemma of the Board to protect 
public investment in improving watercourse protection on private land. 
Until the new provision in the NRM Act can be properly resourced and implemented, 
the Board has included the following condition as part of receiving funding under this 
trial. 
In the event that the landholder sells their property either prior to or following completion of the 
Site Action Plan, the landholder is required to advise the new property owner of any 
agreements with the Board during sale negotiations 
While this does not obligate the new landholder to accept responsibility for 
maintaining on-ground works paid for by the Board (and in many cases jointly by the 
landholder), it does alert the potential new landholder to additional land management 
responsibilities that would accompany the purchase.  
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5 Simulation  
Catchment Care is a formal discriminative price auction process which provides a 
method for ranking and selecting bids algorithm within a risk analysis framework. The 
bid ranking and selection algorithm calculates cost effectiveness (environmental 
benefits per dollar) of bids based on environmental value and threat character 
scores, combined with the area, threat reduction and cost. Bids are then ranked and 
selected until the funding limit or reserve price is met (Sections 4.7 and 4.8).  
Prior to the trial the behaviour of the bid ranking and selection algorithm in Catchment 
Care was unknown. The algorithm may behave unpredictably, leading to undesirable 
results. For example, due to idiosyncratic properties of the algorithm, scoring system, 
or some other aspect, the algorithm may tend to bias large properties over small 
ones, or Dam Modification actions over Revegetation. There is a lot of Board money 
at stake for landholders to undertake environmental works. Before the algorithm can 
be sensibly and reliably applied in the formal bid selection process it is essential that 
we know more about its behaviour. Otherwise, the bids selected will not be those that 
offer the best environmental value for money nor those that are consistent with the 
priorities of the Board.  
To avoid undesirable results, the algorithm needs to be tested under the full range of 
auction conditions before it is applied in a full trial. We can then use this knowledge to 
make the necessary adjustments so that the bids selected are consistent with the 
goals of the Board and the process is fair and free from unwanted bias. 
One method commonly used to test algorithms such as the Catchment Care auction 
process is to use historical data. This is possible for the Onkaparinga as there are 
some 30 or 40 funding applications from the past few years. However, there are two 
immediate problems with this approach. Firstly, the environmental value and threat 
characters of the sites and the threat reduction achieved by landholder actions have 
not been scored. It is very difficult to obtain this information without employing the 
very expensive option of going back out into the field and scoring the sites. The 
second problem is that there are only a few past applications, thus making the 
sample size very small. Testing a highly parameterised and complex algorithm with a 
small sample size is fraught with danger as the historical applications will only cover 
a small proportion of the range of possible bids that may be submitted. 
Another method of evaluation is that of experimental economics (Cason and 
Gangadharan 2004). This approach involves the creation of a laboratory-based 
auction game with the same rules and protocols as Catchment Care. Participants are 
then given a choice of sites on their hypothetical property and are given the same 
information as landholders are given in the trial. They then consider their own private 
information (e.g. opportunity costs, preferences, expertise, etc.) and construct bids 
for Catchment Care funds. The experimentally derived bids can then be evaluated 
and run through the algorithm to test its performance. Further modification could be 
done to test the effects of auction and contract design. Experimental evaluation of the 
Catchment Care auction process was not done on this occasion but would provide 
useful insights perhaps for future larger rollouts of the Catchment Care system over 
the Mt. Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide Natural Resource Management region. 
In this study we use Monte Carlo simulation generate a large number of feasible bids 
to test the behaviour of the algorithm under the full range of parameter scenarios. 
Simulation is a commonly used analytical method designed to imitate the behaviour  
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of a system when other types of analyses are too complex or difficult to reproduce. 
Monte Carlo simulation works by producing a large number of examples where the 
values for each parameter are randomly taken from a given distribution whether it be 
normal, lognormal, Poisson, uniform etc. By simulating plausible inputs for a system 
the behaviour of the system may be estimated by analysing the distributions of the 
outputs. 
The aim of the simulation aspect of the Catchment Care study is to test the behaviour 
of the bid selection algorithm under the full range of possible bid scenarios. This 
information can then to refine the algorithm to increase the compatibility of bid 
selection with the goals of the Board and to understand and remove unwanted bias 
from the algorithm. The objectives are to use Monte Carlo simulation to simulate 
1,000 bids with plausible random scores for environmental values, threats, threat 
reductions from landholder actions, costs and areas of landholder actions. The 
Catchment Care bid selection algorithm will then be applied to this synthetic dataset 
and the outcomes of the bid selection process will be assessed. The characteristics 
of the bids will be compared to their ranking and the biases and idiosyncrasies of the 
system will be analysed and modified. 
5.1 Methods 
The simulation was conducted in Microsoft Excel. The basis of the simulation was a 
spreadsheet of the scores for each bid where each row is a bid and the columns hold 
the scores for environmental value, threat, cost, area etc. Each bid is given a location 
coordinate and a tender ID number. The simulation involves 6 parts listed below: 
1.  Simulation of environmental values and threat scores 
2.  Simulation of effort, area and cost of landholder actions 
3.  Translating landholder action effort and areas into threat reduction scores and 
areas 
4.  Running the bid selection algorithm 
5.  Regressing the EB/$ against the input parameters to assess influence 
6.  Assessing the benefit of using the Catchment Care auction process. 
5.1.1 Simulation of Environmental Value and Threat Scores 
In Catchment Care, sites are attributed environmental value and threat scores in the 
field-based site assessment as integer scores from 1 to 5, with 1 being low 
value/threat and 5 being high value/threat. In the simulation, the 1,000 bids were 
given random integer values between 1 and 5 for their threat scores. 
Geomorphology, Hydrology and the three vegetation environmental value characters 
(Conservation Significance, Condition and Landscape Connectivity) were also given 
random scores between 1 and 5. The Remnant Vegetation Value character is a 
weighted sum of the three vegetation characters where the weights can be adjusted 
according to the priorities of the Board. In this case, it is the average of the three 
characters.  
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5.1.2  Simulation of Effort, Area and Cost of Landholder Actions  
Effort, area and cost of landholder actions are also simulated for each bid. The level 
of effort of each of the five landholder actions provides an indicator of the intensity of 
the action. Higher effort scores will result in higher threat reduction scores later in the 
simulation. Effort scores for each landholder action are simulated using a modified 
Poisson generator. Each bid is assigned an effort score as a random integer between 
0 and 4 sampled from a modified Poisson distribution (Table 17). 
The modified Poisson distribution allowed most landholder actions to have no effort 
at all (i.e. a null action, the action does not occur) with a probability of receiving an 
effort score of zero equal to 0.4 or 0.6. If landholder actions occurred they were most 
likely to have a small effort score with less and less chance of achieving the highest 
effort score of 4 (p = 0.03). Landholders are less likely to undertake Dam Modification 
and this was reflected in the different set of probabilities in the simulation (Table 17). 
The distributions can be modified to test the effects of different types of actions and 
different levels of effort. 
 
Action Effort Score  Probability (A)  Probability (B) 
0 0.4000  0.6000 
1 0.3000  0.2000 
2 0.2000  0.1200 
3 0.0700  0.0500 
4 0.0300  0.0300 
 
Table 17 – Probability of landholder actions being assigned different effort scores. 
Landholder actions of Non-Engineered Structures, Stock Exclusion, Revegetation 
and Weed Eradication were assigned threat reduction scores according to probability 
distribution A whilst the landholder action of Dam Modification was assigned threat 
reduction scores according to probability distribution B. 
If a landholder action received a non-zero effort score for a bid as determined by the 
modified Poisson generator, the action was then assigned an area. Plausible area 
ranges for each action were derived from past applications and the experience of 
Board officers. Thus, each action was assigned a reasonable upper and lower area 
limit (Table 18) and each bid was attributed a random area selected from a uniform 
distribution with these limits for each action. The area of Dam Modification was 
specified as the area immediately downstream of the dam that is affected by the 
reduction in flow caused by the dam. 
 
Action  Minimum Area (m
2) Maximum Area (m
2) 
Non-Engineered Structures 20  200 
Stock Exclusion  500  400,000 
Revegetation 50  10,000 
Dam Modification  500  20,000 
Weed Eradication  50  50,000 
Table 18 – Area ranges for landholder actions.  
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The cost to the Board of each landholder action is simulated as a function of the 
effort and area over which the actions occur with some random variation. The cost of 
implementing Non-Engineered Structures is both effort and area dependent as the 
greater the area addressed and the greater the effort used to implement the 
structures, the greater the cost. The mean price of Non-Engineered Structures was 
specified as $3 per m
2 per effort unit with a standard deviation of $1. The total cost to 
the Board of the landholder action of implementing Non-Engineered Structures for 
each bid equals the area (m
2) multiplied by the effort score multiplied by a price 
sampled from a normal distribution with a mean of $3 and standard deviation of $1. 
The minimum cost of Non-Engineered Structures was specified at $100. 
The cost of Stock Exclusion was area dependent only as it was considered that an 
area could not be partially fenced off. The cost was specified as a function of the 
typical length of fencing required to fence off a given area. In most cases the shape 
of the areas to be fenced off in the Onkaparinga are linear strips along streams about 
15 m wide. Estimating the length of fencing was a difficult task given the significant 
variation in the lengths of fencing required to exclude different areas from stock in the 
catchment. Some areas may not be linear at all whereas other areas may already be 
partially fenced off. The function used to estimate the length of fencing required to 
fence off an area attempted to capture this variation. The length of fencing was 
specified as the length required to fence off a rectangle with the same area with a 
width of 15 m. This length was then multiplied by a random number between 0.2 and 
1.2 to simulate the variation in lengths required for a given area. The price of fencing 
was estimated at commercial rates with an average of $5,000 per km and a standard 
deviation of $1,500. The cost of fencing for each Stock Exclusion action was 
simulated by multiplying the length of fencing by a number randomly selected from a 
normal distribution with these characteristics. 
The cost of Revegetation was area dependent only. Typical commercial contractor 
prices were used for Revegetation with a mean of $20,000 per hectare with a 
standard deviation of $5,000 per hectare. The cost of Revegetation for each bid is 
equal to the area of Revegetation multiplied by a price per hectare randomly sampled 
from a normal distribution with the above mean and standard deviation. 
The cost of Dam Modification was considered neither area nor effort dependent as it 
costs similar amounts to modify a dam irrespective of how far downstream its effects 
are felt and the how great the effects are. Thus, the cost of Dam Modification based 
on professional contractor rates was said to be on average $5,000 with a standard 
deviation of $2,000. Costs of Dam Modification for each bid were specified as a 
random number taken from a normal distribution with these characteristics. 
Weed Eradication costs were considered to be both area and effort dependent as the 
greater the area targeted and the more weed cover is reduced, the greater the costs. 
The price of Weed Eradication was considered to be on average $3,500 per hectare 
and effort unit with a standard deviation of $1,000. The cost of Weed Eradication for 
each bid was calculated as the area of Weed Eradication multiplied by the level of 
effort and a random price sampled from the above normal distribution. 
5.1.3  Translating Landholder Actions into Threat Reduction 
The relationship between landholder actions and threat reduction in the Catchment 
Care auction process is complex. Some threats require multiple actions to be  
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undertaken over the same area. For example, an eroding stream bank that is grazed 
by stock requires the landholder to undertake the actions of Stock Exclusion and 
either Revegetation or the implementation of Non-Engineered Structures. In addition, 
some actions can address multiple threats. For example, the landholder action of 
Stock Exclusion can result in threat reduction to the Grazing Pressure and Bed and 
Bank Instability threats. The bid selection algorithm is able to cater for this complexity 
in the translation of landholder action effort scores into threat reduction scores for 
each threat. 
The calculation of threat reduction scores for each threat was a two stage process. 
Firstly, threat scores were calculated assuming landholder actions had been 
successfully undertaken and then threat reduction scores were calculated by 
subtracting these scores from the original threat score. Calculating threat scores 
assuming successful landholder actions enabled the linking of effort scores from 
landholder actions to actual threat reduction scores. Effort scores could reduce threat 
scores directly on a 1:1 ratio. To illustrate, a Revegetation effort score of 2 can 
directly reduce the Patch Size threat by 2 for a given bid. 
The area of landholder actions also had to be translated into plausible areas of threat 
reduction given the inherent complexity associated with multiple objective actions and 
some threats requiring multiple actions. In most cases there is a direct relationship 
between the area of an action and the area of threat reduction for the associated 
threat but in a few cases a more complex relationship was specified.  
Implementing Non-Engineered Structures is a single objective action – it can only 
address either Bank Instability or Bed Instability. Effort scores for this action were 
given a mutually exclusive 50% chance of reducing the threat of Bank Instability and 
Bed Instability. Thus, Non-Engineered Structures had an equal chance of reducing 
Bank Instability and Bed Instability but could not simultaneously reduce both threats. 
The area of the Non-Engineered Structures landholder action is mapped directly to 
the area of either Bank or Bed Instability. 
Stock Exclusion is a multiple objective action. Effort scores from Stock Exclusion 
actions always directly reduce the threat of Grazing Pressure on a 1:1 basis and the 
area of Stock Exclusion transfers directly to the area of Grazing Pressure threat 
reduction. However, Stock Exclusion effort scores can also reduce the Bank 
Instability and Bed Instability threats at the same time. To capture this feature in the 
simulation, Stock Exclusion was given a 66% chance of reducing Bank and Bed 
Instability if they occur and if it reduced one it also reduced the other. Thus, if Stock 
Exclusion occurs on a site and the site also has problems with Bank or Bed 
Instability, then there is a two in three chance that the area fenced off will also 
contain the areas of instability. If, through these rules, Stock Exclusion is deemed to 
reduce Bank and Bed Instability then the total areas of these threat reductions are 
likely to be much less than the total area fenced off from stock. Hence, the area of 
Bank and Bed Instability threat reduction resulting from Stock Exclusion is sampled 
from a normal distribution with a mean of 2,000 m
2 and a standard deviation of 400 
m
2.  
Revegetation is also a multiple objective landholder action. Revegetation effort 
scores directly reduce both the Patch Size and the Weed % Cover threats directly on 
a 1:1 basis. The area of Revegetation transfers directly to the area of Patch Size and 
Weed % Cover threat reduction. The Bank and Bed Instability threats also have a 
mutually exclusive one in three chance of being reduced by Revegetation as well. If  
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Revegetation also reduces the Bank and Bed Instability threats, the area of threat 
reduction equals the area of Revegetation. 
Dam Modification is a single objective action which directly reduces the threat of 
Dams and Off-Takes only. Hence, the area and effort map directly. Weed Eradication 
is a multiple objective action that directly reduces the threats of both Weed % Cover 
and Invasive Weed Presence. The area of threat reduction for both of these threats 
equals the area of the Weed Eradication action. 
By mapping landholder action effort to threat reductions we can calculate the score 
for each threat assuming the landholder actions are successful by subtracting the 
effort scores from the threat score. All threats could only be reduced to a minimum of 
1. For example, if the Bank Instability threat score for a site is 4 and the sum of the 
landholder action effort scores is 5, the threat score assuming successful landholder 
actions equals 1 rather than -1. Hence, the sum of the effort scores for all actions 
undertaken to reduce a threat is sometimes greater than the total amount of threat 
reduction achieved. In the example above the sum of the effort scores is 5 but the 
total amount of threat reduction achieved is only 3 (i.e. 4 – 1). This feature of the 
simulation captures the propensity of some threats to require more than one action to 
address them as discussed above.   
To calculate the total threat reduction scores, the threat scores assuming successful 
actions are subtracted from the original threat scores. These values are used in the 
calculation of the impact of landholder actions. 
5.1.4 Running the Bid Selection Algorithm 
The above simulation exercise created a database of 1,000 bids with character 
scores, areas, threat reduction scores and costs that spanned the full range of 
plausible values. The bid selection algorithm was then run, creating risk, impact and 
environmental benefit scores for each bid. The bids are ranked by environmental 
benefits per dollar and the outcomes of this process graphed to understand the 
behaviour of the algorithm. 
5.1.5 Parameter Regression 
Part of the task of understanding the behaviour of Catchment Care’s bid selection 
algorithm includes understanding how the output variable – environmental benefits 
per dollar, is influenced by different aspects of the bid. It is important to understand 
the drivers of the ranking variable to ascertain what characteristics are likely to 
influence it such as the environmental value or threat scores of the site, the level of 
threat reduction, the type of action, the cost or area of the actions.  
The calculation of environmental benefits per dollar in involves multiple variables. 
The influence of each variable is clouded by the complexity of the algorithm and is 
unclear. Stepwise multiple linear regression is used to identify the parameters that 
most strongly influence the calculation of environmental benefits per dollar. A 
probability of F of 0.05 is used for variable entry into the regression model and a 
removal probability of 0.1 used. Stepwise regression begins with no independent 
variables in the model and includes the variable with highest correlation with the 
dependent variable. The second variable selected is that with the highest partial 
correlation provided the significance is less than 0.05. The significance levels of the  
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included variables are then removed if their significance has dropped below 0.1. 
Variable selection proceeds in this way until no more variables can be added or 
removed. The result is a model based on the subset of the best predictor variables.  
5.2 Results and Discussion 
5.2.1 Results of the Simulation 
The results of running the bid selection algorithm on the synthetic dataset generated 
by Monte Carlo simulation gave many insights into the behaviour of the algorithm and 
the nature of bids for landholder environmental restoration and protection actions. 
The distribution of the cost effectiveness of bids (EB/$) (Figure 19) was such that 
there were a few bids offering very cost effective services (>100 EB/$). Most bids 
were reasonably cost effective (i.e. between 20 and 100 EB/$) and some offered very 
poor environmental returns for the investment (<20 EB/$). The implications of this are 
that there are significant benefits to be made by funding the first few bids.  
The inverse of cost effectiveness is the marginal cost of environmental benefits to the 
Board (Figure 19). Analysis of the marginal cost of EBs offered by landholders 
reveals that around 80% of bids offered environmental benefits at low cost ($/EB). 
The remainder offered increasingly costly environmental benefits. This seems to 
have captured the rent seeking behaviour of some landholders and the same pattern 
has been found by Stoneham et al. (2003). The marginal cost curve can provide 
information about setting a reserve price. Ideally, the reserve price should be set 
somewhere along the flatter part of the curve where environmental benefits are less 
expensive and just before the sharp increase in marginal cost occurs around the 
$0.10/EB (bid 800) mark. 
Bids offering the greatest EB/$ for Catchment Care funds are those where significant 
threat reductions can be made over large areas at high risk sites, for relatively little 
outlay. In most cases, these bids involved the landholder action of Stock Exclusion 
where this action could reduce not only the threats of Grazing Pressure but also Bank 
and Bed Instability. 
The simulation results show that, with some variation, the higher ranked bids are 
those sites at higher risk (Figure 19). This follows the intention of the Catchment Care 
auction process that higher risk sites are of a higher priority for funding. It also makes 
sense that the higher ranked bids are those that offer greatest threat reduction 
(Figure 19). However, there exists significant variation in the level of threat reduction. 
This suggests that whilst bids offering significant threat reduction are favoured, it is 
possible to gain a high ranking by offering less threat reduction if other aspects of the 
bid compensate for it. For example, the threat reduction might be offered at low cost, 
over a large area and/or at a site of high risk. This is a desirable characteristic of the 
algorithm because it suggests that bids offering large threat reductions are not 
necessarily favoured over ones offering less.  
The influence of the impact score on ranking is similar to the influence of threat 
reduction (Figure 19). There is a general trend that higher impact bids have a higher 
ranking. There is however, significant variation about this trend. This means that 
whilst bids offering high impact, or in other words, significant threat reduction at high 
risk sites, are favoured by the bid selection algorithm in Catchment Care, bids that  
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offer lower impact may also be selected if they offer it over a large area and at a good 
price. 
The area of proposed landholder actions has little to do with the selection of bids 
(Figure 19). Neither larger nor smaller bids have any advantage. This is also a 
favourable aspect of the bid selection algorithm. This means that small landholders 
are not disadvantaged from receiving Catchment Care funds because of the size of 
their property. In the same way, bids proposing large-scale restoration and protection 
works do not have an advantage due to their size. Instead, the other aspects of the 
bid are more influential of selection such as the risk of the site, and the level of threat 
reduction. 
There is a loose relationship between the environmental benefits offered by bids and 
the rank of the bid (Figure 19). Generally, the higher the environmental benefits 
offered, the higher the bid rank. However, the environmental benefits offered by the 
highest ranked bids are highly variable, with variability decreasing the lower the rank. 
Lowly ranked bids invariably offer low levels of environmental benefits. This suggests 
that landholders do not necessarily have to offer high levels of environmental benefits 
to be ranked highly if they can offer a good price for their actions. Although, low 
levels of environmental benefits are a feature of low ranking bids.  
High ranking bids tend to have lower costs that lower ranking bids although there is 
some variation (Figure 19). High costs bids tended to be ranked lower. Costs of high 
ranking bids varied from low to moderate and no high cost ($/EB) bids ranked highly. 
The cost of lowly ranked bids spanned the full spectrum of costs suggesting that 
these bids either offered low environmental benefits and/or they have a high cost. 
This suggests that in a large sample such as this simulated dataset that there will be 
enough bids of low cost to fund until the funds are exhausted. Whether or not high 
cost bids are selected depends on the amount of funds available, the reserve price 
and the number of bid submissions. Theoretically, if a high cost bid was reasonably 
cost effective, there is no reason why it could not be selected. However, because 
there are so many bids offering high levels of environmental benefits for the cost, the 
high cost bids tend to be ranked lowly.  








































































































































































Figure 19 – Risk, Threat Reduction, Impact, Area, Environmental Benefits, Cost, Cost 
Effectiveness and Marginal Cost of Environmental Benefits of 1,000 simulated 
bids (grey lines). Bids are ranked in order of cost effectiveness (EB/$) from high to 
low. The black line is a linear trendline inserted to provide an indication of the overall 
trend of the data.  
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The stepwise multivariate linear regression offers a more detailed look at the effect of 
individual parameters in influencing the cost effectiveness of bids. Table 19 lists the 
statistics output from the analysis including the 11 significant input parameters 
affecting the distribution of the ranking variable.  
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients  Correlations 
Parameter 
B  Std. 
Error
t  Sig. 
Zero-
order  Partial 
(Constant)  -34.755 5.129 -6.776 .000    
Grazing Pressure Threat Reduction Score  19.053 1.451 13.134 .000 .411  .386 
Stock Exclusion Cost  -2.474E-04 .000 -11.267 .000 -.160  -.337 
Remnant Vegetation Env. Value Score  11.575 1.148 10.084 .000 .251  .305 
Weed % Cover Threat Reduction Score  4.958 1.359 3.648 .000 .198  .115 
Grazing Pressure Threat Score  4.048 .788 5.136 .000 .330  .161 
Stock Exclusion Action Area  7.051E-05 .000 5.011 .000 .035  .157 
Inv. Weed Presence Threat Area  6.071E-04 .000 6.667 .000 .135  .207 
Weed Eradication Action Cost  -7.831E-04 .000 -6.316 .000 .030  -.197 
Revegetation Action Cost  -4.632E-04 .000 -3.090 .002 -.069  -.098 
Inv. Weed Presence Threat Reduction Score  5.456 1.319 4.138 .000 .178  .131 
Weed % Cover Threat Score  2.302 .969 2.376 .018 .176  .075 
 
Table 19 – Output of the stepwise multivariate linear regression analysis of the 
parameters in the Catchment Care bid selection algorithm. Listed are the 
parameters having a significant influence on cost effectiveness (EB/$) including the B 
coefficients, t value and significance score, and correlation statistics. 
Table 19 contains several statistics that assist in interpretation of the influence of the 
bid parameters in Catchment Care. The Beta statistic is the coefficient of the 
parameter in the multivariate linear regression model and the Standard Error of this 
term  is also present. The t statistic and associated significance value state the 
significance level of the parameter. The inclusion rules in the stepwise model ensure 
that all parameters in the model are significant at the 0.05 level. Correlations test the 
level of association between the model independent variables (parameters) and the 
dependent variable of cost effectiveness (EB/$). Zero-order correlations are a 
measure of the direct association between each parameter and the measure of cost 
effectiveness. Partial correlation tests the influence of each parameter on overall cost 
effectiveness given that the influence of all other parameters (control variables) on 
both the parameter (independent variable) itself and on cost effectiveness 
(dependent variable) is removed.  
Interpretation of the outputs of the regression analysis suggests the dominance of 
actions dealing with Remnant Vegetation, specifically Stock Exclusion and Weed 
Eradication. The dominance of Stock Exclusion actions is revealed by several model 
parameters. In terms of landholder actions and threat reduction, the level of threat 
reduction to the Grazing Pressure character displayed the strongest influence on cost 
effectiveness, and the cost of Stock Exclusion was the second strongest influence. 
The area of Stock Exclusion had a moderately strong influence on cost effectiveness. 
This suggests that bids which involve Stock Exclusion conducted cheaply and over 
larger areas have a strong chance of a high ranking in the bid selection process. The  
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Remnant Vegetation environmental value and the Grazing Pressure threat score also 
have an influence on cost effectiveness in the model outputs. Hence, actions 
occurring at sites with higher risk of livestock grazing are also more likely to be 
ranked highly. 
In addition to Stock Exclusion, bids involving Weed Eradication were also likely to be 
ranked highly. Bids involving greater levels of threat reduction to the Weed % Cover 
and Invasive Weed Presence threats, and those addressing larger areas of the 
Invasive Weed Presence threat were more likely to be ranked highly. Bids addressing 
these issues at lower costs and on sites with higher Remnant Vegetation 
environmental value scores and Weed % Cover threat scores (and hence, risk scores 
for Weed % Cover) were especially likely to be ranked highly. Bids involving 
inexpensive Revegetation efforts may also have a greater chance of receiving 
funding. 
Landholder actions of Stock Exclusion and Weed Eradication are more likely to be 
funded in the Catchment Care auction process for very simple reasons. Firstly, these 
actions can be very cheap. For example, to exclude stock from an area a landholder 
may only need to replace a broken gate. Secondly, the actions can be undertaken 
over a large area. Thirdly, the actions, especially Stock Exclusion, can achieve large 
threat reduction scores relatively easily. Stock Exclusion is also a multiple objective 
action which can reduce multiple threats at once. Although it did not come out in the 
regression, bids involving Stock Exclusion where it addressed Bank and Bed 
Instability would be even more likely to be funded. 
5.2.2 Refinement of Bid Ranking and Selection Algorithm  
The simulation exercise had an invaluable effect on refinement and enhancement of 
the bid selection algorithm for Catchment Care. We initially proposed an algorithm in 
draft form that we thought would probably work reasonably well. The value of actually 
testing new and untested frameworks and algorithms was quickly realised when we 
began the simulation exercise. Simulation identified many weaknesses and 
conceptual errors in the risk analysis framework and identified many new pieces of 
information that needed to be collected from the landholder. It also identified the 
potential to include weights on value and threat characters to cater for the 
environmental and management priorities of the Board. 
Our first attempt at bid ranking and selection algorithm development assessed the 
change in risk achieved by landholder actions and the terminology used was risk 
reduction multiplied by area / cost. The essence of this algorithm was that landholder 
actions could reduce threats and increase environmental values. Simulation was able 
to identify the weakness with this approach. Specifically, if environmental values were 
increased by landholder actions, risk may also be increased. This approach did not 
prioritise sites at high risk but focussed simply on risk reduction. However, the 
simulation did suggest that there was benefit in using threat reduction as an outcome 
of landholder actions.  
The characters and the algorithm were then changed to look more like the final 
version. It was structured to ensure that environmental values could not be altered by 
landholder actions whilst threats could be reduced by actions. Further problems were 
uncovered in that this approach aggregated risk to environmental values of Remnant 
Vegetation, Geomorphology and Hydrology which have 4, 2 and 1 threats,  
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respectively. The problem with this approach was that because of the weighting, any 
action on a Remnant Vegetation threat had only a half the influence on the ranking 
variable as did an action on either of the 2 Geomorphology threats, and only a 
quarter of the influence of an action reducing the single threat to Hydrology. Likewise, 
an action reducing either of the Geomorphology threats only had half the influence of 
an action affecting the threat to Hydrology. Thus, the algorithm was changed to 
calculate risk according to each individual threat, instead of each value. 
Simulation made manifest the potential complexities involved in the types of actions 
people may bid for including multiple sites and actions. Initially, in the Catchment 
Care Site Assessment Sheet and algorithm, only one area had to be recorded for 
each site proposed and only one bid needed to be submitted for each landholder. 
Thus, the risk analysis framework was changed such that if a landholder wanted to 
propose more than one site then they had to be submitted as separate bids and 
evaluated separately. If, on the single site, a landholder wanted to propose multiple 
actions over different areas, then each action had to have an area recorded for it. In 
the algorithm, the impact score was the designed as the product of risk and threat 
reduction and was calculated for each threat and summed over all threats. In 
addition, environmental benefits were also calculated for each threat as the product 
of impact and area and summed over all threats. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to good effect to simulate the full range of possible 
bids for funds for landholder environmental work in the Onkaparinga catchment 
Board area. Simulation identified substantial changes that needed to be made to 
various aspects of the Catchment Care auction process including the characters and 
types of information recorded, and the structure of the bid selection algorithm. 
Without these changes, a trial of the auction process would have certainly failed as 
important information would not have been collected from the landholder and the 
algorithm would not have selected the most cost effective collection of bids. Analysis 
of the results when the algorithm was run on simulated data enabled a good 
understanding of the behaviour of the algorithm and the types of bids that were more 
likely to be selected for funding. There tended to be a few bids offering extremely 
good environmental benefits for the cost, with many bids offering moderate to poor 
value for money. Less expensive bids were more likely to be selected, especially 
those offering more environmental benefits over a larger area and at high risk sites. 
Area by itself was not influential in determining the rank of bids which indicates that 
smaller landholders are not disadvantaged over large. Bids involving Stock Exclusion 
or Weed Eradication tended to rank more highly, especially where they were 
inexpensive or addressed sites at high risk of Grazing Pressure or Weed % Cover 
and Invasive Weed Presence. Stock Exclusion and Weed Eradication are relatively 
inexpensive actions and can result in significant threat reduction over large areas. 
Simulation of the Catchment Care auction process enabled a detailed understanding 
of the behaviour of the bid selection algorithm. It also identified many aspects of the 
algorithm that required modification before rollout of the auction system in an on-
ground trial.  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 99 
6 Catchment Care Auction Trial 
Once the modifications identified by the simulation were made to the auction process, 
especially in the area of scoring and bid selection, a full trial was implemented in the 
upper reaches of the Onkaparinga catchment (Figure 1). This section summarises 
the trial implementation of the Catchment Care auction process which is explained in 
detail in Section 4.   
The Catchment Care auction trial was promoted widely within the upper reaches of 
the Onkaparinga catchment (above Mt Bold, refer to Figure 1). A promotional 
strategy was implemented which included an ‘Advertorial’ in the local paper (The 
Courier) for two consecutive issues, production and distribution of a ‘flyer’, 
information of the Board’s website, and a direct mail-out to 224 landholders (Section 
4.3.1).  
A seven week expression of interest period was set aside in which landholders were 
invited to register interest in the trial. The Board received expressions of interest from 
52 landholders. Following telephone discussions with interested landholders, this 
number reduced to 42 as some landholders did not wish to continue the process. The 
remaining landholders were mailed an extensive information pack (Section 4.3.2) 
from the Board outlining many aspects of the trial in detail. 
Prior to undertaking field based site assessments the Board collated all relevant data 
for each of the 42 landholders included in the trial. Property specific information 
available from the GIS was recorded on Site Assessment Sheets where appropriate.   
Field officers completed 42 site visits over a six week period. The site visits were 
completed by two Catchment Care officers from the Board and two external 
consultants. The environmental value and threat scores for sites were assessed and 
validated in the field. Scores provided by each field officer needed to be consistent 
across properties and scores need to be comparable between different field officers. 
To assist with achieving this, a number of site visits were undertaken by all field 
officers in order to reach consensus in scoring observations.  
Additionally, upon completion of all site visits a workshop was held to discuss all site 
assessments and scores in detail. This workshop involved all field officers and project 
team members. The scores were examined relative to one another by the field 
officers who each have detailed knowledge and opinions of the landholder’s 
properties. Qualitative evaluation and discussion of the scores resulted in relatively 
few changes to those originally entered and agreement was reached in all cases. 
This suggests that the field officer guidelines and the Site Assessment Sheet provide 
adequate detail to enable a relatively robust site assessment. There also seems to be 
relatively little ambiguity in the scoring resulting from the site assessment process of 
Catchment Care even when different field officers assess the same site. 
Recommendations for on-ground works were made by the field officer in discussion 
with the landholder at the time of the site visit. Actions ranged across a number of 
broad areas including Stock Exclusion, Revegetation, Weed Eradication (including 
exotic tree control), Dam Modification, and Non-Engineered Structures for 
watercourse erosion control. Landholders were able to suggest actions, but were 
generally led by the expert opinion of the field officer. A list of recommended actions 
was developed by the field officer back at the Board and mailed to the landholder 
following the site visit (Appendix F.1) together with a map delineating the area of  
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recommended actions (Appendix F.2) and a letter explaining the next steps for the 
landholder (Appendix F.3).   
Landholders were given up to 6 weeks to prepare and lodge their bids. Telephone 
support was made available to landholders during this period. Bids were submitted to 
the Board’s tender box and remained confidential at all times. A total of 29 bids were 
submitted by landholders with 2 landholders submitting 2 bids each. Each bid 
includes a list of actions and designated areas, and a bid price (the amount of 
funding requested from the Board), all contained in the Site Action Plan. Landholders 
were able to add or remove actions from those recommended to them, upon 
consultation with their field officer. The landholder may also make alterations to the 
areas of actions. These need to be clearly delineated on the map and returned with 
the bid. An example of a submitted Site Action Plan is presented in Appendix F.2. 
The landholder also submits a Gantt chart describing the timing of actions (Appendix 
F.2). Site Action Plans were generally closely aligned with the recommended actions 
developed in consultation with the field officer and very few alterations were made to 
delineated areas of actions.  
Threat reduction scores for all bids were derived in a workshop format consisting of 
all field officers. The area over which threat reduction is achieved by landholder 
actions was then calculated using the methods described in Section 4.6.1. Data on 
scores, costs, and areas for all properties that received site visits was entered into a 
spreadsheet and checked over again for consistency and comparability between 
bids.  
Once the field officers were satisfied that the scores for landholder’s properties were 
sensible relative to one another the algorithm was run to calculate the environmental 
benefits per dollar. At this stage the weights were adjusted to reflect the priorities of 
the Board. Despite significant changes to some of the weights on a trial and error 
basis, hardly any changes to the ranking of bids occurred. This suggests that the 
Catchment Care bid selection algorithm is relatively robust to changes in the 
weightings of various characters. 
Bid selection was made on the basis of rank according to cost effectiveness 
(environmental benefits per dollar). The funding budget for the trial was $150,000. 
Given that this is the first iteration of this MBI trial, it was not possible to set a reserve 
price for bids upfront. Bids were selected for funding based on their cost 
effectiveness up to this funding limit. 
A summary of the broad actions proposed by bids received is presented in Table 20 
and the full data and ranking is presented in Table 21.  A total of 17 bids were 
accepted from the 29 submitted, representing a total budget of $139,278. A detailed 
assessment of successful bids is presented in Section 7. 
Landholders were advised of the auction process success immediately following 
selection. The notification included feedback on the reasons for success or failure of 
their bids. Landholders were invited to seek further comments by telephone. 
Successful landholders were also sent a tax invoice and a reporting and payment 
schedule (Appendix G). Schedules where tailored for each successful bid in 
consideration of the timelines identified by the landholders and approved by the 
Board. The schedules include up to 7 individual payments over the three year period. 
An initial, up-front payment is made to assist landholders with commencing their  
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work, with subsequent payments made at 6 monthly intervals (in some cases longer) 
upon receipt and approval of a progress report. 
 
Actions 
Bid Rank  Weed 
Eradication 
Stock 









1                      
2                      
3                      
4                      
5                      
6                      
7                      
8                      
9                      
10                      
11                      
12                      
13                      
14                      
15                      
16                      
17                      
SUBTOTAL 15  7  10  8  1  0  1 
UNSUCCESSFUL BIDS 
18                      
19                      
20                      
21                      
22                      
23                      
24                      
25                      
26                      
27                      
28                      
29                      
SUBTOTAL 7  10  12  4  0  1  2 
TOTAL  22  17  22  12  1  1  3 
Table 20 - Summary of actions proposed to be undertaken in all bids received.  
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1  3 4 3 5 5 4.33 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 0 0 103,000 0 495 1,339,000 2,705.1 $495 
2  3 4 4 4 5 4.33 2 2 3 1 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0  0 0 82,680 82,680 0 5,000 5,015,920 1,003.2 $5,495 
3  0 0 3 4 4 3.67 0 0 0 4 3 5 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0  0 0 11,420 11,420 0 1,349 879,340 652.0 $6,844 
4  3 4 2 4 4 3.33 3 3 3 3 2 5 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 237 948  35 0 158,580 158,580 0 11,575 6,354,705 549.0 $18,419 
5  3 5 4 5 5 4.67 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0  0 0 27,370 27,370 0 2,340 894,087 382.1 $20,759 
6  3 4 4 4 3 3.67 2 2 3 4 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2,208 552  0 0 108,110 108,110 87,970 15,400 2,643,690 171.7 $36,159 
7  2 5 2 3 4 3 2 3 1 4 2 4 2 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 1,100 825  0 6,350 1,100 0 0 2,220 244,550 110.2 $38,379 
8  3 2 5 3 5 4.33 2 2 5 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0  0 0 29,860 0 29,860 7,675 517,573 67.4 $46,054 
9  3 5 3 4 5 4 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  0 0 6,000 76,630 0 19,730 1,274,080 64.6 $65,784 
10  3 5 4 2 4 3.33 3 3 1 3 2 5 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 312  0 0 87,260 0 0 11,400 584,541 51.3 $77,184 
11  3 4 1 2 2 1.67 1 1 3 5 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0  0 0 12,670 12,670 12,670 3,940 190,050 48.2 $81,124 
12  2 5 1 2 1 1.33 3 3 1 5 5 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 10,806  0 2,000 2,000 2,000 13,540 6,690 146,276 21.9 $87,814 
13  0 0 2 4 2 2.67 0 0 0 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  0 7,670 7,670 7,670 0 3,760 81,813 21.8 $91,574 
14  0 4 1 2 4 2.33 0 0 2 5 5 1 3 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 0  0 2,800 2,800 0 5,500 12,515 207,667 16.6 $104,089 
15  3 4 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 5 5 2 4 2 2 1 2 2 0 3 1,000 250  360 4,800 4,800 0 14,200 19,900 297,540 15.0 $123,989 
16  2 5 1 2 2 1.67 2 3 1 5 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 352 244  0 0 9,340 9,340 0 6,049 82,169 13.6 $130,038 
17  1 4 1 1 2 1.33 4 3 5 5 5 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1,400 430  0 1,440 0 0 39,180 9,240 120,970 13.1 $139,278 
18  2 5 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 3 4 5 3 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.5 3,600 1,500  0 0 23,600 0 30,000 37,901 488,000 12.9 $177,179 
19  1 2 5 2 4 3.67 2 3 2 5 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  0 0 0 0 4,140 8,302 91,080 11.0 $185,481 
20  1 5 1 1 2 1.33 2 2 1 5 5 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1,208 906  0 1,600 1,600 0 6,100 5,074 52,495 10.3 $190,555 
21  2 5 2 2 2 2 4 5 1 5 4 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 1,548 1,548  0 3,200 3,200 3,870 0 14,450 132,944 9.2 $205,005 
22  3 5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4 4 1 5 5 4 3 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 954 356  0 1,600 1,600 0 8,400 6,345 52,920 8.3 $211,350 
23  1 5  0.5 1 1 0.83 2 3 1 5 4 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 521  0 720 0 720 9,110 9,902 51,313 5.2 $221,252 
24  1 2  0.5 0.5 2 1 2 2 5 5 4 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 696 174  0 0 560 0 2,430 4,279 11,270 2.6 $225,531 
25  0 0  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 5 5 2 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0  0 1,800 2,000 0 2,000 8,795 21,500 2.4 $234,326 
26  2 4 1 2 0.5 1.17 2 2 3 5 4 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 160 0  0 1,600 0 0 1,800 6,900 14,173 2.1 $241,226 
27  1 5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 5 5 1 5 5 1 3 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 804 201  0 1,120 1,120 0 6,800 25,145 38,850 1.5 $266,371 
28  3 2 1 3 1 1.67 2 2 4 5 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1,572 1,179  0 0 0 0 0 14,119 16,506 1.2 $280,490 
29  1 5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3 4 1 5 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 140  0 0 0 0 0 600 560 0.9 $281,090 
30  2 5 5 3 3 3.67 2 2 4 4 4 5 3                                        
31  2 2 5 2 4 3.67 2 2 5 4 3 3 3                                        
32  2 5 3 3 5 3.67 1 2 1 2 2 4 1                                        
33  3 4 3 5 5 4.33 2 2 3 1 1 2 1                                        
34  2 2 1 1 3 1.67 2 2 5 5 3 1 1                                        
35  1 5  0.5 0.5 1 0.67 3 3 3 5 5 2 3                                        
36  1 5  0.5 0.5 1 0.67 5 5 5 5 5 1 3                                        
37  1 5 1 2 1 1.33 2 2 1 5 4 4 1                                        
38  3 4 3 3 5 3.67 2 2 2 5 4 3 2                                        
39  1 2 1 1 0.5 0.83 2 2 4 5 3 2 4                                        
40  - - - - - - - - - - - - -                                        
41  1 5  0.5 2 1 1.17 2 3 1 5 1 1 2                                        
42  0 4  0.5 1 1 0.83 0 0 2 5 4 2 2                                        
43  2 5 3 5 3 3.67 2 2 3 4 2 1 2                                        
44  0 0 2 1 5 2.67 4 4 0 5 5 2 3                                        
 
Table 21 – Summary table of bids for Catchment Care funding including scores, areas, costs, and ranking. 
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7 Trial Evaluation 
In this section we evaluate the Catchment Care auction trial in four ways, specifically: 
1.  By evaluating the performance of the bid selection algorithm and assessing 
the characteristics of the bids selected; 
2.  By conducting an economic evaluation of the cost effectiveness of Catchment 
Care versus previous grant schemes including the costs of program 
implementation; 
3.  By qualitatively evaluating all aspects of the auction trial, and; 
4.  By surveying and interpreting landholder attitudes and responses to the 
auction process. 
7.1 Evaluation of Bid Selection Algorithm Performance  
7.1.1 Methods 
The Catchment Care trial was evaluated in a similar way to the simulation analysis. 
The results from the Catchment Care trial are evaluated on two levels – an aggregate 
level and a detailed level. These two levels are qualitatively and quantitatively 
assessed. At the aggregate level, key indicators including cost, area, environmental 
benefits, impact, risk, cost effectiveness and marginal cost are graphed for bids 
ranked in order of cost effectiveness and the results are discussed. These indicators 
are also statistically assessed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test whether 
the means of the indicators are significantly different between the funded and non-
funded bids. Similarly, at the detailed level of analysis, scores for environmental 
values, threats, threat reduction, and area for each bid are graphed for bids ranked in 
order of cost effectiveness and the results are discussed. Scores for these characters 
are also statistically assessed using ANOVA to test whether the mean scores are 
significantly different between the funded bids and those not selected for funding. 
The tables describing the outcomes from the ANOVA analyses include descriptive 
statistics. They also include an ANOVA significance which tells us whether the mean 
scores are significantly different (ANOVA Sig. <= 0.05) or not (ANOVA Sig. > 0.05). 
Coupled with this is a measure of Levene’s significance which is a test of 
homogeneity of variance. Homogeneity of variance is an assumption of the ANOVA 
test and variance is homogeneous when Levene’s Sig. > 0.05. Thus, for 
interpretation, we can be confident that the score means are different when ANOVA 
Sig. < 0.05 and Levene’s Sig. > 0.05. 
7.1.2 Results 
7.1.2.1 Aggregate Level Assessment 
A diverse range of bids were submitted for Catchment Care funding. The 
environmental value and threat and hence, risk, of the sites proposed for funding 
covered the full spectrum. For example, a site was proposed on a property almost 
entirely covered by remnant native vegetation (high value, low threat). The actions 
involved regular patrolling and control of weed incursions over the property. Sites of  
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high value and at high threat were also proposed as were sites of low value and low 
threat. The latter are typical of cleared grazing land traversed by small intermittent 
waterways. On these properties, Revegetation and Stock Exclusion was commonly 
proposed. The funding requested by individual bids ranged from $495 to $37,901 
(Table 21). Overall, the proposed landholder actions were mainly weed control, Stock 
Exclusion and Revegetation. As mentioned above, a total of 17 of the 29 bids were 
funded by the Board. Successful bids were funded in full. 
In a similar way to the simulation, cost effectiveness of bids (environmental benefits 
per dollar) display a sharp decrease with bid rank that tails off after the first few bids 
(Figure 20). This means that significant environmental benefits per dollar are gained 
from funding the few highest ranked bids. The cost effectiveness of bids ranked after 
number 8 are small relative to the first few bids (Figure 20). Significant efficiencies 
are gained from funding the first 8 bids. Most environmental benefits are gained by 
funding the highest ranked 9 or 10 bids and few benefits are gained by funding 
beyond the 17 or 18 bid level (Figure 21). When cost effectiveness is assessed 
against total environmental benefits achieved (Figure 22) there is little to be gained 
from funding beyond around 20 million environmental benefits (around bid 13 - see 
Figure 21).  
Consideration of the marginal cost of environmental benefits to the Board (Figure 20 - 
Figure 22) reveals that the first 22 or so bids offer relatively inexpensive 
environmental benefits. After bid 23 the marginal cost of environmental benefits to 
the Board increases sharply. The funding limit of $150,000 meant that a maximum of 
17 bids could be funded in the trial. The marginal cost of environmental benefits of 
these 17 bids was relatively low. Hence, the Board was not exposed to highly priced 
benefits and a reserve price was not required. However, if more funding was 
available, the marginal cost information could have been used to set a reserve price 
at around $0.12 per unit of environmental benefit (i.e. just before the steep rise in 
marginal cost, see Figure 20 and Figure 22). 
The total risk scores clearly decrease with the ranking of bids (Figure 20). The 
ANOVA identifies a significant difference in the mean total risk scores for funded bids 
versus non-funded and the variances are homogeneous (Table 22). This is also a 
desirable characteristic of the bid selection algorithm insofar as high risk sites are a 
high priority for funding. 
Total threat reduction scores have little bearing on the ranking of the bids (Figure 20). 
The ANOVA found no significant difference between the mean threat reduction 
scores for funded bids compared to non-funded and the variances are homogeneous 
(Table 22). Hence, neither bids proposing large actions nor small were advantaged in 
the selection process. 
Total impact scores are fairly variable across the ranking of bids. However, higher 
ranked bids tend to have a higher total impact score (Figure 20). The ANOVA results 
suggest that the mean total impact scores are significantly higher for funded bids 
(note variances are not homogeneous) (Table 22). This is a positive result as bid 
selection should encourage higher impact landholder actions as high impact actions 
represent high levels of threat reduction at sites that are at high risk. 
The areas of the higher ranked bids are highly variable and the funded bids (up to 
and including bid ranked 17
th) may include large areas of landholder actions (Figure 
20). The areas of funded bids are significantly larger than non-funded although the  
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variances are different (Table 22). The high variance in area of funded bids suggests 
that bids proposing small areas could be funded if they offered good value for money. 
Higher ranked bids had higher total environmental benefits (Figure 20, Table 22). 
Funded bids had a large amount of variance in environmental benefits offered whilst 
non funded bids invariably offered low environmental benefits. Again, this variance 
suggests that whilst bids offering large environmental benefits were more likely to be 
funded, it was not necessary if the bid offers good value for money. 
There is no relationship between total cost and bid rank and the means are not 
significantly different (Figure 20, Table 22). This suggests that the bid selection 
algorithm does not favour cheap bids over expensive bids. Any bid can be funded 
depending on the value for money it offers. This is an important feature of the bid 
selection algorithm as there should be no selection bias based on cost alone. 
  











































































































































































Figure 20 – Key aggregate indicators of Catchment Care bid selection algorithm 
performance.  
























Figure 21 – Cumulative environmental benefits of bids. 
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Figure 22 – Cost effectiveness and marginal cost of environmental benefits. 
   N  Mean  Std. 




Not Funded  12  38.361  16.11  8  68       
Funded  17  57.647  15.292  26.7  85.3  0.003  0.749  Risk Score 
Total  29  49.667  18.139  8  85.3       
Not Funded  12  4.54  2.31  1  9       
Funded  17  4.35  2.6  1  12  0.842  0.852 
Threat 
Reduction 
Score  Total  29  4.43  2.44  1  12       
Not Funded  12  21.222  13.078  4  50       
Funded  17  38.961  26.614  10.7  92  0.043  0.009  Impact Score 
Total  29  31.621  23.473  4  92       
Not Funded  12  11479.75  15519.14  140  58700       
Funded  17  82362.88  95433.79  9375  318380  0.017  0.005  Area (m
2) 
Total  29  53031.93  81001.58  140  318380       
Not Funded  12  80967.58  133554.94  560  488000       
Funded  17  1227881  1816169.3  81813.3  6354705  0.039  0.005 
Environmental 
Benefit Score 
Total  29  753296  1490744.9  560  6354705       
Not Funded  12  11817.67  10346.84  600  37901       
Funded  17  8192.8  6096.59  495  19900  0.246  0.22  Total Cost ($) 
Total  29  9692.74  8160.78  495  37901       
Table 22 – ANOVA statistics comparing the means of aggregate indicators for funded 
and non-funded bids. ANOVA statistics are bold where means are significantly 
different (sig. < 0.05). Levene’s Sig. statistics are bold where the variance is not 
significantly different (sig. > 0.05).  
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7.1.2.2 Detailed Assessment 
Analysis of the individual character scores against bid ranking provides insight into 
the types of environments and actions more likely to be selected by the Board. 
Consult Figure 23 to Figure 26 and Table 23 for interpretation of the influence of 
individual characters on bid selection.  
Neither the scores for environmental values of Geomorphology nor Hydrology have 
any influence on the selection of bids. The Remnant Vegetation value score does 
however, have a significant influence (Figure 23), and the means are also 
significantly different (with homogeneous variances, Table 23). This suggests that 
bids at sites with high Remnant Vegetation value score were more likely to be funded 
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Figure 23 – Graphs of environmental value scores against bid rank. 
Interesting and complex relationships occurred between some of the site threat 
scores and bid rank. No relationship was found between the Bank Instability, Dams 
and Off-Takes and Grazing Pressure threats, and bid rank (Figure 24). Likewise, no 
difference was found in the means of these threat scores for funded and non-funded 
bids (Table 23). However, the threat of Bed Instability was related to the ranking of 
bids and the mean Bed Instability score for funded bids was significantly lower than 
non-funded (Table 23). Similarly, scores for the Patch Size and Weed % Cover 
threats are also lower for higher ranking bids (Figure 24, Table 23). 
The threat scores for Invasive Weed Presence appear higher for higher ranking bids 
but this is not supported by ANOVA results. These results are counterintuitive as it is 
the intention of the Board and the design of the algorithm to select higher threat (and 
therefore higher risk) sites. This may be a peculiarity of the type of bids that were 
submitted on this occasion. Specifically, there were several bids that involved weed 
control over large areas to remove fairly low threats to high value remnants. Perhaps, 
in future trials, the types of sites and actions may be different to this.  
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Table 23 – ANOVA statistics comparing the means of scores for successful and 
unsuccessful bids. ANOVA statistics are bold where means are significantly 
different (sig. < 0.05). Levene’s Sig. statistics are bold where the variance is not 
significantly different (sig. > 0.05). 
 
 
 Bid Status   N  Mean  Std. 




Unsuccessful  12 1.5 0.9 0 3       
Successful  17 2.18 1.19 0 3  0.108 0.317 Geomorphology 
Total  29 1.9 1.11 0 3       
Unsuccessful  12 3.75 1.76 0 5       
Successful  17 3.76 1.6 0 5  0.982 0.299 Hydrology 
Total  29 3.76 1.64 0 5       
Unsuccessful  12 1.31 0.93 0.50 3.67       









Total  29 2.29 1.38 0.50 4.67       
Unsuccessful  12 2.5 1.31 0 5       
Successful  17 1.76 1.2 0 4  0.13 0.949 Bank Instability 
Total  29 2.07 1.28 0 5       
Unsuccessful  12 2.83 1.47 0 5       
Successful  17 1.82 1.19 0 3  0.05 0.59 Bed Instability 
Total  29 2.24 1.38 0 5       
Unsuccessful  12 1.75 1.48 0 5       
Successful  17 2.18 1.51 0 5  0.457 0.799 Dams and Off-Takes 
Total  29 2 1.49 0 5       
Unsuccessful  12 4.83 0.58 3 5       
Successful  17 3.65 1.54 1 5  0.017 0.001 Patch Size 
Total  29 4.14 1.36 1 5       
Unsuccessful  12 4.33 0.49 4 5       
Successful  17 2.94 1.48 1 5  0.004 0.002 Weed % Cover 
Total  29 3.52 1.35 1 5       
Unsuccessful  12 2.25 1.22 1 5       
Successful  17 2.94 1.34 1 5  0.168 0.383
Invasive Weed 
Presence 
Total  29 2.66 1.32 1 5       
Unsuccessful  12 2.5 0.9 1 4       










Total  29 2.14 0.92 1 4       
Unsuccessful  12 0.75 0.62 0 2       
Successful  17 0.41 0.62 0 2  0.159 0.778 Bank Instability 
Total  29 0.55 0.63 0 2       
Unsuccessful  12 0.83 0.58 0 2       
Successful  17 0.59 0.71 0 2  0.334 0.119 Bed Instability 
Total  29 0.69 0.66 0 2       
Unsuccessful  12 0 0 0 0       
Successful  17 0.12 0.33 0 1  0.233 0.009 Dams and Off-Takes 
Total  29 6.90E-02 0.26 0 1       
Unsuccessful  12 0.67 0.65 0 2       
Successful  17 0.53 0.94 0 3  0.667 0.278 Patch Size 
Total  29 0.59 0.82 0 3       
Unsuccessful  12 0.92 0.9 0 2       
Successful  17 1.18 0.64 0 2  0.369 0.077 Weed % Cover 
Total  29 1.07 0.75 0 2       
Unsuccessful  12 0.17 0.39 0 1       
Successful  17 0.94 0.9 0 3  0.009 0.041
Invasive Weed 
Presence 
Total  29 0.62 0.82 0 3       
Unsuccessful  12 1.21 0.99 0 3       



















Total  29 0.84 0.96 0 3       
Unsuccessful  12 878.5 1048.47 0 3600       
Successful  17 370.41 656.36 0 2208  0.12 0.234 Bank Instability 
Total  29 580.66 861.91 0 3600       
Unsuccessful  12 543.75 587.57 0 1548       
Successful  17 845.12 2585.01 0 10806  0.696 0.308 Bed Instability 
Total  29 720.41 1994.21 0 10806       
Unsuccessful  12 0 0 0 0       
Successful  17 23.24 87.19 0 360  0.367 0.075 Dams and Off-Takes 
Total  29 13.62 66.93 0 360       
Unsuccessful  12 970 1028.77 0 3200       
Successful  17 1474.12 2489.52 0 7670  0.515 0.029 Patch Size 
Total  29 1265.52 2005.29 0 7670       
Unsuccessful  12 2806.67 6628.86 0 23600       
Successful  17 32450.59 47126.04 0 158580  0.04 0.001 Weed % Cover 
Total  29 20184.14 38821.39 0 158580       
Unsuccessful  12 382.5 1117.61 0 3870       
Successful  17 35262.94 50127.08 0 158580  0.024 0
Invasive Weed 
Presence 
Total  29 20829.66 41737.18 0 158580       
Unsuccessful  12 5898.33 8256.14 0 30000       







Total  29 9437.93 18249.55 0 87970        
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Figure 24 – Graphs of threat scores against bid rank. 
 
In terms of threat reduction scores, bids proposing actions aimed at reducing threats 
of Weed % Cover and Invasive Weed Presence were more likely to be more highly 
ranked. Conversely, actions reducing threats of Bank Instability, Bed Instability and 
Grazing Pressure seem to be more likely to be lowly ranked (Figure 25). The ANOVA 
results do not support this qualitative interpretation because of the low numbers 
involved with threat reduction scoring (Table 23). This phenomenon could again be 
related to the distinctive types of bids submitted in the Catchment Care trial. The 
actions targeting weed control over large areas to remove low threats to high value 
remnants rank highly because they are usually inexpensive. Comparatively, Stock 
Exclusion actions and Revegetation are much more expensive over the same area 
than patrolling for weeds.   
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Figure 25 – Graphs of threat reduction scores against bid rank. 
 
Similarly, the larger areas of landholder actions tended to occur for Weed % Cover 
and Invasive Weed Presence because of the reasons described above. More highly 
ranked bids had larger areas of threat reduction for these threats (Figure 26). The 
ANOVA supported these results but the variances were significantly different (Table 
23). No relationship between the area of threat reduction and bid rank occurred for 
any other threats and may well have been negatively related for Bank Instability and 
Patch Size suggesting that bids proposing larger areas of erosion reduction and 
Revegetation tended to be more lowly ranked by the algorithm. 
The high ranking of bids involving Weed Eradication may be a flaw with the algorithm 
where these actions double up on environmental benefits because they receive credit 
for both reducing the Weed % Cover threat and the Invasive Weed Presence threat. 
This needs to be corrected in future auctions.  
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Figure 26 – Graphs of area of threat reduction against bid rank. 
7.2 Economic Evaluation 
The evaluation of auctions for conservation contracts has largely focussed on 
comparison of a price discriminating auction with a uniform price schemes 
(Stoneham et al. 2003, White and Burton 2005). Whilst we briefly summarise the 
method here, Stoneham et al. (2003) and White and Burton (2005) should be 
consulted for a full description of this kind of evaluation.  
Stoneham et al. (2003) based their evaluation of discriminative price auctions versus 
uniform price schemes on outputs. Comparison involves selecting the most cost 
effective bids in a discriminative price auction and comparing the marginal cost 
($/EB) of these bids against that paid for the same bids under a uniform price 
auction. Effectively, under the uniform price auction all selected bids are paid at the 
same price per unit of environmental benefit calculated using the marginal cost of 
either the most expensive bid funded or the most cost effective bid to miss out on 
funding.  
Stoneham et al. (2003) then compare the discriminative price auction with a uniform 
price auction in two ways. Firstly, they calculate the total cost of achieving the same 
environmental benefits under the uniform price as achieved under the discriminative 
price auction. Secondly, they calculate the amount of environmental benefits  
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achieved under the uniform price auction for the same total cost as the discriminative 
price auction.  
Using these techniques, Stoneham et al. (2003) report that a uniform price auction 
would require almost 7 times the amount of funding to achieve the same 
environmental benefits achieved under the discriminative price auction. Conversely, 
they also report the very different result that for the same amount of funding the 
uniform price auction would result in 25% less biodiversity benefits.  
Using this methodology of comparing the discriminative price auction to a uniform 
price auction based on outputs the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care is also 
over-estimated. Based on the marginal cost of the last bid selected ($0.0764 / EB) a 
uniform price auction would have paid more than 10 times more for the same 
environmental benefits (20.87 million EBs) for the 17 most cost effective bids funded 
in the trial. For the same total cost to the Board of funding the 17 most cost effective 
bids ($139,278) less than 9% of the environmental benefits would have been 
achieved by the uniform price auction based on the cost effectiveness of the last bid 
funded (13.1 EB/$). This comparison is a misleadingly high measure of the efficiency 
gains of the Catchment Care auction. 
A significant source of error originates in the calculation of the marginal cost payable 
under a uniform price auction being highly dependent upon the reserve price or 
funding limit. The marginal cost curve increases exponentially with quantity 
(environmental benefits). Thus, small changes in the reserve price or funding limit 
can dramatically affect the marginal cost of the last funded bid (Figure 27). 
Consequently, this can also dramatically affect the comparison of the discriminative 
price auction versus the uniform price auction.  
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Figure 27 – Graphs of the proportional change in comparative measures of cost 
effectiveness of discriminative price auction versus uniform price auction 
based on the cost of outputs. Comparative measures can change dramatically 
depending on how the reserve price or funding limit are set. 
White and Burton (2005) also evaluate a discriminative price auction based on inputs. 
The basic idea is that bid price can be calculated according to the costs of all inputs 
that would be required for the actions proposed in each bid. Calculating input cost for 
each bid is a relatively straightforward matter of summing standard input prices 
multiplied by the number of units of input required for each bid. We extend the White 
and Burton (2005) assessment of input costs and consider the impact of in-kind 
support leverage and negotiated input prices paid under the previous grant scheme.  
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In this study we evaluate the Catchment Care auction process with the Watercourse 
Management Assistance Program (WMAP). WMAP encompasses the funding 
protocols in place at the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board prior to 
the development of Catchment Care (i.e. prior to October 2002). The WMAP 
protocols have been developed over several years. Essentially, WMAP is a devolved 
grant scheme where landholder actions and costs are negotiated with the Board (see 
Section 3.3). This comparison will involve not only the funding costs but will provide a 
more realistic comparison of the cost effectiveness of the Catchment Care auction 
process with WMAP. This evaluation aims to provide sufficient information to support 
the decision on rolling out an auction system on a regular basis in the Onkaparinga 
catchment and potentially in the Mt. Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide NRM region.  
The aim of the Catchment Care trial has been to examine the effect of an auction 
process in improving the cost effectiveness of funds for on-ground natural resource 
management actions by landholders. To provide a robust comparison we calculate 
the cost effectiveness of the auction trial and of WMAP based on the bids submitted 
in the Catchment Care trial. Calculating the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care is 
simply done by dividing the total environmental benefits by the total cost of 
successful bids. To calculate the cost effectiveness of WMAP we need to cost the 
actions proposed in the suite of bids received during the Catchment Care trial based 
on funding levels provided under the WMAP program. The total environmental 
benefits achieved by the actions can then be divided by the total WMAP cost. 
It is most informative to consider not only the costs of landholder funding but also the 
costs of implementation of both programs in the comparison. This analysis quantifies 
the total cost to the Board of implementing each of these programs including 
operating costs, wages and materials. We also quantify the costs of developing and 
establishing an auction system in the Onkaparinga catchment to assess the real cost 
of moving from a devolved grant scheme to an auction-based program. This analysis 
can inform decision makers considering the move from a devolved grant scheme to 
an auction format. 
Only by accounting for the implementation costs as well as the funding costs involved 
in both the WMAP and Catchment Care programs can we obtain a meaningful 
comparison of their cost effectiveness. Information about the development costs of 
an auction program is also important for assisting NRM agencies in deciding whether 
to adopt an auction system for distributing funds for on-ground works. Below we 
quantify both the development costs of Catchment Care and the implementation 
costs of both programs as a basis for comparing the cost effectiveness of both 
programs.  
7.2.1 Development Costs of Catchment Care 
Data on costs incurred in all aspects of the design and development of the 
Catchment Care auction system were compiled. The largest costs were incurred in 
the design, testing and refinement of the auction system and bid selection algorithm. 
Significant costs were also incurred in development of the proformas (e.g. Site 
Assessment Sheet, Site Action Plan) and the protocols used throughout the process, 
and in the development of the landholder information. Costs include materials, 
labour, and research. They do not include evaluation and analysis of the auction 
results. Hence, these costs represent the minimum development costs for designing  
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and running an auction trial. Auction evaluation is important for understanding the 
behaviour of the system and refinement for future rounds.  
Development costs are separated into non-labour and labour costs. The total 
development costs of the Catchment Care auction system have been estimated at 
just under $100,000 (Table 24). For a full auction design, trial, evaluation and 
refinement these costs would likely double. 
 
Development Costs 
Non-labour Costs    Cost $ Count Total Cost $ 
Envelopes DL    0.025 15 0.38 
 C4  0.39 0 0.00 
Postage DL    0.5 15 7.50 
 C4  0.8 0 0.00 
Paper B/W  A4  0.015 1100 16.50 
 A3  0.34 0 0.00 
 Colour A4  0.015 100 1.50 
 A3  0.34 0 0.00 
Envelopes print  B/W  DL   0.015 15 0.23 
 C4  0.015 0 0.00 
Vehicles  $/km  1.43 320 457.60 
Phone Calls  Local  0.25 300 75.00 
 Mobile 1 75 75.00 
Sub Total   633.70 
Labour Costs  Cost $ Count Total Cost $ 
Board Officers   $/hr  30 325 9750.00 
Contractor costs   $/hr  80 685.5 54840.00 
Research and Development  n/a n/a 32301.00 
Assistant $/hr  23 86 1978.00 
Sub Total   98869.00 
Total  $99,502.70 
Table 24 – Development costs of the Catchment Care auction system. 
Thus, based on the Catchment Care experience, around $100,000 is a reasonable 
estimate of the minimum upfront costs required to move from a devolved grant 
scheme to a robust and well-designed auction based system. Auction systems could 
be established without the meticulous design and development that went into 
Catchment Care for a lower cost. However, they would likely achieve lower 
efficiencies and have a much higher chance of failure altogether. 
7.2.2 Implementation Costs 
To compare cost effectiveness of the two programs we need to account for the costs 
involved in funding and implementing both Catchment Care and WMAP. The 
implementation costs are presented in terms of the non-labour and labour costs. 
Non-labour costs include items such as paper, printing, postage, vehicles and 
telephone calls. Table 25 estimates the cost of implementing Catchment Care to a 
funding limit of $150,000 whilst WMAP is considered to have no funding limitation. 
Note that the costs are based on Catchment Care funding 17 bids and for the  
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purposes of the comparison, WMAP is considered to fund all 29 bids. Many costs are 
based on the number of successful bids. 
 
Implementation Catchment Care 
Fixed costs  Cost $  Count Total Cost $ 
DL   0.025 513 12.825  Envelopes each 
C4 0.39 95 37.05 
DL   0.5 513 256.5  Postage 
C4 0.8 95 76 
A4 0.015 6700 100.5  BW 
A3 0.34 15 5.1 
A4 0.015 2970 44.55 
Paper 
CL  A3 0.34 200 68 
BW DL    0.015 513 7.695  Envelopes 
print     C4  0.015 95 1.425 
Vehicles/Fuel/maint     1.43 760 1086.8 
LL 0.25 170 42.5  Phone Calls $/call 
Mob 1 50 50 
Advertising     1000 1 1000 
Total      2788.95 
          
          
Implementation WMAP 
Fixed costs  Cost $  Count Total Cost $ 
DL   0.025 29 0.725  Envelopes each 
C4 0.39 29 11.31 
DL   0.5 29 14.5  Postage 
C4 0.8 29 23.2 
A4 0.015 58 0.87  BW 
A3 0.34 0 0 
A4 0.015 0 0 
Paper 
CL  A3 0.34 69 23.46 
BW DL    0.015 29 0.435  Envelopes 
print     C4  0.015 29 0.435 
Vehicles/Fuel/maint     1.43 253 361.79 
LL 0.25 43 10.75  Phone Calls $/call 
Mob 1 10 10 
Total      457.48 
 
Table 25 – Non-labour costs of implementing both Catchment Care and WMAP. 
Table 25 shows that the non-labour costs of Catchment Care are more than six times 
higher than WMAP. Some of the additional material costs for Catchment Care are 
incurred as a result of advertising in local print media and in providing landholders 
with detailed information on various forms of natural resource management in the 
landholder information pack. This level of information is not provided through WMAP 
as a majority of the decisions regarding the correct management techniques are 
made by the Board.   
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In addition, considerable labour costs are incurred by the Board to run both 
Catchment Care and WMAP including the labour required to assess and process 
each bid. The number of labour hours required to assess and process each property 
varies quite markedly under Catchment Care and WMAP.  
Under Catchment Care, the number of officer hours is different for withdrawn bids, 
unsuccessful bids and successful bids. Landholders who choose to express an 
interest in the program but elect not to submit a bid for funding (i.e. withdraw) will 
require the least officer hours. Successful bids will require the most hours labour and 
unsuccessful bids require an amount of labour somewhere between the other two. 
Hours of labour have been calculated for both Catchment Care and WMAP by 
breaking down the hours on a per bid basis (Table 26). Hours are based on a three 
year contract and all labour costs incurred over that three year period. 
The Catchment Care auction runs over a relatively short period of the year. The 
intense labour requirement in running the auction has the potential to place a large 
burden on Board staff. As was the case in the trial, Board staff may not be able to 
provide all of the labour required to conduct the auction including all of the site 
assessment, and may require the use of external contractors. This contrasts to the 
continuous WMAP process which does not require external labour. Introducing 
external contractors reduces the cost effectiveness at which Catchment Care can be 
implemented as the labour cost of contractors is priced at $85 per hour whilst Board 
staff are priced at $35 per hour. To assess the impact of using contractors on the 
cost effectiveness of the auction process, we have conducted our analysis using two 
scenarios. Firstly, we consider labour costs based on using Board staff only. 
Secondly, we consider labour costs based on using external contractors for the 
actual number of hours labour required in the trial (Table 27). 
 
WMAP   Catchment  Care 
        Tender Status 







Preliminary contact  0.2   0.5 0.5  0.5
Produce map and other info  0.2   1 1  1
site visit  2   3 3  3
admin (database entry and other)  2   2 2  2
Writing Plan  3    2  2
Contractor admin/prelim  3    1.5  1.5
site inspection post work  3        3
Misc (problem solving)  1        1
Total hours/property  14.3   6.5 10  14
Number of properties  29    13 12  17
Total Hours   415.7    84.5 120  238
Summary WMAP   CC    
Number of funded properties  29    17    
Total Hours   415.7    442.5    
Hours / funded property  14.33    26.03    
 
Table 26 – Hours of labour involved of implementing both Catchment Care and WMAP.  
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WMAP   Catchment  Care 
Type of Field Officer Used  Board only    Board only Board & Contractors
Labour Hours (Board Officers)  415.7   442.5 241
Labour Cost (Board Officers @ $30/hr)   $12,471.00    $13,275.00   $7,241.10 
Labour Hours (Contractors)  0   0 201
Labour Cost (Contractors @ $85/hr)   $0    $0  $17,096.40 
Labour Cost Total   $12,471.00    $13,275.00   $24,337.50 
Table 27 – Labour costs involved of implementing both Catchment Care and WMAP. 
During the Catchment care trial the 13 withdrawn bids each required 6.5 hours labour 
totalling 84.5 hours. Twelve unsuccessful landholders required 10 hours labour each, 
totalling 120 hours labour. The 17 successful bids required 14 hours of labour each, 
totalling 238 hours. The labour hours are then summed to produce the total number 
of labour hours required to implement the programs. In terms of the labour hours per 
funded property WMAP (14.3) and Catchment Care (14) are comparable. However, 
Catchment Care incurs substantial labour costs in assessing and processing those 
landholders who are unsuccessful or choose to withdraw from the process. 
Nonetheless, the educational and engagement benefits achieved by these activities 
with the withdrawn and unsuccessful landholders may be of benefit in future 
iterations of the program should those landholders choose to bid again. 
The total labour cost of WMAP compared to Catchment Care is comparable if Board 
staff only are used for labour. As contractors were used in the trial, the labour costs 
of Catchment Care are around double those of WMAP for the 29 bids submitted 
(Table 27). 
7.2.3 Costing Actions Proposed in Catchment Care using WMAP Pricing 
In order to compare the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care with WMAP we need 
to estimate the level of funding the Board may have paid for the actions proposed in 
each Catchment Care bid under WMAP to achieve the same level of environmental 
benefits.  
Obtaining an independent estimate of the WMAP price that would be paid for the 
landholder actions proposed in the 29 Catchment Care bids proved to be difficult. 
Several methods were trialled including asking field officers to cost each bid as if the 
landholder had proposed the same actions under WMAP. This failed because it could 
not incorporate one of the great strengths of WMAP - the ability to leverage in-kind 
actions from the landholder. To realistically model the price paid for landholder 
actions under WMAP the level of in-kind support from the landholder leveraged 
through negotiation needs to be considered.  
To obtain data on typical prices paid per unit area for landholder actions under 
WMAP that includes in-kind leverage with a minimum of bias we used historical data. 
Board records of the actions, areas and prices paid were used to assemble data on 
cost per unit area paid for landholder actions under WMAP in the past. A subset of 
100 WMAP properties were randomly selected from the Board’s database to provide 
likely levels of funding paid under WMAP. Where the WMAP properties were not 
privately owned or where the application was not made by a private landholder (i.e.  
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by an environmental group) the property was removed from the selection. This left a 
set of 40 properties from which the appropriate information was extracted. Where 
necessary, missing information was supplied and annotated by Board field officers. 
Analysis of the results revealed that 17% of the properties funded for Stock Exclusion 
provided those actions at their own expense (i.e. in-kind), 15% of the properties 
provided Weed Eradication at their own expense, and none of the properties 
provided Revegetation at their own expense (Table 28). In-kind actions are 
represented in Table 28 as an area of action with a zero cost to the Board. Average 
costs per unit area paid for landholder actions in the past under WMAP were 
calculated by summing the total cost to the Board and summing the area of actions, 
then dividing the total cost by the total area of actions. The in-kind contribution is 
incorporated as landholder actions conducted over some specified area (>0) but at 
zero cost. This has the effect of decreasing the cost of actions per unit area through 
increasing the total area of action without increasing the cost. In this way, the 
historical data inherently includes the in-kind contributions leveraged from 
landholders. 
There were no examples of erosion control or dam removal in any of the historical 
WMAP properties assessed although the Board officers indicated that where the cost 
of these actions is small they would most likely fund the action.  
Table 28 summarises the costs and areas for actions of a historical subset of 
properties funded by WMAP. It also displays the average cost per unit area of those 
actions which are used as a basis for calculating the level of funding that may have 
been paid under WMAP for the bids received in the Catchment Care trial. Table 28 
includes the funding costs only and does not account for the costs of implementing 
the program.  
  
































































































































































































































































































































































1           $900  1,500  $0.60  $750  24,508  $0.03 
2  $580 7,098  $0.08  $4,080 3,000  $1.36  $1,813  31,997  $0.06 
3                    $8,000  79,751  $0.10 
4  $1,820  13,034  $0.14           $5,000  37,250  $0.13 
5                    $8,000  191,322  $0.04 
6                    $7,300  30,689  $0.24 
7           $20,400  9,000  $2.27  $2,100  26,974  $0.08 
8  $0 38,973  $0.00  $27,200 12,000  $2.27  $14,000 38,973  $0.36 
9                    $4,790  74,372  $0.06 
10  $2,400 27,348  $0.09  $8,500  3,750  $2.27  $8,000  124,862  $0.06 
11                    $7,500  7,971  $0.94 
12  $100  7,000  $0.01           $3,500  40,621  $0.09 
13  $690 20,188  $0.03  $13,600  7,500  $1.81  $4,000 23,957  $0.17 
14  $2,010  13,052  $0.15  $6,800  3,000  $2.27          
15  $13,160 101,317  $0.13 $4,950  8,250  $0.60  $0 184,569  $0.00 
16           $1,530  900  $1.70  $6,500  175,987  $0.04 
17                    $7,500  37,946  $0.20 
18  $930 5,291  $0.18  $6,000 1,700  $3.53  $0 6,671  $0.00 
19           $5,000  2,400  $2.08  $0  8,823  $0.00 
20  $850  4,931  $0.17           $4,023  26,690  $0.15 
21  $3,270 15,064  $0.22  $1,800  2,000  $0.90  $5,925 34,502  $0.17 
22           $720  1,000  $0.72  $7,137  82,819  $0.09 
23                    $2,673  6,625  $0.40 
24  $2,800 24,927  $0.11  $17,000  7,500  $2.27  $5,000 24,927  $0.20 
25           $6,800  3,000  $2.27  $3,722  46,324  $0.08 
26  $0 4,222  $0.00  $1,440 1,600  $0.90  $0 4,222  $0.00 
27  $200 3,739  $0.05  $11,900 3,500  $3.40  $5,522 9,730  $0.57 
28  $1,380 14,077  $0.10  $5,100  1,500  $3.40  $0  1,204  $0.00 
29  $2,750 3,823  $0.72  $10,767 4,000  $2.69  $700 2,737  $0.26 
30  $2,160 6,699  $0.32  $9,633 3,000  $3.21  $1,100 6,699  $0.16 
31  $0 9,932  $0.00  $9,633 3,000  $3.21  $5,000 9,932  $0.50 
32  $1,260 20,892  $0.06  $13,600  6,000  $2.27  $0 21,879  $0.00 
33  $0 5,665  $0.00  $15,300 4,500  $3.40  $3,800 2,166  $1.75 
34  $4,280 28,409  $0.15  $27,200  8,000  $3.40  $13,400 28,409  $0.47 
35  $1,300 14,254  $0.09  $13,600  6,000  $2.27  $6,950 14,254  $0.49 
36           $6,800  2,000  $3.40  $2,500  9,978  $0.25 
37           $5,100  1,500  $3.40  $2,650  6,399  $0.41 
38                    $4,200  41,841  $0.10 
39  $5,588 54,305  $0.10  $17,000  5,000  $3.40  $5,000 54,305  $0.09 
40           $13,600  4,000  $3.40  $1,000  6,412  $0.16 
Sum  $47,528  444,240     $285,953  120,100     $169,055  1,589,297    
Average      $0.11      $2.38      $0.11 
 
Table 28 – Historical data on area and costs of actions funded under WMAP.  
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An analysis of the results in Table 28 above shows that in the past WMAP has paid 
an average of $0.11 per square meter for Stock Exclusion, $2.38 per square meter 
for Revegetation and $0.11 per square meter for Weed Eradication (including exotic 
tree control). These global average cost figures are used for costing the actions 
proposed in the 29 Catchment Care bids as a basis for comparing the cost 
effectiveness of WMAP and Catchment Care. 
7.2.4 Comparison of Catchment Care and WMAP 
To robustly compare the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care and WMAP we use 
the 29 Catchment Care bids and historical WMAP funding records. The comparison 
involves the calculation of the total cost of the actions proposed by landholders in the 
Catchment Care bids as if they were funded under WMAP based on the historical 
mean price paid for each action per unit area under WMAP (Table 28). 
To do this comparison we first quantify the cost effectiveness of the Catchment Care 
trial considering both funding and implementation costs. This is done by summing the 
total implementation costs with the total amount of funding provided to landholders 
given the costs involved in funding the highest ranked 17 bids identified by the 
Catchment Care bid selection algorithm. The total environmental benefits achieved 
by the 17 funded bids are then divided by the combined implementation and funding 
costs.  
Quantification of the cost effectiveness of WMAP is a little more complex. Table 28 
summarises the historical data and presents the mean price paid per unit area under 
WMAP for on-ground works inclusive of in-kind works provided by landholders. 
These mean costs per unit area are applied to the area of actions proposed in the 29 
bids submitted in the Catchment Care trial (see Table 21).  
In reality, the Board may not have funded all 29 bids under WMAP. WMAP combines 
informal field assessment, negotiation, and prioritisation in a tacit decision framework 
that is not transparent or easily described. Hence, despite several attempts at 
simulation, it was not possible to mimic the human decision-making processes 
involved in WMAP to enhance comparison with Catchment Care in a satisfactory 
way. Nor was it possible to use the opinion of field officers to select which of the 29 
bids would and would not have been funded under the WMAP program 
independently of the information provided by Catchment Care and without bias. 
Hence, in this evaluation we base the comparison on the plausible scenario that 
unlimited funding is available and all 29 bids are funded by the Board at WMAP 
prices. 
Considering both funding and implementation costs, Catchment Care was able to 
achieve a relative cost effectiveness of 134 environmental benefits per dollar when 
Board officers were used for all labour. When contractors were used to provide 
support, the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care was reduced to 125 EB/$ (Table 
29). In comparison, in funding all 29 bids at historical mean WMAP prices, WMAP 
achieved a cost effectiveness of 101 EB/$ considering all funding and 
implementation costs (Table 29). Hence, based on these methods, Catchment Care 
was between 24% and 33% more cost effective than WMAP.  
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WMAP   Catchment  Care 
       
       
Assuming board 
officer only 
Assuming 50/50 Board 
officers to Contractors 
Total Hours   415.67   442.5 442.5 
Labour costs $  $12,470.00    $13,275.00   $24,337.50  
Materials costs $  $457.88    $2,788.95   $2,788.95  
Total costs $  $12,927.88    $16,063.95   $27,126.45  
Costs/property $  $923.42    $944.94   $1,595.67  
Total Funds $   $202,951.00     $139,277.55   $139,277.55  
Total (Funds + costs) $   $215,878.88     $155,341.50   $166,404.00  
Total Environmental Benefits  21835532.67   20873971.67 20873971.67 
Cost Effectiveness (EB / $)  101.15   134.37 125.44 
 
Table 29 – Comparison of the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care and WMAP 
accounting for both funding and implementation costs. 
However, whilst these results provide a plausible indication of the difference in cost 
effectiveness of the two programs, significant uncertainty surrounds these estimates. 
Uncertainty surrounds the inability to incorporate the decision framework used in 
WMAP to weed out less desirable or lower priority bids. Many factors can affect the 
cost effectiveness of WMAP including: 
•  The order of receipt and consideration of the bids and their priority to the 
Board; 
•  The ability of the field officers to negotiate cheaper prices with landholders and 
to leverage in-kind support, and; 
•  The ability of decision makers to use judgement to exclude the lower priority 
bids 
Depending on these factors the estimate of the cost effectiveness of WMAP may 
increase or decrease. Based on the analyses above, we cannot provide any sense of 
the possible magnitude of the change in cost effectiveness of WMAP resulting from 
variation in the above factors.  
In addition, the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care can also change depending on 
the reserve price. In the Catchment Care trial a funding limit of $150,000 was used 
and this resulted in a certain level of cost effectiveness as discussed above. 
However, a lower or higher funding limit would have resulted in quite different levels 
of cost effectiveness from Catchment Care. Analysis of the optimal funding level (see 
Section 7.2.5) shows that by funding only 4 bids a cost effectiveness of 400 EB/$ can 
be achieved. 
In summary, our best estimate is that Catchment Care is between 23 and 34% more 
cost effective than WMAP based on the techniques and data above but this is subject 
to significant uncertainty on both sides. This is the first attempt at such a detailed 
comparison and evaluation of an auction system for supporting policy decisions. We 
recommend that future auction rounds further develop and integrate a more robust 
and independent methodology for assessing the cost effectiveness of the auction 
format with previous programs to provide a better comparison.  
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7.2.5 Maximising Cost Effectiveness 
An important outcome of the trial evaluation is to understand the nature of the bids 
proposed by landholders and to help identify any rules of thumb that may be 
applicable to future auctions regarding the cost effectiveness of NRM funding. We 
investigate this problem from two directions. Firstly, we analyse and discuss the 
maximisation of cost effectiveness of Board funding for NRM. Secondly, we assess 
the marginal cost of environmental benefits to the Board. 
The cost effectiveness of bids proposed in the Catchment Care trial is measured in 
terms of the number of environmental benefits achieved for the cost (EB/$) and bids 
are ranked by cost effectiveness in the selection process. When the funding costs 
only are considered, the cost effectiveness decreases steeply over the first few bids 
then levels off (Figure 20). The optimum point to fund in this situation is the highest 
ranked bid only. 
However, when the full costs of the Catchment Care trial are accounted for the cost 
effectiveness curve looks different. As discussed earlier, withdrawn, unsuccessful 
and successful bids all attract different implementation costs. We can calculate the 
full cost (FC = funding costs plus implementation costs) of funding any number of 
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Where:  N = the total number of bids where bids i = 1, 2, …, N 
x = the number of successful bids 
  a = the implementation cost of an successful bid 
  b = the implementation cost of an unsuccessful bid 
  n = number of withdrawn applications 
  c = the implementation cost per withdrawn application 
  fi = proposed funding for bid i 
 
We can then graph the cost effectiveness of varying the number of successful bids 
(funding from only 1 through to all 29 bids). Assessment of this curve shows a peak 
cost effectiveness (around 400 EB/$) occurring when only 4 bids are funded (Figure 
28). This peak occurs because of the differing implementation costs involved in 
successful versus unsuccessful bids. 
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Figure 28 – Cost effectiveness of different funding levels. Grey line considers funding 
costs only, black line considers full costs (funding + implementation costs). 
The results suggest that if the goal of the Catchment Care program is to maximise 
the cost effectiveness of public funds for on-ground NRM works by landholders, then 
we should only fund the few highest ranked bids. A total of 17 bids were funded in 
the Catchment Care trial. The cost effectiveness of funding 17 bids is well below the 
maximum. However, funding only 4 bids out of a total of 29 is likely to have adverse 
effects on landholder attitudes to the Catchment Care program. These effects include 
a lack of motivation to apply for funding because of the low chance of success. This 
could quickly lead to thin markets and a lack of supply of environmental benefits by 
landholders. Hence, funding needs to occur beyond the maximum level of cost 
effectiveness to maintain a strong market for conservation contracts. 
Analysis of the marginal cost of environmental benefits to the Board reveals 
important information regarding bid selection. Figure 22 shows the increasing 
marginal cost of environmental benefits to the Board in terms of $ / EB when bids are 
ranked in order of least expensive to most expensive as they are in the bid selection 
algorithm of Catchment Care. The marginal cost curve is inclusive of the opportunity 
costs of supplying the environmental benefits and information rent (Stoneham et al. 
2003). Marginal costs of environmental benefits are low up until about 20 million 
(Figure 22), after which the cost increases sharply. These bids are expensive 
because they offer very low environmental benefits. The point at which the cost of 
environmental benefits begins to increase may be a fruitful place to set a reserve 
price or cap on the price paid for environmental benefits. 
7.2.6 Discussion 
The great benefit of Catchment Care is that it provides a mechanism for the Board to 
access some very inexpensive environmental benefits. Bids are ranked highest by 
the bid selection algorithm in Catchment Care and are funded first because they offer 
the greatest value for money. Landholders proposing these bids either have lower  
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opportunity costs or they receive greater private benefits from performing the on-
ground NRM works. Hence, they do not require large amounts of Board funding to 
undertake the proposed actions. 
Many landholders in the Onkaparinga catchment earn the majority of their incomes 
off-farm, many are (semi-) retired, or have opted for a rural or nature-based lifestyle. 
For these people the opportunity costs of conducting on-ground NRM works are low 
as it is often their intention to manage the property in an environmentally sensitive 
way anyway. Private benefits may include an increase in economic returns from 
agricultural productivity or ecotourism and recreation. More likely however, 
landholders in the Onkaparinga catchment are more environmentally-minded and 
receive aesthetic and feel-good benefits of managing their land for the better of the 
environment. The auction format of Catchment Care enables landholders to name 
their own price for on-ground works. Landholders who receive significant private 
benefits from performing on-ground works are able to out-compete other landholders 
who do not receive the same private benefits or whose opportunity costs are higher. 
However,  
The blanket comparison of Catchment Care versus WMAP based on total cost 
effectiveness of both programs does not tell the whole story. Both programs have 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Where the black line is above the red line in the cost effectiveness graph (Figure 29) 
the landholder has bid less in the auction than what would typically be paid under 
WMAP and this represents efficiency gains of the auction. On the other hand, where 
the red line is above the black line in the cost effectiveness graph, the Board paid 
more for these actions than would have been paid under WMAP. In the case of the 
bid ranked 9
th (Figure 29) the bid price is substantially higher than the price paid for 
the actions under WMAP. The cost effectiveness of this bid is still good enough to be 
selected under Catchment Care because it represents considerable environmental 
benefits. However, if the actions in this bid were paid at WMAP prices the cost 
effectiveness of the bid would have been excellent. This is a disadvantage of the 
auction system as the Board is obliged to pay the bid price for these landholder 
actions. A reserve price based on maximum levels of payment for actions rather than 
environmental benefits may reduce this effect. Further research is required to verify 
this. 
Conversely, WMAP involves paying of standard or negotiated prices for on-ground 
works with an in-kind contribution leveraged from the landholder. There is less room 
for the landholder to provide very inexpensive environmental benefits. Hence, WMAP 
is unlikely to be able to leverage similar levels of cost effectiveness (environmental 
benefits per dollar) as the most cost effective bids received under Catchment Care.   




















Figure 29 – Cost effectiveness of the Catchment Care bids. The black lines are the cost 
effectiveness of the Catchment Care bids based on actual bid price whereas the red 
lines are the cost effectiveness of the bids as priced under WMAP.  
Assessment of the marginal cost (Figure 30) shows that a few bids are exceedingly 
expensive. Under the Catchment Care auction format, these bids are simply rejected 
as they breach the reserve price (or in this case, the funding limit) and no further 
action is taken. These landholders may have bid high for a variety of reasons but 
most likely because either they made an honest but incorrect judgement about the 
level of competition or they were shading their bids high in order to try to seek 
information rent from the Board. An advantage of WMAP is that it is purpose-
designed to negotiate downwards the price of these highly-priced bids. However, 
there is no way of knowing whether landholders offering very expensive 
environmental benefits would have accepted payment lower than their bid price.  
The marginal cost of bids according to the prices paid under WMAP and under 
Catchment Care (Figure 30) follows a pattern. The price paid under WMAP tended to 
be higher than the auction bid price in terms of $/EB for the highest ranked (most 
cost effective) bids. Conversely, the marginal cost of bids priced under WMAP was 
generally lower than the auction bid price for the lower ranked bids. Where the 
WMAP price (red line) has a higher marginal cost than the bid price (black line) the 
auction is more efficient than WMAP (Figure 30).  
Catchment Care does not allow for the subsequent follow up and negotiation with 
unsuccessful landholders who have proposed more expensive environmental 
benefits. Thus, under the auction system, the interest generated in on-ground works 
especially by legitimate bidders is lost to the Board. As these bids tend to offer very 
low environmental benefits the impact of not funding these bids in terms of lost 
natural resource management effort is minimal (see Figure 21). 
  

















Figure 30 – Marginal cost of the Catchment Care bids. The black lines are the marginal 
cost of the Catchment Care bids based on actual bid price whereas the red lines are 
the marginal cost of the bids as priced under WMAP.  
7.3 Qualitative Evaluation 
This section provides a review and evaluation of selected processes and protocols 
developed and employed during the Catchment Care auction trial and makes 
suggestions for future improvement.  
7.3.1 Catchment Care Promotion 
Promotion of the Catchment Care trial aimed to encourage landholders to register an 
interest in taking part in the trial, or to seek further information so as to determine 
whether the trial was of interest to them. All who registered an interest regarding the 
Catchment Care trial were asked how they found out about the trial. Most landholders 
who expressed an interest in participating in the trial were contacted directly using 
Board records and data. Only two of the 52 respondents to the Board’s call for 
expressions of interest registered as a result of advertising in local print media. 
While the cost of advertising in local print media is not high (around $1,000 including 
preparation time), the low success rate of only two respondents raises questions 
about the cost effectiveness of this means of communication. The use of local print 
media to advertise future NRM contract auctions is favoured by the Board because it 
provides the opportunity for tender submission by a wide range of landholders 
proposing works on a range of different sites and environment types. However, the 
promotion of future trials/rounds using local print media should be reviewed in order 
to achieve a higher hit rate.   
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7.3.2 Site Visit and Assessment 
An evaluation of the utility of the field protocols and Site Assessment Sheet for 
scoring environmental values and threats was undertaken by the field officers 
involved in the Catchment Care trial. The main recommendations arising from this 
evaluation are presented below. 
7.3.2.1 Geomorphology 
The Geomorphology value character is currently scored according to the river style 
classification. While river style characterises river geomorphology, it does not provide 
any information on watercourse condition. Hence, this character does not capture 
any information about the biodiversity habitat value or naturalness of the 
watercourse. The Geomorphology value character should be reviewed to include an 
assessment of watercourse condition which considers the amount of in-stream 
habitat (woody debris, pool/riffle sequences). 
The Bed and Bank Instability threats are scored according to degree of erosion 
observed on site. Accurately scoring these characters requires some training in order 
that consistency between field officers can be achieved. Nonetheless, the Bed 
Instability and Bank Instability characters are useful. 
7.3.2.2 Hydrology 
The Hydrology value character is scored by determining the degree of disturbance of 
the current flow conditions from modelled natural conditions. The accuracy of the 
score is dependent on having up-to-date data on farm dams. In addition, the 
hydrological disturbance scores are calculated at a landscape scale which is not 
always commensurate with site-based assessment. More time may be required in the 
field to collect information on dams and other in-stream structures to complement the 
GIS data. This need should be reflected in the Catchment Care field officer guidelines 
as well as in future training for field officers.  
The current disturbance values calculated with the use of GIS will need detailed peer 
review. While the algorithm which underlies the calculation appears sound, field 
validation indicated some anomalies that require investigation.  
The Dams and Off-takes threat character represents the threat to the in-stream 
environment imposed by farm dams and other in-stream structures designed to 
impound and divert water. Use of this character in the Catchment Care trial has 
revealed a potential weakness. Specifically, the character considers only the size and 
use patterns of the dam/off-take and does not consider the relative impact of the 
structure on the natural hydrological regimes. The Dams and Off-takes threat 
character should be revised to include some consideration of the actual impact of the 
dam/off-take on the natural hydrology and be peer reviewed. 
7.3.2.3 Remnant Vegetation 
The Remnant Vegetation Condition value character assessment appeared to work 
reasonably well, but it also became evident that modifications to the assessment 
system would benefit future rounds of Catchment Care. Relating a single set of  
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vegetation condition descriptions to a variety of different vegetation associations was 
difficult. Modifications to this character would most profitably include developing 
condition descriptions for the different vegetation associations occurring in the 
Onkaparinga catchment. 
In addition, the Remnant Vegetation Condition environmental value character is 
related to all of the Remnant Vegetation threat characters especially Weed % Cover 
and Grazing Pressure. This may introduce systematic bias in the bid selection 
algorithm as Remnant Vegetation Condition is effectively scored twice through the 
Condition value and the Remnant Vegetation threats. The Remnant Vegetation 
values and threats need to be modified to avoid this occurrence. 
The Conservation Significance character could be enhanced using existing state 
government databases. GIS layers of biodiversity hotspots can be created from 
species databases and used to set priorities for species of conservation significance 
(see Crossman et al. in review). 
The Landscape Connectivity value character recognises the importance of the spatial 
relationship of proposed sites to existing remnant vegetation as a means of 
promoting biodiversity outcomes. The character is simple to score given availability of 
aerial photography, although the area classes are somewhat arbitrary, and worked 
adequately for the purposes of the trial. 
The Remnant Vegetation Patch Size character was identified as a threat to Remnant 
Vegetation. There is some concern regarding the appropriateness of specifying Patch 
Size as a threat character especially when Landscape Connectivity is a value 
character. Revegetation is a common action and in the trial was able to increase the 
patch size and hence reduce the Patch Size threat. Theoretically, Revegetation can 
also increase landscape connectivity as well, but Landscape Connectivity was 
specified as a value character and hence, could not be affected by landholder 
actions.  
The structure of the Remnant Vegetation values and threats especially with regard to 
Landscape Connectivity and Patch Size need to be revised and possibly also be 
enhanced by consideration of patch shape. Further, if the auction system is to be 
rolled out for the much larger Mt. Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide NRM region in 
the future, significant improvements the Remnant Vegetation characters could be 
made. This may involve the addition of new characters which capture the regional 
conservation priorities of the region according to established principles of 
conservation planning. Regionally based GIS layers could be constructed which 
prioritise areas that are under-represented in reserves or that have been subject to 
preferential clearance (see White and Burton 2005). Regional strategic linkages and 
habitats could also be prioritised (Crossman and Bryan in review).  
The results of the trial show a strong bias towards landholders who chose to 
undertake Weed Eradication actions. In the site assessment process the Weed % 
Cover and Invasive Weed Presence are scored independently of one another. This 
has resulted in a systematic bias favouring Weed Eradication actions in the auction 
trial through counting two weed threat characters. Another weakness in the weed 
threat characters is that there is no mechanism to identify the relative impact of each 
weed species which differ in their invasiveness and ecological impact.  
To remedy this, the Invasive Weed Presence and Weed % Cover threats need to be 
combined. This could be done by scoring the proportional cover of each weed  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 130  
species and multiplying this by the threat rating score for the species. These scores 
could then be summed and normalised (e.g. Table 30). This would capture the 
differential ecological impact of weed species and eliminate the bias.  
 
Invasive Weeds                      








A x B 
African Boxthorn     Lycium ferocissimum  Yes  3          
Blackberry     Rubus sp     Yes  4          
Boneseed     Chrysanthemoides mon.  Yes  4          
Broad-leaved Cotton Bush  Asclepias rotundifolia  No  2          
Cape Broom     Genista monspessulana  Yes  4          
English Broom    Cytisus scoparius     Yes  4          
Erica     Erica species    No  4          
Gorse   Ulex europaeus     Yes  4          
Olive     Olea europaea    Yes  4          
Pittosporum   Pittosporum undulatum  No  3          
Radiata Pine     Pinus radiata    No  3          
Wattles   Acacia sp     No  2          
Willow      Salix sp    No  3          
Ash, Popular, Elm    Fraxinus sp etc     No  2          
African Daisy     Senecio pterophorus  No  3          
Cape Weed    Arctotheca calendula  No  1          
Salvation Jane     Echium plantagineum  Yes  3          
Bulbil Watsonia    Watsonia      Yes  3          
Monadenia     Monadenia bracteata  Yes  4          
Bridal Creeper and Bridal Veil  Myrsiphyllum sp     Yes  4          
Periwinkle     Vinca major    No  3          
Fountain Grass    Pennisetum macrourum  Yes  3          
Phalaris     Phalaris sp     No  4          
        Sum       
 
Sum Score x 




1-200  1 
200-500  2 
500-1000  3 
1000-1500  4 
1500-3000  5 
Score Threat   
Table 30 – Potential solution for a revised Invasive Weeds character. 
7.3.2.4 Potential Expansion of Character Set  
Geomorphology, Hydrology and Remnant Vegetation are a subset of the range of 
natural resource management objectives of importance in the Onkaparinga 
catchment. They are of high priority to the Board. However, there are other objectives 
that may also be worth considering for expansion of the Catchment Care character 
set. An important issue in the Onkaparinga and the greater Mt. Lofty Ranges region 
is water conservation and quality. Revegetation can have an impact on water quantity 
and quality. Spatial priorities can be constructed for revegetation priorities that limit 
the impact on water quantity reaching reservoirs and enhance water quality through 
land use change in sensitive areas. Similarly, spatial priorities may be set for 
enhancing aquifer recharge, reducing erosion, improving landscape aesthetics, 
reducing salinisation, and other NRM objectives. In summary, in rolling out the  
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Catchment Care auction trial to the larger NRM region, it would be beneficial to 
develop a set of regionally based multiple objective NRM priorities (see Bryan et al. 
2005). These can take the form of a series of GIS layers that have been modelled 
based on biophysical principles and can be queried and scored prior to the field 
assessment. This would greatly complement the field assessment stage and provide 
a mechanism for aligning the auction system with regional NRM objectives detailed in 
regional plans. 
7.3.3 Site Action Plan Development 
7.3.3.1 List of Recommended Actions 
The Site Action Plan is developed by the landholder based on discussion with, and 
written advice from the field officer. In most cases, the landholder need only 
transcribe the recommendations made by the officer to their Site Action Plan, 
providing additional information as required and nominating funding amounts. A 
number of issues were encountered during this process. Some issues were able to 
be dealt with early on in the process and so were remedied prior to final plan 
development and submission. Outstanding issues are summarised below. 
The recommendations in the Site Action Plan were presented to the landholder as 
“flexible” in the sense that they were able to amend or include activities which would 
assist in achieving biodiversity and water quality outcomes. In some cases this 
presented the landholder with an opportunity to include activities not considered to be 
best practice, or in fact unnecessary to achieve biodiversity and water quality 
outcomes. Site Action Plans including such activities generally presented lower levels 
of environmental benefits per dollar and were not successful in securing funding. 
To avoid the modification of actions in the Site Action Plan it is recommended that in 
future auction rounds a more prescriptive approach to the recommendation of actions 
be taken in Site Action Plan development. This may require the mandatory adoption 
of the field officer recommendations in their Site Action Plan by the landholder. Any 
negotiations over the suite of activities to be included in the Site Action Plan may 
need be undertaken during the site visit and assessment phase. Officers will need to 
be very sensitive in their approach to this as an overly autocratic approach may lead 
to landholders losing interest in the program. In this way, the Board can be more 
confident that the suite of activities to be undertaken are the minimum required and 
include best management practice. 
7.3.3.2 Defining the of Area of Landholder Actions 
As the prioritisation of tenders for funding includes a consideration of the area of 
proposed works, the calculation of area needs to be as accurate as possible. In 
reality, highly accurate area estimation is difficult to achieve in the field as areas can 
only be broadly delineated and subject to error. In addition, the actual area of works 
(should the bid be successful) is not likely to be exactly the same as that proposed.  
This will be a difficult issue to resolve as information on area is vital to tender 
assessment and errors in area determination are inherent in the process.  Area 
determination also proved to be an impost on Board resources and may not be 
achievable using standard Board resources in the future. It is recommended that the  
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method of area determination be reviewed with the intention that it be streamlined to 
fit current Board resource limitations and ensure an acceptable level of accuracy.  
The method of calculating the area over which the Dams and Off-Takes threat 
reduction occurs also needs attention. Although, simulation and trial results suggest 
that area alone does not affect bid success, further sensitivity analysis may be 
required to investigate the impact of area on bid rank. The need to resolve this issue 
becomes more critical where tender rank is shown to be highly sensitive to area. 
The proposed area of works also needs to be defined in the Site Action Plan to 
minimise confusion between the Board and landholder with respect to areas of 
intended works.  
7.3.4 Tender Submission/Auction Process 
The first price sealed bid auction format also worked reasonably well. Economic 
evaluation of the Catchment Care trial results suggests that significant efficiencies 
were achieved. There was no evidence of collusion or other nefarious processes. 
The introduction of reserve prices may enhance the efficiency in future auction 
rounds. This format of auction seems to be well suited to the auctioning of 
conservation contracts. There may be incremental benefits to be gained from using a 
Vickrey auctions although this needs to be tested. 
7.3.5 Cooperation, Site Connectivity, and Synergy 
Many landscape processes occur over space and involve horizontal flows of matter 
and energy. This is especially the case with the two natural resource management 
objectives of interest here - biodiversity and water quality. There are many ecological 
processes that operate in a spatial context including species migration and 
recruitment, metapopulation functioning and so forth. Several processes of 
degradation also occur within a spatial context including weed invasion and feral 
predation. These processes are dependent upon the landscape scale context of 
sites. Hydrological processes are also spatially explicit. Hydrological systems are 
based on flows within the catchment and direct linkages occur between the 
catchment and the watercourse and between upstream and downstream 
watercourses.  
Thus, a number of external processes can influence the value and threat character 
scores of a site. Conversely, a number of processes occurring on a proposed site can 
affect other sites. Ideally, the value and threat scores as well as the threat reduction 
expected from landholder actions should be assessed within the broader landscape 
context as this may fundamentally affect the environmental outcomes of on-ground 
actions.  
For example, consider a site where a landholder proposes to undertake Weed 
Eradication works in a patch of high value remnant native vegetation that is adjacent 
to a patch of heavily weed infested vegetation. The success of these Weed 
Eradication actions is likely to be reduced if the weed problem in the adjacent 
vegetation is not addressed as the potential is high for weeds from the adjacent block 
to re-invade the proposed site. In this case it would be beneficial to be able to factor 
in spatial linkages in site assessment and bid evaluation and even to encourage  
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cooperative bids where both landholders could be contracted to remove weeds from 
the whole patch.  
Another example to illustrate this point involves erosion and sedimentation. Consider 
a site experiencing minor bed or bank erosion which receives a low risk score and 
hence a low environmental benefits score for any action addressing it. However, let’s 
say that the hydrological characteristics of the reach results in the sedimentation of a 
high value riparian habitat 2 kilometres downstream. Thus, the erosion problem may 
not have severe implications for the site itself but the off-site sedimentation impact 
may be high. Again, consideration of spatial processes would be beneficial as they 
would have increased the priority of erosion mitigation action at this hypothetical site. 
Processes involving spatial linkages were not able to be successfully incorporated in 
the Catchment Care trial because off-site causes and impacts were too difficult to 
robustly assess given the time and resource constraints. In addition, off-site causes 
cannot be addressed by landholder actions. 
The problem of off-site causes and impacts has been identified by Stoneham and 
Chaudhri (2000) and has not yet been successfully addressed in auctions for 
conservation contracts. Taylor et al. (2004) trialled all-or-nothing group contracts for 
cooperative voluntary non-point source pollution reductions using experimental 
auctions. Parkhurst et al. (2002) examined the use of incentives to encourage 
cooperation towards the best landscape goals in auctions. 
Windle et al. (2005) has made some progress towards cooperative bidding amongst 
landholders. Windle et al. (2005) tested a group bidding process and a 2-stage 
bidding process for their ability to encourage landholders to cooperate in the building 
of wildlife corridors which spanned multiple properties in an experimental or game 
type workshop setting. The first format involved landholders with adjoining properties 
developing a bid for establishing a vegetation corridor but the bid price for each 
landholder remained private. The second format involved an initial individual bid by 
landholders to create a corridor across their property. Landholders were then given 
the chance to submit a second bid with incentives for actions contributing to efficient 
corridor creation and they were shown information about all initial bids and how they 
might enhance them. 
Windle et al. (2005) found that both formats were successful in engendering 
cooperative bids between landholders to fulfil landscape or regional goals. 
Implementation of a competitive/cooperative auction setting for conservation 
contracts can offer significant and synergistic environmental benefits. In this case, the 
benefits of multiple actions done cooperatively towards a landscape or regional goals 
are worth more than the sum of the individual actions.  
However, for multiple objective outcome auctions such as Catchment Care, the 
identification of landscape scale geographic and process linkages is not trivial. A 
substantial number of bidders are required to generate competition and allocative 
efficiency at auction. These can be located anywhere in the landscape. Each 
combination of 2 or more landholders can have any number of process linkages 
between them. Add to this the fact that bidder behaviour in a competitive auction with 
a cooperation mandate is unknown. The problem quickly becomes very complex with 
the number of linkages, potential points of cooperation and human behaviour.  
Nonetheless, the problem is not intractable and may be tackled in the following way. 
Firstly, the underlying spatial connectivity of environmental processes needs to be  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 134  
quantified. For example, we need to be able to analyse for each bid all other potential 
linkages for biodiversity processes and hydrological linkages. This will involve setting 
objectives and doing some spatial process modelling to quantify the linkages. We can 
then use an optimisation framework to select bids that optimise landscape of regional 
goals. Formal bidder behaviour analysis is required for this competitive/cooperative 
auction environment in order to design the most efficient auction format. This could 
profitably be conducted before any future roll out of the Catchment Care auction 
system to the larger Mt. Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide NRM region. The trade-
off involved with incorporating spatial linkages in bid selection lies in the greatly 
increased complexity of the bid selection algorithm. This kind of increase in algorithm 
sophistication would need to be closely coupled with simulation and sensitivity 
analysis which facilitates a clear understanding of the algorithm behaviour. 
7.3.6 Quality Assurance 
It became apparent during the process of the site assessment that the good 
intentions of landholder were not always matched by practical ability or technical 
understanding in relation to best watercourse management practices. In a number of 
cases, field officers were not satisfied that the landholder either had the practical 
experience or history of involvement that would allow the Board to feel secure in their 
investment on the landholder’s property. Further, the implementation of inappropriate 
watercourse management techniques or insensitive practices could actually lead to 
further degradation, particularly in sensitive sites. Without an appropriate level of 
confidence in the landholder’s ability in watercourse management, the Board needs 
to question whether rehabilitation objectives could be met by landholders.  
To reduce the risk of the Board to under-performance and enhance quality 
assurance, it is recommended that an additional character assessing landholder 
ability and commitment be included in the bid selection algorithm. This character 
would need to be carefully constructed in order to reduce subjectivity and ensure fair 
treatment of the landholders. 
7.3.7 Site Selection 
In some cases, the inexperience of landholders in watercourse management resulted 
in the misdirection of management focus towards low priority areas at the expense of 
high priority areas. For example, some landholders considered that watercourse 
reaches with high densities of invasive weeds were a higher priority for works than 
relatively intact reaches with few invasive weeds. 
While selection of the proposed area for works is the ultimate responsibility of the 
landholder, it is recommended that field officers impress upon landholders the need 
to work in areas of higher priority on their property. This should extend to the officer 
identifying higher priority reaches on participating properties in order that they are 
considered in the Site Action Plan. 
In general, the field officer will have the ability to identify higher priority reaches. This 
has the dual effect of achieving high priority biodiversity and water quality outcomes 
for the Board and increasing the landholder’s chances of success in receiving 
funding.  
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7.3.8 Monitoring 
One of the sources of risk on behalf of the Board involved in funding landholder on-
ground works is quality assurance and monitoring the success or otherwise of 
specific actions. Monitoring can provide useful information over time about the 
reasons for success and failure of landholder actions. Monitoring could be done 
using digital photographs of each proposed site during the site visit and engage the 
Universities seeking research students to quantify the ecological and environmental 
success or otherwise of landholder actions. Significant insights may be gained into 
the success or failure of various actions and this information may be useful for 
modification of the funding rules, priorities, contracting, and best practice guidelines. 
In the future, the GIS database will also form an invaluable record of the restoration 
and protection actions funded by the Board and when cross-referenced against new 
aerial photography, may also be used to evaluate the success or otherwise of each 
action. The Site Assessment Sheet and Site Action Plan may also be used for 
evaluation, as a baseline for monitoring, and as an indicator of success at the end of 
the funding period 
7.3.9 Efficiency Improvements 
A number of areas were identified in the Catchment Care trial where improvements in 
the efficiency of the processes could be made. These revolve around the 
development of an automated and integrated database to store, manage and analyse 
data and are discussed below. 
An Access database could be developed to fully integrate the Catchment Care data 
and analysis requirements. This would streamline the processes of data entry and 
storage, and bid selection and ranking. A prototype database was developed after 
the Catchment Care trial (Figure 31). It is essentially an electronic amalgamation of 
the site assessment sheet, threat reduction sheet and tender selection algorithm. 
This database is an extension to previous work undertaken by the Board and builds 
upon the Watercourse Management Assistance Database and Water course Priority 
Setting Tool. The database provides the field officer with the opportunity to add the 
landholder’s details, character scores and costs for each site proposed. The 
environmental benefits per dollar are then automatically calculated.  
The database also provides the field officer with a readily accessible record of all 
landholders, details, character scores, areas and costs. If this management tool were 
to be used for future iterations of the process then it would be worth considering 
increasing the scope of this database to allow the officer to add the proposed actions 
and current status of the project as a means of tracking project progress. Digital 
photos may also be stored in the database. The Board should also consider linking 
this database to the GIS database for ease of mapping and a quick method for 
finding the map of a particular site.  
The database can be seamlessly linked to the GIS and can then store all types of 
information linked to each property including mapping layers, records, photos, 
recommended actions, Site Action Plan etc. Textual information might be stored in 
another Microsoft Office program format such as Word or Excel and linked to the 
database. This would result in a complete record of each bid and make the data 
accessible from a single location.   
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Bid management processes could be further enhanced by the provision of the 
landholder’s land parcel ID. The parcel ID is the property folio number and lot 
number. This ID uniquely identifies a property and is used in the GIS cadastral layer 
in the same manner. Having this ID will reduce the need for Board officers to search 
the GIS cadastral database to find each property and allow for greater automation of 
the process. The parcel ID should be added to the proposed Access database similar 
to the one developed after the trial. The parcel ID can be used to retrieve the 
landholders address and generate an automatic mail out of letters to interested 
landholders.  
Field officers could be provided with GPS units and digital cameras to accurately 
locate control points and points of specific interest to improve mapping efficiency and 
maintain a photographic record of the sites progress. These GPS points and the 
digital photos can be added to the database. Digital photographs can be taken at 
different time periods to track the progress and success of on-ground works. Field 
officers could also be provided with hand held computers (e.g. Palm Pilots) with the 
Access database and ArcPad. Areas can be mapped in the field directly into the 
database via the hand held computer and uploaded to the main database back at the 
Board.   
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Figure 31 – Screen shot of the Access database interface developed as a prototype for 
Catchment Care.   
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Such an integrated database system is well within the capability of existing off-the-
shelf technology and software. It has potential to add significant enhancements to the 
Catchment Care protocols and processes. Efficiencies would not only include saving 
time and effort especially in the labour-intensive site assessment process but also in 
increasing the ability to input, store, manage, retrieve, visualise, analyse and 
compare bid data.  
7.4 Questionnaire and Feedback 
As part of the evaluation of the Catchment Care trial, a questionnaire was developed 
and mailed out to all participants in the trial to evaluate their levels of satisfaction and 
understanding of the process. Questionnaires were designed and stratified to enable 
comparison of the attitudes of landholders to the Catchment Care program that have 
been successful in obtaining funding, unsuccessful at obtaining funding, and those 
that withdrew from the program (Appendix H). To do this, three slightly different 
questionnaires were developed to suit the successful, unsuccessful, and withdrawn 
groups. In order to alleviate concern about discrimination based on their responses to 
the questionnaire, landholders were given the opportunity to divulge or conceal their 
identity at their discretion.  
A total of 42 questionnaires were sent out and landholders were given six weeks to 
complete and return them. At the end of that six week period 21 questionnaires were 
completed and returned (a 50 % return rate). Of those 21 questionnaires returned, 10 
(59%) of the successful applicants were returned, 4 (33.3%) of the unsuccessful 
applicants were returned and 7 (54%) of those who chose to withdraw from the trial 
were returned. The results of the survey have been collated and summarised to 
outline the general responses to different aspects of the Catchment Care trial. Where 
the question asked for a yes/no type of response the results are presented in 
percentages. Where the question asked the participants to rate their responses the 
results are presented as an average response. In situations where a question does 
not apply to a particular group (i.e. those who withdrew from the trial) the averages 
were based only on the results from the appropriate group(s). Table 31 below 
summarises the results. 
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 Very  Poor    OK    Very  Good 
Response colour guide  1 to 2  2 to 3  3  3 to 4  4 to 5 
          
Question Successful  Unsuccessful  Withdrawn  Totals 
Yes 100%  75%  57%  81% 
No   0%  0%  0%  0% 
1. Did you read the background material provided? 
Some 0% 25%  43%  19% 
If No or Some please indicate why         
   Too Much Information  N/A 100%  66.30%  75% 
   Didn't Understand it/ Confusing  N/A 0% 0%  0% 
   No Time  N/A 0%  33.30%  25% 
   Did Not Apply to my Situation  N/A 0% 0%  0% 
If Yes How did you find it         
   Informative/ Useful  90%  100%  100%  94% 
   Difficult to understand  0%  0%  0%  0% 
   Too much  10%  0%  0%  6% 
   No help  0%  0%  0%  0% 
2. How would you rate your understanding of watercourse and 
remnant vegetation management issues prior to your involvement 
in this trial 
3.6  3  3.9  3.6 
3.  Did you find the visit informative/useful  4  2.75  N/A  3.6 
4. Were you happy with the level of advice you received during 
the trial?  4.5  3  N/A  4.1 
4. How well do you believe you were informed of how the trial 
works and what would be required of you?  4.1  3  3.6  3.7 
5. Do you feel you were made fully aware that you would be 
competing against other landholders for limited funding?  4.6  3.5  4.7  4.4 
Yes 100%  75%  71.50%  86%  6. Do you feel you were treated fairly? 
No   0%  25%  28.50%  14% 
7. Did the background material in the Landholder Information 
Pack help you develop your Site Action Plan?  4  3  N/A  3.7 
8. Please rate the ease in which you completed your Site Action 
Plan  3.1  2.75  N/A  3 
9. Do you think the Landholder Information Pack provided will 
help you implement your Site Action Plan?  3.6  2.75  N/A  3.4 
10. How much support did you receive from your Catchment Care 
Officer when developing your Site Action Plan?  4  3  N/A  3.7 
Yes 30%  N/A  N/A 30% 
No   10%  N/A  N/A 10% 
11. Would you have implemented your Site Action 
Plan if you had not received funding? 
Some 60% N/A  N/A 60% 
Yes  N/A 25% N/A 25% 
No   N/A 25% N/A 25% 
12. Will you implement the actions in your Site 
Action Plan even though you have not received 
funding? 
Some  N/A 50% N/A 50% 
13. Would you participate if you had to attend occasional land 
management workshops?  3.5  3.75  3.3  3.5 
14. Do you expect to expand your works into other areas of your 
property in the future?  4.1  3.5  N/A  3.9 
15. Do you feel this process has made you more aware of the 
environmental issues affecting your property and the local area?  3.5  3.5  2.7  3.2 
16. Has the trial increased your enthusiasm to undertake 
environmental restoration works?  3.7  3  2.9  3.3 
17. Please rate your satisfaction with the level of ongoing support 
to date?  4  N/A  N/A  4 
Table 31 – Summary of the landholder questionnaire responses. 
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7.4.1 Successful Applicants 
Of the ten responses received from the successful applicants, all indicated that they 
read the information provided to them and 90% found it to be useful and informative. 
One landholder found the background information to be too much. On average, 
successful landholders felt that the level of information, support and advice they 
received was good to very good, and all of them felt they were treated fairly. On 
average, successful landholders considered themselves to have a good knowledge 
of NRM issues prior to the trial and considered that the Catchment Care trial process 
has increased their awareness of these issues (average response was 3.5).   
7.4.2 Unsuccessful Applicants 
Of the 12 landholders who were unsuccessful in their applications for funding under 
Catchment Care only 4 responded to the questionnaire. The results need to be 
interpreted with caution given this limited response rate. Of the four that responded, 3 
indicated that they read all of the background material and found it useful and 
informative. One unsuccessful landholder only read some of the background material 
suggesting that it provided too much information to get through. On average, the 
unsuccessful applicants were indifferent regarding the level of advice and support 
they received. These landholders also thought that their knowledge of natural 
resource management issues prior to the trial was reasonable.  
Of concern is the fact that, on average, unsuccessful landholders felt that the site visit 
was not very informative and/or useful. They also considered that completing the Site 
Action Plan was not easy, and the landholder information pack was not very helpful 
when attempting to complete it. A number of the unsuccessful applicants (75%) 
received site visits from the contracted field officers. This raises an important issue 
regarding the use of contractors in site assessment. Field officers need to have a 
high level of knowledge of the local trial area to provide an equivalent level of support 
as that provided by Board staff that are experienced with local environments and 
issues. 
Unsuccessful applicants expressed the greatest willingness to participate in land 
management workshops of all the groups surveyed. This willingness to attend 
workshops, the difficulty expressed in understanding and completing the Site Action 
Plan and the general dissatisfaction with the level of support and advice suggests 
that the unsuccessful applicants may be less knowledgeable about natural resource 
management and feel that this disadvantaged them in the process. It is also 
reasonable to assume two possible causes for the level of dissatisfaction expressed 
by the unsuccessful landholders. The level of support that successful landholders 
found adequate may have been insufficient to assist those less knowledgeable in 
NRM and therefore these landholders may require a greater level of support than 
was provided. 
7.4.3 Withdrawn Applicants 
A total of 13 landholders chose to withdraw from the trial and, of those, 7 responded 
to the questionnaire. Of these 7 responses, 57% said they read the background 
material and 43% said they only read some. Of those that read the background 
material all indicated that they found it useful and informative. Two thirds of the  
CSIRO Land and Water     Page 141  
withdrawn applicants who only read some of the background material suggested that 
there was too much information and the other third felt they had no time to read it all. 
When asked to rate their understanding of natural resource management issues in 
their local area the withdrawn applicants return the highest average response (3.9) of 
the three groups. Unfortunately they also returned the lowest average responses 
when asked if the trial has improved their knowledge of NRM issues and whether it 
has increased their enthusiasm to undertake NRM works. The withdrawn applicants 
were not asked how they felt about the level of advice offered to them or how they felt 
about the site visit. In retrospect this group should have asked these questions in 
order to fully evaluate where the trial educational performance has failed. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this MBI Pilot Program project was to develop the Catchment Care 
auction system for the more efficient distribution of Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board funds for on-ground NRM works by landholders. The focus of the 
auction was to encourage cost effective private restoration and protection works that 
enhance biodiversity and water quality in the Onkaparinga catchment. Catchment 
Care includes processes and protocols developed for the scoring, ranking and 
selection of landholder bids and formal auction rules and contracting protocols 
designed to maximise the allocative efficiency of Board funds for on-ground works.  
The Catchment Care auction trial has demonstrated that auctions can be effective in 
increasing the cost effectiveness of funds for on-ground NRM works. We compare 
Catchment Care with previous devolved grant scheme used by the Board (WMAP) 
and consider development, implementation and funding costs. Moving to an auction 
system from a devolved grant scheme is likely to cost a minimum of $100,000. 
However, once in place, we estimate that the auction system is between 23 – 34% 
more cost effective than WMAP. It is likely that the auction is even more cost 
effective than other less sophisticated devolved grant schemes. There is however, 
some uncertainty surrounding this estimate both in estimating the cost effectiveness 
of Catchment Care and WMAP. 
Computer-based simulation was used to test the processes and protocols before the 
trial. This analysis was essential in identifying weak points especially in the behaviour 
of the bid selection algorithm which were difficult to predict. Simulation facilitated a 
clear understanding of the algorithm behaviour and enabled weaknesses to be 
corrected before the trial.  
In conducting the trial significant learnings were made regarding elements of the 
auction process: 
Step 1 – Catchment Care Promotion – Significant interest in the trial was generated 
by promotional activities to create a competitive market for NRM contracts and 29 
bids were received by the Board. By far the most effective promotion was by direct 
mailing. A comprehensive suite of information was provided to the landholders to 
support bid development. This aided landholders in making an informed bid, in 
targeting high priority actions, and reduced the risk to the Board of 
underperformance. Information about the specifics of bid selection was withheld to 
minimise bid shading. Getting the correct balance of information provision so as to 
adequately inform bids without enabling bid shading is one of the most time 
consuming but important aspects of the trial. 
Step 2 – Site Visit and Assessment – Sites were assessed and scored according to 
their environmental value and threat scores as specified in the Catchment Care site 
assessment protocols. The suite of characters provided a useful basis for bid ranking 
and selection using the risk analysis framework in the trial. However, experience from 
the trial suggests that a major revision of most of the site assessment parameters 
would benefit future rounds. Most characters could be improved but the most 
important modification involves combining the Weed % Cover and Invasive Weed 
Presence threats into a single threat character to negate the bias towards bids 
involving Weed Eradication actions.  
The character set could be profitably expanded to include other objectives such as 
environmental flows, groundwater/aquifer recharge and other NRM objectives of  
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interest to the Board. In addition, an important complement to the existing local scale 
site assessment would be to include a systematic regional scale priority assessment. 
This would directly complement other work being done in the region (Bryan et al. 
2005, Crossman and Bryan in review) and directly address regional natural resource 
management targets. 
Step 3 – Site Action Plan Development – In the Catchment Care trial landholders 
were recommended certain actions in certain sites by the Board. Landholders were 
able to modify these actions/sites as they saw fit and submit their bid. It was 
considered that this left too much scope for landholders to bid for actions that were 
not high priority, or incorrectly conducted, sequenced or located. In future rounds 
there will be less scope for modification of the recommended actions and sites by 
landholders. It is also recommended that the method of defining the area of actions 
be revised, especially in quantifying the area over which the Dams and Off-Takes 
threat is reduced. 
Step 4 – Bid Submission and Auction Process – The first price sealed bid auction 
format worked well and significant efficiencies were achieved. Bids did not seem to 
be systematically shaded high and there was no evidence of collusion. 
Step 5 – Bid Assessment – The risk analysis framework enables bids to be ranked 
on the priority of the site as calculated according to risk, the reduction in threats 
acting upon the site, the area over which the actions are conducted, and the cost to 
the Board of performing those actions. This framework is flexible and extensible and 
can easily cope with the increased complexity involved in extending the site 
assessment characters. It also allows for weighting different characters according to 
changing priorities. There is also scope for incorporating combinatorial or cooperative 
bidding into Catchment Care which capitalises on linkages and synergies between 
bids. 
Step 6 – Bid Selection and Contracting – Ranking and selection of the bids is 
straightforward once the cost effectiveness is calculated. Contracting was used in the 
trial to formally tie landholders into achieving milestones. Payments were staged and 
dependent upon meeting milestones. This was an important aspect of Catchment 
Care and substantially reduces the risk to the Board of underperformance. Further 
enhancements could include property right solutions which enhance the longer term 
outcomes of Board funded actions by formally carrying landholder obligations with 
the property title. 
 
We have been critical of the commonly used comparison of discriminative auctions 
for conservation contracts against uniform price auctions which overestimates the 
efficiency improvements of auctions in distribution funds for on-ground works. 
Assessment of the cost effectiveness of Catchment Care versus the Board’s previous 
grant program WMAP reveals that both programs have advantages and 
disadvantages. The great benefit of the auction system is that it is able to access 
some very inexpensive environmental benefits from landholders who do not require 
substantial funds to conduct on-ground works. However, the auction protocols do not 
enable access to the very highly priced environmental benefits by any other means 
than paying the bid price for them. Even with its inherent standard pricing, leverage of 
in-kind support and negotiation, the cost effectiveness of prices paid for these 
environmental benefits under WMAP is not as high as those elicited under the 
auction. WMAP does allow very highly priced environmental benefits to be accessed  
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through either negotiated price reduction or through leverage of in-kind contributions 
from the landholder. Whilst, this is a clear advantage of WMAP, these higher priced 
bid tend to offer the lowest amount of environmental benefits. Hence, the impact of 
accessing them in the case of WMAP, or conversely, the cost of missing out on them 
in the case of Catchment Care, is limited. 
One practical disadvantage of the auction process is that it can create workloads that 
cannot be covered by the human resources available to the Board. This could be 
remedied by extending the time taken for site assessment and the development of a 
continuous sign-up process to cater for more urgent actions and important sites, 
along the lines of the US Conservation Reserve Program. 
Where to from here? There is potential to refine (as discussed above) and expand 
the Catchment Care auction process from the pilot area in the Onkaparinga 
catchment to the new natural resource management administrative region – the Mt. 
Lofty Ranges and Greater Adelaide NRM region. The US Conservation Reserve 
Program is a much larger auction for conservation contracts and it has been very 
successful. The timing is good as it coincides with the merger of the existing 
Catchment Boards and other associated NRM agencies into the larger administrative 
unit. There is also a good opportunity to use the auction as a mechanism to directly 
address the stated regional natural resource management targets. Regular adoption 
and expansion of the auction system would be benefited by the introduction of 
monitoring techniques into the site assessment protocols. Significant improvements 
in efficiencies could be gained by the integration of more automated procedures and 
the use of database and other technologies.   
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